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ABSTRACT
The A m erican Indian Religious Freedom Act has proven to be a terrible
disappointm ent for the Indians all across the country. This act presupposed an analogy
betw een Native American ceremonial practices and Euro-American religions, but Native
Am erican ceremonies involve a broader range social institutions than Euro-A m erican
"religion." Hence, the analogy between Indian ceremonies and Euro-American religions
broke down after passage of the act, and Indians failed to receive the legal rem edies sought
under its provisions. The following is an attempt to address the problems associated with
this act by examining the historical development o f a Native American rhetoric o f religious
freedom in the twentieth-century.
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Introduction.
W hereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a governm ent
denying individuals the right to practice their religion and, as a result, has benefited from a
rich variety of religious heritages in this country;
Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskan and
Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradition and heritage, such practices forming
the basis of Indian identity and value systems;
Whereas the traditional American Indian religions, as an integral part of Indian life, are
indispensable and irreplaceable; ^
-Preamble to the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution of 1978.
The preamble to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act treats religion not only as
of intrinsic worth, but as a central element of Indian culture, emphasizing the dual values o f
strengthening Indian personal identity and of enriching the larger society through diversity.
. . W hile stressing cultural distinctiveness, the Act places Indian religion in the context o f
universal values, term ing the exercise of traditional practices an 'inherent right,' and
asserting that Indian practices should be accorded the respect due all religions.^
-Ellen M. W. Sewell, "The American Indian Religious Freedom Act."
The American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution of 1978 emerged during a time
of heightened public concern for ethnic and cultural diversity.^ This resolution affirm ed
that the United States would follow policies protecting the religious freedom of "traditional"
Native American religions, and it directed the executive branch to evaluate federal policies
in light of this r e s o lu tio n T h e resolution was signed into law on August 11th, 1978,
(after which it became generally known as the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, or
the AIRFA). Sewell argues above that the preamble to the AIRFA appeals to notions o f
both universal value and cultural diversity. This conjunction of two very different abstract

^Preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
2 Ellen M. W. S ew ell, "The American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Arizona Law Review. 25 (1983)
431. (Footnotes have been omitted, as has a quotation taken from sections of the preamble itself.)
^Sewell, 30
'^The American Indian Religious Freedom. 469-70.
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values shaped the distinctive nature of interests advanced through appeal to the AIRFA.
The difference between these values remained, however, largely in the background of
dialogue throughout the history of the act. The text of the AIRFA itself made it easy to
speak as if maintaining the integrity of Indian culture(s) and preserving individual freedom
of conscience could be embodied in the same notion. Both principles were subsumed under
the rubric of "religious freedom," but this marriage of rhetorical themes continually came
apart in the process of implementation. Not surprisingly, the AIRFA came to be something
of a disappointment to Indians all over the United States.
Throughout the nineteen-eighties Indian activists appealed to the AIRFA in
conjunction with the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to support a variety of
legal interests, (e.g. access to sacred sites, ceremonial harvesting o f endangered species,
rights to distinctive fashions of bodily adornm ent, control of cultural artifacts, and
protection of burial sites and ancestral rem ains). W hile an appeal to both the First
Am endment and the AIRFA may appear to contain redundant references to the same
abstract principle of religious freedom, each o f these references actually invoked a different
sense o f the social context implicit within that principle. The sense of "religious freedom"
informing the AIRFA could not be understood apart from the legal history of Indian-white
relations, nor could it be understood apart from the culturally specific interests of Native
Americans. Its preamble includes as attempt to model the value o f cultural diversity as a
secondary benefit o f individual freedom (thus voicing James Madison's famous argument
Federalist Ten), but many o f the cultural values addressed within the act simply could not
be understood in these terms.^ Hence, the AIRFA borrowed from the language o f the First
Amendment, but it infused that language with a set o f values tied closely to a working
relationship between the federal government and Native American tribes. In keeping with

5See James Madison, "The Federalist," Number 10, American State Papers. The Federalist. J. S. M ill.
Volume 43, Great Books o f the Western World, ed., Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago, London,
Toronto: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1952) 49-53 passim.
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that working relationship the federal government asserted an interest in Native American
religion quite different than that implied by concepts of individual freedoms. Under the
AIRFA the rhetoric o f "religious freedom" implied a broad range of cultural interests not
norm ally associated with the First Amendment. This conjunction of appeal to religious
freedom and cultural diversity under the AIRFA constituted a unique rhetorical stance in the
history o f Indian-white relations, playing on subtle features o f the public imagination as
well as technical facets of the American legal system.
Through the AIRFA Congress explicitly linked notions of religious freedom to
aspects o f Indian culture which policy-makers would normally have dealt with in secular
term s. Few of the interests advanced under the AIRFA met with com plete success,
however; and with the determination of the Lvng (1988) and Smith (1990) cases by the
U.S. Supreme Court, the working rationale behind AIRFA litigation became untenable. In
the interim Native Americans could plausibly generate a distinct set of legal arguments in
favor of mandatory accommodation for the aforementioned practices in the event that they
conflicted with federal policies. Many of these claims involved a novel sense of the right of
free exercise. The prospect that matters of free exercise could be implicated in general
policy guidelines involving federal management of public lands, for example, seemed
counter-intuitive to many schooled in free exercise jurisprudence. The prospect certainly
struck Justice O 'Conner as absurd, and the majority opinion she w rote in L vng v.
Northwest Indian Cemeterv Protective Association (1988) effectively brought the prospect
o f sacred site litigation to a close.^ The AIRFA linked other aspects of federal policy to
novel questions of free exercise, and for a time this encouraged a host of unusual litigation
strategies. All told, those active in the struggle for Native American rights enjoyed a unique
set o f strategic options from the passage of the AIRFA in 1978 to the decision of

^Lyng

V.

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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Employment Division. Department of Health and Human Resources o f Oregon, et al. v.
Smith et al. in 1990.
The AIRFA has in fact led to some positive developments for Native American
rights. Simply by laying the groundwork for dialogue about a broad range of subjects, the
act has played a role in shaping public opinion, in transforming certain aspects of federal
policy, and in generating the rationale for subsequent legislation dealing with sim ilar
issues.^ Yet, the consensus of opinion about the AIRFA remains that the act has generally
proven to be ineffective.^ Perhaps this can be attributed to an unrealistic set of expectations
regarding what was essentially no more than a joint resolution by Congress and the

^E.g. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. Statutes at Large. 104,3048 (1990);
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Statutes at Large. 107, 1488 (1993); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994. Statutes at Large. 108, 3125 (1994).
See also, "Repatriation Act Protects Native American Burial Remains and Artifacts," NARF Legal
Review. 16 (Winter, 1990) \-A passim-, James E. Wood, Jr., "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,"
Journal o f Church and State. 33 (1991) 63-19 passim; Kristin L. Boyles, "Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989
Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Cornell Law Review. (July, 1991)
1117-1149 passim
8See Kristin L. Boyles, 1117-1149 passim; Celia Byler, "Free Access or Free Exercise?: A Choice Between
Mineral Development and American Indian Sacred Site Preservation on Public Lands," Connecticut Law
Review. 22 (1990) 416-420; Ward Churchill and Glenn T. Morris, "Key Indian Laws and Cases," The State
of Native America: Genocide. Colonization, and Resistance, ed. M. Annette Jaimes, Race and Resistance
Series, (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1992) 17; Vine Deloria, God is Red: A Native View of
Religion. (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing: 1994) 268; Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle,
American Indians. American Justice. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983) 237-239; Walter EchoHawk, "Loopholes in Religious Liberty: The Need for Federal Protection of Worship for Native People,"
American Indian Religions. 1 (Winter, 1994) 5-16passim; Charlotte Frisbie. Navaio Medicine Bundles or
Jish: Acquisition. Transmission, and Disposition in the Past and Present. (Albuquerque: University o f New
Mexico Press, 1987) 371-389; Paul E. Lawson and Jennifer Scholes, "Jurisprudence, Peyote and the Native
American Church," American Indian Culture and resource Journal. 10 (1986) 21; Ira C. Lupu, "Where
Rights Begin: The Problem o f Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion," Harvard Law Review. 102
(March, 1989) 946n; Robert S. Michaelsen, "Is the Miner's Canary Silent? Implications of the Supreme
Court's Denial o f American Indian Free Exercise o f Religion Claims," Journal of Law and Religion. 6
(1988) 97-98,105-106; Patrick T. Noonan, "Mining Desecration and the Protection o f Indian Sacred Sites:
A Lesson in First Amendment Hurdling," Public Land and Resources Law Digest. 27 (1990) 317-321;
Sharon O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments. (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989) 90; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights o f Indian Tribes: The Basic ACLU Guide to Indian and
Tribal Rights. Second edition. An American Civil Liberties Union Handbook, ed. Norman Dorson,
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992) 230-231; Steve Talbot,
"Desecration and American Indian Religious Freedom," Journal of Ethnic Studies. 12 (1985) 14-15;
Christopher Vecsey, ed.. Handbook o f American Indian Religious Freedom. (New York: Crossroad, 1991)
passim; John R. Wunder, "Retained bv the People": A History of American Indians and the Bill o f Rights.
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 193-199.
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presidency. But the full significance o f the AIRFA could not have been known at the time
o f its passage, and as with any legal conflict, a good deal of the AIRFA's implications were
actually generated after the fact through debates which were ostensibly about its "real"
meaning.
AIRFA Case History: A Record of Disappointments.
Soon after passage of the AIRFA a disparity emerged between the expectations of
Indian activists and the policy provisions entertained by Federal agencies concerned with its
implementation. Naturally the disparity between Indian activists and policy-m akers led to
extensive litigation. At the time o f the AIRFA's passage some Native A m ericans were
already involved in free exercise litigation. A collection of Navajos sought to enjoin the
N ational Park Service to accommodate their ceremonial interests in Rainbow Bridge
N ational M onument, and Cherokee litigants sought to prevent construction o f the Tellico
Dam (of Snail Darter fame) which would soon flood lands sacred to their own tribe. After
passage o f the AIRFA the Indian litigants in each of these disputes simply added AIRFA
claims to their ongoing cases, but each o f their respective claims ended in defeat.^ The
D istrict Court o f South Dakota then drew on these precedents in denying Lakota and
Tsistsistas claims relating to management of the Bear Butte State Park in the Black Hills, as
did United States Court of Appeals in its rejection o f Hopi and Navajo efforts to block
expansion o f a ski resort in the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona. *0 The district court of
A rizona further denied free exercise and AIRFA relief to Navajo p lain tiffs forcibly
relocated as a result o f the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act.* i Thus, despite extensive

9See, Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah, C. D., 1977); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F. 2d.
172 (Tenth Circuit, 1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E. D. Tennessee,
N. D., 1979); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F. 2d 1159 (Sixth Circuit, 1980).
>OCrow V . Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D. South Dakota, 1982); WHson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (District
o f Columbia Circuit, 1983).
* *Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Arizona, 1989).
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litigation efforts the AIRFA did not generally improve the courts' willingness to back
Indian interests in sacred geography.
During the nineteen-eighties there were a few rulings which seemed promising from
the standpoint of Indian litigants. Three cases initially yielded favorable results for their
Indian claimants: New M exico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C.: United States v. Means:
and Northwest Coast Indian Cemeterv Protective Association v. Peterson. I n

1988,

however, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed N orthw est Coast C em etery Protective
A ssociation v. P eterso n . In this case, known as Lvng v. N orthw est Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, the Supreme Court ruled that the internal policies of a government
agency could not have posed a burden on any right o f free exercise.

Following this

Supreme Court ruling both M eans and the New M exico Navajo Ranchers Association lost
their respective cases in continued l i t i g a t i o n . T h e Lyng case had effectively ended the
prospect o f successful sacred site litigation, and thereby produced a chilling effect on
Indian attem pts to secure federal accom m odation for Indian interests in sacred
geography. 15
The case law dealing with federal game management includes a small number of
victories for Indian claimants, as well as a few losses. Many of the issues involved in cases
o f game management turned on questions about the specific details o f management policy.
Hence, questions about the facts of such cases generally overshadow ed debate over
abstract principles of religious freedom. Before passage of the AIRFA federal agents

l^New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 702 F. 2d 227 (District o f Columbia Circuit, 1983);
United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D. South Dakota, W.D. 1985), Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association v. Peterson, 764 F. 2d 581 (Ninth Circuit, 1985); Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association v. Peterson, 795 F. 2d 688 (Ninth Circuit, 1986).
l^Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
’"^United States v. Means, 858 F. 2d 404 (Eighth Circuit, 1988); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v.
I C C. 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. Circuit, 1988). See also Star Lake R. Co. v. Lujan, 737 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C.
1990).
*5cf. Sharon O'Brien, in Handbook. 35-40.
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successfully prosecuted members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe for sale of eagle feathers
under the Bald Eagle Protection Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently
rejected an appeal claiming that such actions infringed upon one defendant's right o f free
e x e rc ise .

In 1979, however, the Supreme C ourt of Alaska ruled in favor o f an

Athapaskan Indian who had killed a moose out of season for use in a funeral potlach.*^
This decision referred to the First Amendment and the written opinion did not mention the
AIRFA, but the case did seem promising to those who hoped to employ notions religious
freedom in the context o f Indian ceremonialism. The District Court of New M exico also
dismissed charges against a member of the Isleta Pueblo for possession of eagle parts in
violation o f the Bald eagle Protection Act. That court cited concerns over the defendants'
right o f free exercise as well as the terms of the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo.'® On the
other hand, courts upheld the confiscation o f bald eagle parts from Chippewa tribal
members in United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, and rejected the First Amendment
/ AIRFA appeal of an Indian claimant who had killed endangered birds for commercial gain
in United States v. D i o n . '^ M ost of these cases turn of details of game m anagement
policies. W ith the exception of Frank v. S tate, a case largely ignored or m isread by
subsequent courts, the cases dealing with endangered species and game management have
produced nothing that would constitute a clear principle o f case law connecting principles
of religious freedom to federal policies of game management.
The courts also dealt with a collection of AIRFA cases involving treatment of prison
inmates. Indian inmates gained favorable rulings over dress codes as well as access to
religious facilities and ceremonial authorities in three of these cases, Reinert v. Haas. Bear

'^U nited States v. Top Sky, 547 F. 2d 483 (Ninth Circuit, 1976).
'^Frank v. State, 604 P. 2d (Supreme Court o f Alaska, 1979).
'^U nited States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. (D. New Mexico, 1986).
'^U nited States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nevada, 1986); United States v.
Dion, 762 F. 2d 674 (Eighth Circuit, 1982).
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R ibs

V.

T a v lo r. and M arshno v. M cM annus.^Q In other cases, however, courts ruled

against mandatory accommodation for Indian rights of free exercise at both the district and
circuit levels, arguing that inmates' religious rights were over-raled by the security interests
o f prison regulations.^' The courts were thus split for some time on questions about
m andatory accommodation of religious freedom for prison inmates, including those of
Native Americans. In 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Islamic inmates in a New
Jersey prison, affirming the notion that deference to the disciplinary judgem ent of prison
authorities should override a prison inmates right of free exercise.22 This non-Indian case
effectively shut down any general prospects that Indian litigants could obtain mandatory
accommodation for their religious practices.
Some of the AIRFA-related cases are hard to classify. The Oneida Indian Nation,
for example, fought denial of federal recognition based in part on questions about the role
that attendance in a ceremony had played in preventing one of its members from signing the
necessary petitions. They lost the

c a s e .23

An Abneki Indian, Steven J. Roy, challenged a

Departm ent of Health and Human Services policy requiring that his daughter receive a
social security number in order to gain health benefits. Roy had argued that a social security
num ber would rob his daughter of her spirit, but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
internal policies o f the Social Security administration could not have imposed a burden on
either Roy's or his daughter's religious

b e lie f s .2 4

This rather unusual case involving the

details o f bureaucratic procedure would later provide the groundwork for the Lvng decision

20Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa, 1984); Bear Ribs v. Taylor, Civ. No. 77-3985RJK(G)
(C.D. California, 1979); Marshno v. McMannus, Case No. 79-3146 (D. Kansas, 1980).
2'Shabazz v. Bamauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712 (D. M.D. Florida, 1985); Indian Inmates of Nebraska
Penitentiary v. Grammar, 649 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Nebraska, 1986); Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F. 2d
1525 (Ninth Circuit, 1987).
22o'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 340 (1987).
23Oneida Indian Nation o f N.Y. v. Clark, 593 F. Supp. 257 (D. N.D. New York, 1984).
24Sowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
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in which the Supreme Court treated construction of a road through sacred lands as another
internal matter beyond the scope of the Free Exercise clause.
Native American ingestion of peyote posed a unique set of problems during the
years following passage o f the AIRFA. Indian interests in the use o f peyote seemed
generally secure throughout the nineteen-eighties, at least insofar as the practice took place
under the auspices of the Native American Church. This accommodation had actually been
reached long before passage of the AIRFA, and the Native American Church would not be
considered a "traditional" religion in many Native American communities. Hence, the right
to ingest peyote occupied a marginal role in the development of AIRFA policies and case
law. During the years immediately following passage o f the AIRFA, Indians limited their
peyote litigation to a defense of the special status given the Native American Church and its
Indian members.
In three separate cases various courts pointed to the AIRFA as evidence o f the
special interest taken by the federal government on behalf of Native American religion,
thereby effectively heading off attempts to use the Native American Church as a basis for a
general religious exemption for drug

u s e .2 5

in the 1990 case of Em ploym ent Division.

Department o f Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the Free Exercise clause could not be used to preclude the application o f criminal
laws, including those proscribing the use of peyote, unless such laws were clearly intended
to discrim inate against a given

r e lig io n .2 6

The Sm ith ruling effectively nullified long

standing Constitutional protections exempting Indian members of the Native American
Church from prosecution for ceremonial use of peyote.2? The ruling also signaled the

25peyote Way Church of God, Inc, v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632 (D. N.D. Texas, 1983); United States v.
Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D. North Dakota, 1984); United States v. Rush, 738 F. 2d 497 (First Circuit,
1984).
2^Employment Division, Department of Human Resources o f Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2?See People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Supreme Court o f California, 1964); State of Arizona v. Janice
and Fred ^ ittin g h a m , 504 P. 2d 950 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1971); George L. Whitehom v. State of
Oklahoma, 561 P. 2d 539 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 1975).
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10
Court's general unwillingness to extend any extra latitude to the religious practices of
Native Americans. Many have therefore read the Smith decision as a denial of the principles
associated with the AIRFA. The case subsequently led to new interest in legislation dealing
with the topic of Indian religious freedoms. Moreover, it is the Smith case itself which led
AIRFA proponents to link the interests of the Native American Church with the protection
of "traditional" Native American religions, a link that many Indians themselves themselves
had previously considered

im p la u s ib le .2 8

It is easy to look back on the history of AIRFA litigation and proclaim that the goals
pursued by various Indian activists were unrealistic in relation to the provisions o f the act
itself, but this is to transform a historical fact into a teleological principle. W hatever the
outcome of subsequent legal conflict the significance of the AIRFA remained in some sense
an open question until the Lyng and Sm ith decisions. In retrospect it is clear that the
AIRFA embodied an inconsistent set of principles. The principle of religious freedom could
not be stretched far enough to reach the interests advanced under the provisions o f the
AIRFA, and once fram ed as m atters o f religious freedom , courts were reluctant to
accommodate attempts to portray the act as something other than a restatement o f the same
principle implicit in the free exercise clause. Thus a significant part of the rationale behind
passage o f the AIRFA was lost on the courts, and the inconsistencies implicit within the
text o f the act rem ained largely in the background of the legal discourse following its
passage. Interested parties simply invoked alternative visions of the AIRFA based on
different ideological positions, each of which could be read into the text of the act itself. It
is only through the coercive authority of the Supreme Court that a given construction of the
AIRFA was finally determined. Moreover, it is only because the Supreme Court voiced an

28As a result the AIRFA was amended in 1994, providing for the use o f peyote in traditional Indian
religious practices. See, U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, vol. 140 (August 8, 1994) 7155-57;
U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 140 (September 27, 1994) 13433; U.S. Congress,
House o f Representatives, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments o f 1994. Report to
accompany H R. 4230, One hundred-third Congress, Second Session, House Report No. 103-675. (1994).
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ideological position of its own that the AIRFA acquired a more or less fixed meaning. So
long as the highest court in the land had not spoken clearly on the subject, Indian activists
had reason to hope for a broad interpretation o f the AIRFA. In the wake of the Lyng and
Sm ith decisions, however, little remains o f the AIRFA itself except a historical record of
disputes about its significance.

"Religion" and Native American Culture: Some Preliminarv Remarks.
Passage o f the AIRFA laid the groundwork for a particular kind o f argument in
which Native Americans could pursue a concrete interest by linking that interest to
generalized notions of their own cultural order. This strategy rested on an analogy between
the significance that a given legal interest would receive in a Native American culture and
the significance that it would receive within the relatively narrow category of EuroAmerican culture known as "religion". Under the AIRFA Native American practices of an
ostensibly religious nature (e.g. the taking of endangered species, hunting out o f season,
maintenance of religious artifacts, performance of ceremonies, conduct of burial rites, etc.)
would receive protection comparable to that o f a right of free exercise. The AIRFA also
brought the relatively narrow language o f "religious freedom" into the service o f a broader
public interest in Native Am erican "culture" - as such. The provisions o f the AIRFA
therefore applied to a potentially vast scope of legal subject matter. Yet, the AIRFA
addressed this broad range o f subject-matter by means of a term possessing a normally
restricted scope o f legal im plications. N ot surprisingly, AIRFA rhetoric consistently
stumbled over the difference between the significance that various Indian practices would
receive in Native American cultures and the significance made available through the EuroAmerican category o f "religion." The prospective success of the AIRFA therefore rested on
a tenuous analogy between Native and Euro-American cosmological systems and patterns
of social organization.
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It took the better part of this century to form the case for such an analogy in the
American popular consciousness, and the (in)ability to maintain it under the full weight of
law would prove a crucial stumbling block for interests advanced under the AIRFA. The
Taos Indians of New Mexico had successfully used an abstract appeal to religious freedom
in their efforts to reclaim Blue Lake, a natural feature long considered sacred by the tribe,
from control of the Forest Service (See chapter 2). The tribe had been fighting for control
o f Blue Lake and its watershed since 1906, and efforts to cast their interest in terms of
religious freedom evolved rather slowly along with changes in public opinion and federal
Indian policy. The success of the Taos campaign in 1970, however, generated a vast
number o f similar claims by various Indian peoples. Yet, the problems associated with
such an appeal could already be seen in the history of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of
1968. Congressional debates over the passage of the ICRA touched on significant cultural
differences betw een the m ajor categories o f tribal social organization and those
presupposed by Euro-American notions of civil rights (see chapter 3). Tribal courts had
already learned that placing Native American ritual practices under the heading of "religion"
offered a mixed set o f blessings.
Drawing the equation between any given feature o f Indian culture and the
significance of religious practices for Euro-Americans generally constitutes an artificial
narrowing of its cultural significance. The Euro-American category o f "religion" is
normally contrasted with notions of "politics," "economics," aesthetics," etc. Hence, this
Euro-American term presupposes a set of social divisions largely absent from Native
American culture. It is possible to define Euro-American notions of religion in contrast to
such institutions; but it is not really possible to contrast Indian religions from other aspects
of Indian society. Native American appeals to "religious" freedom have therefore generally
carried implications far beyond those normally contemplated under the First Amendment.
Moreover, such Indian claims do not emerge from conventional Euro-American sources of
religious discourse, written doctrines. This leaves them with an ambiguous source of
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motivation by the standards of First Amendment jurisprudence. This in turn has made it
easier forjudges to view Indian claims as though they were rooted in something other than
religion.29 So, theoretical problems associated with glossing various aspects of Indian
culture as "religious" matters led directly to mistrust of Native American claimants.30
The difference between various social institutions found in Native American
cultures and those presupposed by the legal principles o f religious freedom helped to give
rise to the AIRFA, as an attempt to redefine the legal basis for free exercise cases involving
Native Americans. Under the AIRFA a right of free exercise would constitute a kind of
positive government interest in keeping with federal trust doctrine rather than serving as a
limit on government interest to be exercised by individuals. According to trust doctrine, the
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal governm ent could be m odeled as a
relationship between ward and trustee (see chapter 1). During the nineteen-seventies,
moreover, federal authorities had begun to understand tribal authority in terms of the
distinct cultural patterns belonging to individual tribes, federal authorities therefore came to
express an interest in maintaining generally intangible features of Indian cultures as a means
of fulfilling its responsibilities to Indian tribes.
The rubric of "religion" helped to provide a category through which such interests
could be understood, but the governm ent interest at stake in fulfilling its trust
responsibilities remained nominally secular. Implementation o f federal trust responsibilities
under the AIRFA effectively grounded the right of free exercise in a working relationship
between governmental agencies rather than a theory about the natural rights of individual
Native Americans. W hereas the AIRFA seemed called on the courts to adopt a broad
interpretation o f "religion," this reflected an historical expansion o f federal trust
responsibilities as much as it did an expansion of the principle o f free exercise. As a

29cf. Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians. American Justice. 237-8; Frisbie, 371-2.
30cf. Robert S. Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation: Promise and Perils,"
The Journal o f Law and Religion. 3 (1985), 63-64.
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instrument of trust doctrine, the AIRFA engendered a practical subordination of individual
religious freedom to cultural relativism. This recontextualization of "religious freedom"
would, it was hoped, provide Native Americans with a device capable of extending the
significance of this phrase to aspects of their own culture which would never have received
such protection under the First Amendment.
Congressional efforts to recontextualize the significance o f religious freedom
through the AIRFA were frustrated by bureaucratic attem pts to read it as a sim ple
restatem ent of the Free Exercise Clause (see chapter 4). The Carter administration,
responsible for signing the bill, and various federal agencies responsible for its
implementation generally treated the AIRFA as a moral equivalent to the Free Exercise
clause. M ost o f the courts hearing AIRFA cases seem to have followed their lead,
effectively blocking attempts to recast questions about the governm ent stance toward
relevant Indian practices in terms o f trust doctrine. This effectively returned questions about
the legal viability of Native American interest in religious freedom to the standards o f free
exercise jurisprudence in effect prior to its passage. Having thus framed the legal context of
AIRFA cases in terms of conventional free exercise doctrines, the courts naturally rejected
each of the unusual claims advanced through its provisions. Hence, the abstract appeal to
an American sense of "religious freedom" which made the AIRFA possible also rendered it
generally ineffective.

AIRFA Scholarship: The Pragmatic Limitations of Cultural Awareness.
The unravelling of the AIRFA has been well documented by previous scholars and
activists. Scholarship on the AIRFA typically dealt with themes about the differences
between Native American religious practices and those o f a predominantly Christian public.
Native Am erican perspectives on the environment provided a favorite theme for such
scholarship. Peter Nabokov, for example, explained the religious significance that the
American landscape held for Native Americans and provided an abstract commentary on the
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role that this played in Indian-white relations.^' Daniel McCool provided a detailed case
study of Papago interest in a particular sacred Mountain, called

" B a b o q u iv a ri." 3 2

Such

work helped to illustrate the vast differences between Native and Euro-American religious
practices, effectively underscoring the need for unusual mechanisms of free exercise
protection relating to Indian interests in the environment.
Other scholars attempted to relate the significance of the American landscape
directly to legal disputes associated with the

A I R F A .3 3

Sarah Gordon, for example, related

the inability of AIRFA claimants to secure their free exercise right over land claims to
deficiencies in case law, a problem which in turn stemmed from the displacement o f an
Am erican public from the Jewish and Christian holy

la n d s .3 4

The absence o f such

mainstream sacred geography in the American landscape has facilitated the assumption that
land may be dealt with exclusively in economic terms. After the Lvng case in 1988, a host

3 'Peter Nabokov, "America As Holy Land," North Dakota Quarterly. 48 (Autumn, 1980) 9-20 passim.
32oaniel McCool, "The Sacred Mountains of the Papago Indians," Journal o f Ethnic Studies. 9 (Fall,
1981) 57-69 passim.
33E.g. Cynthea Thorley Andreason, "Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of
Religion Cases," Utah Law Review. (1984) 313-336 passim; Celia Byler, 397-435 passim; Mark S.
Cohen, "American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis
in an Unconventional Setting," Michigan Law Review. 85 (February, 1987) 771-808 passim; Vine Deloria,
"Sacred Land and Religious Freedom," NARF Legal Review. 16 (Summer, 1991) 1-6 passim; Laurie
Ensworth, "Native American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands," Boston University Law
Review. 63 (1983) 141-79 passim; Jeff Fish, "Sacred Site Free Exercise Claims on Government Land: The
Constitutional Slighting o f Indian Religions," New M exico Law Review. 20 (Winter, 1990) 113-34
passim; Scott David Godshall, "Land Use and the Free Exercise Clause," Columbia Law Review. 84 (1985)
1562-89 passim; Robert S. Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,"
93-115; Steven C. Moore, "Sacred Sites and Public Lands," in Handbook of American Indian Religious
Freedom, ed., Christopher Vecsey, 81-99 passim; Patrick T. Noonan, 311-32 passim; Richard Pemberton,
Jr., '"I Saw that it Was Holy': The Black Hills and the Concept o f Sacred Land," Law and Inequality. 3
(1985), 287-342 passim; Michael N. Ripani, "Native American Free Exercise Rights in Sacred Land: Buried
Once Again," American Indian Law Review. 15 (1991) 323-39 passim; Howard Stambor 59-89 passim;
Dean B. Suagee, "American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting
Mother Earth's Caretakers, " American Indian Law Review. 10 (1982) 1-57 passim; David R. M. White,
"Native American Religious Issues. . . Also Land Issues," Wassaia. The Indian Historian. 13 (1980) 39-44
passim; James H. Woodall, "American Indians and the First Amendment: Site-Specific Religion and Public
Land Management," Utah Law Review. (1987) 683-702; and see below.
3^Sarah B. Gordon, "Indian Religious Freedom and Government Development of Public Lands," The Yale
Law Journal. 94 (1985) 1447-71 passim.
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of articles appeared criticizing the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find place for sacred
site interests within the fram ew ork of the American legal system.35 Such works
documented the unusual problems facing Indian litigants who asserted a religious interest in
the physical environment. The cross-cultural problems were indeed substantial, but the
authors working on this subject could do little other than lay the responsibility for resolving
these problems associated with sacred site claims at the feet of the judiciary, a responsibility
easily rejected by a conservative American Supreme Court.
Native American burial practices posed a number of problems that could be
characterized in terms of sacred sites, but this issue also posed some concerns of its own.
Many Indian remains had long been stored in various museums around the country, and the
largest collection was located in the government owned facilities of the Smithsonian.
Indians m ade an effort to ensure more respectful treatment for their burial sites and to
secure the return of such remains as could be identified and linked to a given tribe. A
number of works dealt with the contemporary legal stanis of Indian

r e m a in s .^ 6

Some were

critical of the present legal framework affecting Indian remains, and offered comments on

3^E.g., Nancy Akins, "New Directions in Sacred Lands Claims: Lyng v. Northwest Indian cemetery
Protective Association," Natural Resources Journal. 29 (Spring, 1989) 593-605 passim; Donald Falk,
"Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing First Amendment Protection of
Indian Sacred Lands," Ecology Law Quarterly. 16(1989) 515-570 passim; Joani S. Harrison, "
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment- Goyemment Action Does Not Violate Free Exercise Clause
o f First Amendment When it Neither Coerces Action Contrary to Religious Beliefs Nor Prohibits Access to
Practice Those Beliefs, But Merely Imposes an Incidental Burden on Religious Practice. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. ed. 2d 534 (1988)." St Mary’s
Law loum al. 20 (1989) 427-451 passim; Robert J. Miller, "Correcting the Supreme Court's 'Errors’:
American Indian Response to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association," Enyironmental
Law. 20 (1990) 1037-1062 passim; S. Alan Ray, "Lyng y. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association: Goyemment Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause," Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly. 16 (Spring, 1989) 483-511 passim; Joshua D. Reisman, "Judicial Scrutiny of Natiye American
Free Exercise Rights: Lyng and the Decline o f the Kader Doctrine," Enyironmental Affairs. 17 (1989) 169199 passim; Michele L. Seger, "Unjustified Interference of American Indian Religious Rights: Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association," Creighton Law Reyiew. 22 (1988) 313-31 passim.
^^For a general discussion o f the issue, see Margaret B. Bowman, "The Reburial of Natiye American
Skeletal Remains: Approaches to the Resolution of a Conflict," Haryard Enyironmental Law Reyiew. 13
(1989) 147-208 passim; Lawrence Rosen, "The Excayation of American Indian Burial Sites: A Problem in
Law and Professional Responsibility," American Anthropology. 88 (March, 1980) 5-27 passim.
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the policy (non-)implications of the AIRFA and a host o f related laws.^^ Often such a
critique involved a historical commentary relating differences between the legal status of
Native and Euro-American remains to past policies of oppression and scientific racism.^^
All together, this work successfully demonstrated both the inequities of the current legal
system and described the historical process through which Indian remains had become
valuable "property" in the public eye.
Other scholars dealt with similar problems regarding a variety of sacred objects held
by, or destined for, museums and private collections. Charllotte Frisbie, for example
described the inadequacies o f both the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act in reference to Navajo medicine

b u n d le s .3 9

And

W alter Echo-Hawk provided a general critique of the property rights affecting sacred Indian
artifacts.'*® The return of eleven wampum belts to Iroquois leadership and the return of the
Zuni w ar gods to that Pueblo provided some positive examples of respectful treatment by
museums.'** These examples seemed, however, only to underscore the fact that museums

^^E.g. David J. Harris, "Respect for the Living and Respect for the Dead: Return of Indian and Other Native
Remains," Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law. 39 (1991) 195-224 passim; Dean Higginbotham,
"Native Americans Versus Archaeologists: The Legal Issues," American Indian Law Review. 10 (1982) 91115 passim; John E. Peterson H, "Dance of the Dead: A Legal Tango for Control of Native American
Skeletal remains." American Indian Law Review. 15(1988) 115-50pasj(m.
^^E.g. Vine Deloria, Jr., "A Simple Question of Humanity: The Moral Dimensions of the Reburial Issue,"
NARF T.egal Review. 14 (Fall, 1989) 1-12 passim; Walter R. Echo-Hawk and Roger Echo-Hawk,
"Repatriation, Reburial, and Religious Rights," in Handbook of American Indian Religious Freedom, ed.,
Christopher Vecsey, 63-80 passim; Walter R. Echo-Hawk, "Tribal Efforts to Protect Against Mistreatment
o f Indian Dead: The Quest for Equal Protection of the Laws," NARF Legal Review. 14 (Winter, 1988) 1-5
passim; Steven C. Moore, "Federal Indian Burial Policy - Historical Anachronism or Contemporary
Reality?" NARF Legal Review. 12 (Spring, 1987) 1-9 passim; Red Arrow Inc., "Why Were Native
American Remains taken to Museums for Study and Research," Akwesasni Notes. 23 (Summer, 1991) 1011.

39prisbie, 365-400.
'*®Walter R. Echo-Hawk, "Museum Rights Vs Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal
Interests in Native Cultural Resources," Review of Law and Social Change. XIV (1986) 437-53 passim.
41gee William F. Fenton, "Return o f Eleven Wampum Belts to the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy on
Grand River, Canada," Ethnohistorv. 36 (Fall, 1989) 392-410 passim; William T. Merrill, Edmund J. Ladd,
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and private collections across the country continued to hold artifacts sacred to a variety of
Indian peoples.
As had been the case with burial rights, the principle threat to sacred artifacts lay in
the potential economic value that such artifacts held for non-Indians as well as vast
historical precedent for practices divesting Indian tribes o f many o f their m ost sacred
objects. Many of the objects held in various public and private libraries had ironically been
placed there by tribal elders hoping to preserve them in the days of rescue anthropology and
government assimilation. At the same time that religious and government leaders sought to
eradicate Indian ceremonial practices, a number o f anthropologists and archaeologists
attempted to document and preserve the artifacts o f these "vanishing" cultures. Hence,
Indian practitioners often turned to museums and private collections as likely repositories
for sacred materials. Other artifacts had simply been stolen from Indian tribes by scholars
and entrepreneurs seeking to profit from public interest in the material culture o f Native
Americans. In either event, by the nineteen-seventies it had become clear that Indians
wanted many o f these objects back, or that they wanted to have a say in the treatment and
display o f artifacts remaining in non-Indian hands. The AIRFA did not quite mandate the
return o f Indian artifacts; but it did provide a channel through which Indians could voice
their interests and initiate dialogue with universities and museums holding such materials.
Although peyote constituted an important sacrament to many Native Americans; the
legal disputes surrounding possession of this substance had been defined before passage of
the AIRFA, and so the issue did not draw much additional attention for AIRFA proponents
until the Smith decision in 1990.^*^ The Smith decision, however, sparked a tremendous
backlash from several different quarters. M ainstream religious organizations grew
concerned about the principles of case law announced in Sm ith. This immediately led to a

and T. J. Ferguson, "The Return of Ahayu:da" Current Anthropology. 34 (December, 1993) 523-67
passim.
^2por an excellent example of pre-Smith scholarship on peyote law, see Paul E. Lawson and Jennifer
Scholes, "Jurisprudence, Peyote and the Native American Church," 13-27 passim.
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body o f work critical o f the Court's handling of case. Much of this criticism dealt with the
reasoning offered by the court in Smith, and such complaints could be found in a variety of
newspapers and legal journals.'*^ Those interested in Indian law usually had something to
say about this, and about the potential impact that the Smith case would have on existing
accom modations for the Native American Church.'*'* Ultimately backlash against the
decision would lead Congress to deal with both lines of criticism. It passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration A ct in 1993 in an attempt to redirect the Court's handling of case law
dealing with free exercise, and it Amended the Religious Freedom Act itself in 1994,
largely out of concerns over the status of the Native American Church.'*^

'*3por examples o f the popular reaction to the Smith decision, see Linda Greenhouse, "Court is Urged to
Rehear Case on Ritual Drugs: Religious Groups Team With Legal Scholars," The New York Times
NATIONAL. (Friday, May 11, 1990) A16; Charles Levendosky, "Court Guards religious Liberty for Some,
Not All," Las Vegas Review Journal. (Monday, December 9,1991) 9b; Richard John Newhaus, "Church,
State, and Peyote," National Review. (June 11,1990) 40-44; David E. Williams, "Endangered Free
Exercise' Clause," Christian Science Monitor. (May 21, 1990).
For examples o f scholarly backlash against the reasoning used in Smith decision, see "The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases," Harvard Law Review. 104 (1990) 198-209 pajs/m; Daniel A.
Hess, "The Undoing o f Mandatory Free Exercise Accommodation - Employment Division, Department o f
Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)," Washington Law Review. 66 (1191) 587-603
passim; Michael W. McConnell, "Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision," University of
Chicago Law Review. 57 (1990) 109-53 passim; Rebecca Rains, "Can Religious Practice be Given
Meaningful Protection After Employment Division v. Smith?' University of Colorado Law Review. 62
(991) 687-710 passim; James E. Wood, Jr., "Abridging the Free Exercise Clause," Journal of Church and
State. 32 (1990) 741-52 passim.
'*'*E.g., Robert N. Clinton, "Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-colonialism and the Supreme
Court's New Indian Law, " Federal Bar News & Journal. 38 (March, 1991) 92-101 passim; Jerilyn
DeConteau & Steven C. Moore, "1990 Decisions o f the United States Supreme Court: Erosion o f Native
Tribal and Religious Rights," Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 13 (September & October, 1990)
1-6 passim; 19 Paul E. Lawson and Patrick Morris, "The Native American Church and the New Court: The
Smith Case and Indian Religious Freedoms, " American Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 15 (1991)7991 passim; Steven C, Moore, Esq., "An Unwarranted Crusade: The State of Oregon's Persecution o f the
Native American Church," Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 12 (August & September, 1989) 1-11
passim; Steven C. Moore, esq., "Supreme Court Deals Devastating Blow to Native American Church, "
Indian Law Support Center REPORTER. 13 (March-April 1990) 1-2 passim; Harry F. Tepker, Jr.,
"Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case," American Indian Law Review. 16 (1991) 1-56
passim.
45See the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.107.1488 (1993); American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments o f 1994. 108,3125 (1994). The potential impact of these laws remains an open
question at present.
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Much o f the scholarly commentary on the AIRFA addressed the role that it was to
play in shaping federal Indian law. Often these commentaries directly addressed the abstract
differences between Native American and Euro-American religions and attributed the
relative lack o f constitutional protection for the former to these abstract cultural differences.
From the standpoint of Indian activists and sympathetic scholars such differences pointed
to a structural bias in the American legal system. Early commentaries located this structural
bias in case law relating to the First Amendment, and interpreted the AIRFA as an attempt
to overcome it. Later studies indicated that the AIRFA itself had come to embody this same
bias, either because it had been written into the text o f the law by Congress, or because it
had been read into the text by policy-makers and judicial authorities. In either event, most
saw the cultural gap between Indian notions o f religion from those guiding the American
legal system as the central problem facing Indias throughout the history of the AIRFA. In
pointing out the gap between Indian and American legal cultures most of the scholars
working on this subject sought to pressure courts and federal policy-makers to overcome
any structural bias existing in the American legal system.
Such critics tacitly accepted the initial absurdity inherent in designating Native
American ceremonial practices as a form o f "religion." Their rhetorical strategy could only
work to the extent that it remained consistent with a basically naive acceptance of the key
term "religion." Scholars often took the time to explain that Indian practices could not easily
be designated as forms o f "religion," but in doing so they typically sought to create a more
flexible sense of the term for use in reference to the AIRFA. Hence, they effected a kind of
social criticism by turning the relative narrowness of this Euro-American term into evidence
that Euro-Americans typically had an impoverished understanding o f "religion".'*^ One
could as easily have taken the problems associated with the narrow sense of this term as

George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fischer's comments on defamiliarization in Anthropology as
Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1986) l'i l -(A passim.
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evidence that Indians do not have "religions," at least not religions cognizable from the
standpoint o f the American legal system. Hence, the structural differences between Native
and Euro-American cultures could only be viewed as a bias to the extent that one insisted
on confounding them in a single utterance. Those willing to insist on their own categories
o f social organization, on the other hand, would have found little bias in the matter.
The imm ense record of scholarship on the AIRFA sheds little light on the process
by which this term had become such an important aspect of Indian-white relations. So long
as Indians perceived the AIRFA as a viable legal resource, most scholars and activists were
content to illustrate the problems that Indians faced in implementing the law. This practice
usually m eant draw ing attention to the awkward relationship between Indian religious
practices and the sense that "religion" takes as legal category. Hence, it is with some irony
that one m ust read the words of Justice Antonine Scalia in the majority opinion for the
Smith case:
It may be fairly said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence o f democratic government must be preferred to a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.'*^
Scholars had labored hard throughout the history of the AIRFA to demonstrate that the
American legal system contained a systematic bias against Native American ceremonial
interests . . . and now Justice Scalia seemed to be agreeing with them. Justice Scalia
himself seemed to stress the cultural limitations implicit within the American legal system,
and turned this in itself into an argument against granting free exercise relief for the Native
American Church. There is little in the majority opinions of either Smith or Lyng to suggest
that their respective authors did not understand the depth of problems stemming from
cultural differences between Native and Euro-Americans. In each case the Supreme Court
simply disclaimed responsibility for the problem, leaving each individual Indian claimant to

'*7Smith, 494 U.S. 890 (1990).
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resolve his or her religious dilemma according to the dictates o f his or her own personal
conscience.
In retrospect the decision to gloss a wide variety o f Indian legal interests with the
Euro-American term "religion" led to something of a dead end. Scores of articles written
during the interval between passage o f the AIRFA and its demise at the hands of the
Rehnquist Court indicate both an awareness of the problems inherent to the use of this term
and a hope that something could be done to overcome those problems. In the end, it is the
critical points of these articles that have proven correct, whereas the aspirations for a more
enlightened sense o f religious freedom have proven unworkable. The term "religion"
clearly does not convey an adequate sense of the legal interests associated with the AIRFA,
and yet the act is a testament to the role that this term has come to play in the contemporary
history of Indian-white relations. It therefore makes sense to inquire as to process by which
such a variety of disparate legal interests could come to be understood under the heading of
"religion." The following is an attem pt to understand this process by analyzing those
developments in the history of Indian-white relations which have played a role in defining
the structure of the AIRFA.

Discourse and the Cultural Status of "Cultural" Categories.
In order to understand the history of the AIRFA one must explain both the
inconsistencies inherent within the act itself, and the relative inability of AIRFA proponents
to address those inconsistencies in a strait-foreword m anner. As noted above, the
inconsistencies associated with the AIRFA tended to remain in the background of debate
over the significance o f the act itself. Congressional proponents of the AIRFA argued about
the specific implications of the act in debates over its passage, but they seemed to ignore
substantial differences in the perception of contemporary Indian-white relations. This
produced a text which invited at least two significantly different perceptions of the context
behind its own passage. The text of the AIRFA seemed to invite either a reading informed
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by the dominant principles of case law in free exercise jurisprudence or a reading informed
by case law involving the trust relationship between Indians and the federal government.
The principles derived from each of these two bodies o f case law were unfortunately
inconsistent with one another. Hence, the prospect that either of them could be used as a
contextual fram ew ork fo r interpreting the AIRFA led those concerned with its
implementation to adopt radically different notions of what was expected of them under the
provisions o f the act itself. Ambiguities within the text o f the AIRFA thus led to real
problems, but these problems remained implicit in the context of discourse throughout
m uch o f the history o f the act rather than em erging as the focus of direct legal
interpretation.
Contextual information rests by definition in the background of discourse, and so
conflicting opinions over the general context of Indian-white relations seemed to escape the
attention of key AIRFA proponents. Participants in AIRFA debates thus failed to address
the full scope of relevant disagreement. The history of the AIRFA is this respect a study in
meta-linguistic consciousness. Each episode in the history o f the AIRFA represents an
interesting study in the ability of historical actors to chart there own role in the history of
the act according to the immediate context o f their own discourse. It will therefore prove
worthwhile to examine the relationship between discourse and culture before reviewing the
empirical history of the AIRFA.
The term "discourse" refers to the context in which both language and culture make
their appearance. It is literally "language in use", to borrow a phrase from Deborah
Schiffrin.'** Discourse may be thought of as the "real-time" context of verbal exchange, or

“^^This approach focuses on "language use" as the defining feature o f discourse. It can be contrasted with
formalist notions of discourse which define it as a unit o f language structure that is larger than a sentence.
See Deborah Schiffrin, Approaches to Discourse. (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, U.S.A.: Blackwell, 1994)
20-43 passim; See also Greg Urban, A Discourse-Centered Approach to Culture: Native South American
Mvths and Rituals. (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1991) %-24 passim.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
as the interactional relationship between the author(s) and the reader(s) o f a written text.'*^
This sense of "language in use" may be contrasted with notions of culture. The term
"culture" implies questions about social relationships and socially constructed meanings
above and beyond the immediate context of verbal or written exchange. An explicit
description of a culture therefore presupposes a process wherein moments of real-time
discourse have been mapped onto an abstract model representing the social relationships
implicit within that discourse.
The aforementioned mapping process is always problematic, but the problem is not
only the concern of social scientists. The participants in any given discursive process must
also form notions about the cultural patterns relevant to their own situation. At least one
folk-model o f social context is therefore implicit in every actual instance o f discourse. Such
a folk-model defines the immediate context of a discursive event, and thereby enables its
participants to coordinate their discursive practices according to pre-established norms of
behavior.^® People engaged in a given instance of discourse frequently proceed according
to very different models of what is happening in the very context o f that discursive
event.5* Such has normally been the case throughout the legal history of Indian-white
relations, and it has certainly been the case in disputes over the significance of the AIRFA.
Such discrepancies normally rest in the background of a discourse event, though they may
become apparent when that event itself becomes the topic of another moment of discourse.

Michael Silverstein, "The Indeterminacy o f Contextualization: When is Enough Enough?" in The
Contextualization o f Language, eds., Peter Auer and Aldo Di Luzio, (Amsterdam and Philadelphia; John
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992) 55-76 passim; Michael Silverstein, "A Minimax Approach to
Verbal Interaction; Invoking 'Culture' in Realtime Discursive Practice," Workshop on Language. Cognition
and Computation: Lectures Sala Prat de la Riba Institut d'Estudis Catalans November 25th and 26th
Barcelona. (Barcelona: Institut D'Estudis Catalanis, 1993) 79-89 passim.
5®Cf. John J. Gumperz, Discourse Strategies. Studies in Interactional Linguistics, 1, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982) 130-52 passim; Silverstein, "Indeterminacy," 55-76 passim;
Silverstein, "Minimax," 79-89 passim.
5* Gumperz, 130-31.
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Reflection on the context of a discursive event requires a shift o f attention away
from its original topic. Such reflection therefore presupposes a form o f meta-linguistic
framing, a device which organizes discourse about discourse into a coherent pattern of
utterance and response. The meta-linguistic framing used in focusing on the context of a
discursive event must be distinguished from the use of paraphrasing and quotations which
retain much the same focus of attention from one discursive moment to the next. For
example. Justice Scalia's comments in the Smith case (see above) could be described either
by paraphrasing his statements about democratic process, or by suggesting that in uttering
those statements he "dismissed" a set of concerns advanced by the respondent. The former
characterization o f Justice Scalia's com m ents would serve to decontextualize the
significance of his utterance by generating a theoretical position about the nature of the
democratic process. The latter characterization of his comments on the other hand calls
direct attention to the pragmatic or interactional significance of Scalia's utterance in that
context. This illustrates a basic distinction between different patterns o f meta-linguistic
framing. Any given utterance can be modeled in terms of at least two different kinds of
textual analysis; a "denotational text" consisting o f what its participants have said or talked
about, and an "interactional text" consisting of what they have done.^2
The event-like qualities associated with discourse posses a num ber of distinct
structural characteristics. The relationship between an utterance and a response provides
any given stretch o f dialogue with a definite pattern of role

r e la tio n s h ip s .^ ^

Moreover,

every language possesses a set of sign-vehicles, commonly referred to as indexicals, which
provide a structural pattern to discursive events. An index refers to something within the

^^Silverstein, "Indeterminacy of Contextualization," passim; Michael Silverstein, "Minimax," passim.
53See M. M. Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," Speech Genres & Other Essavs. tr.) Vem W.
McGee, ed., Carl Emerson and Michael Holquist, (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1986) 60-102
passim; Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs, "Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on
Language and Social Life," Annual Review of Anthropology. 19 (1990) 59-88 passim.
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imm ediate context of discourse.^'* Deictic categories (which include pronouns) constitute
an im portant subset of indexical signs; they determine the relationship between author,
addressee, audience, etc. as well as the spatio-temporal parameters forming the immediate
context o f

d is c o u rs e .5 5

The appearance o f such patterns in an utterance or text conveys

something about its author's sense o f context. The study o f indexical relationships and
meta-linguistic framing (which defines the relationship between utterance and response)
provides a model of discourse-in-context which can be distinguished from abstract notions
o f grammar as well as methods of textual analysis focusing on propositional content.
The necessary link between an indexical sign and its referent contrasts sharply with
the arbitrary nature o f the sign stressed by classical methods of structural analysis. An
arbitrary link between a sign and its referent generally obtains for yet another set o f signvehicles, dubbed "Symbols" by Charles Sanders P e ir c e ." S y m b o lic " relationships
constitute general categories of reference and predication ("red," "house," "guilty," etc.)
w hich are used in the construction o f propositions (sentences that are subject to truth
evaluation). Such propositional content often constitutes the major focus of attention in any
given discourse. Even in such cases, however, the ability to refer to objects-in-a-world

^'*This is the classic formulation given for indexical signs by Charles Sanders Peirce, "Logic as Semiotic:
The Theory of Signs," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed., Justus Buchler, (1940. New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1955) 102, 107-108.
number of scholars have followed Peirce's lead in elaborating on a theory o f indexical sign systems to
provide a structural account of speech. C.f. Roman Jakobson, "Shifters, Verbal Categories, and die
Russian Verb, " Roman Jakobson: Selected Writings. (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971) 131-132;
Emile Benveniste, "The Nature of Pronouns," Problems in General Linguistics, tr. Mary Elizabeth Meek,
(1966. coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971) 217-222; Michael Silverstein, "Shifters,
Verbal Categories and Cultural Description," Meaning in Anthropologv. ed., Keith Basso and Henry Selby,
(Albuquerque: School of American Research, 1976) 29-30; William Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic
Reference," Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, ed., Charles Goodwin and
Allessandro Duranti, Studies in the Social and Cultural Foundations of Language, vol. 11, (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 71n.
^^Peirce "Logic as Semiotic," 102-3,112-115. Note that this terminology is directly opposed to that of
Saussure who refers to the relationship between a sign and its referent as arbitrary and that of a "symbol"
and its referent as one that is fixed. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles
Bally and Albert Sechehaye, tr. Roy Harris, (1972. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986) 67-69, 73. The
differences pose a minor semantic problem which will be avoided in the present context by using Peirce's
terminology.
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necessarily presupposes an implicit set of indexical relationships which define the context
o f reference. For example, a court may focus its attention on the guilt or innocence of a
given defendant; but the process o f deciding this question must take place within a
structured set of social relationships defining the jurisdiction of the court itself and the role
relations between authorized speakers (judge, jury, legal counsels, defendant, etc.). Hence,
the focus of attention in a criminal trial consists of a proposition involving symbolic sign
vehicles, but the conduct o f the trial itself presupposes a working set of indexical
relationships.
Although indexicals are by definition context specific sign vehicles, they are also
the principle indicators of abstract cultural information. The actual employment of indexical
patterns effectively relates contextual information about the micro-structural features of a
discursive event to the m acro-structural features o f a given cultural order. Hence,
"contextualization cues" index both the minimum role relations necessary for dialogue,
(speaker, addressee, audience, etc.) and substantial cultural information about the status of
such participants in a larger social network. For example, systems of deference such as T
(familiar) an V (polite) forms of address in Standard Average European languages index a
speaker and addressee relationship while at the same time conveying information about the
social status of those

in v o lv e d .^ ^

Likewise, the inherently ambiguous boundaries of words

like "we," "you(pl)," "here," "now," "there," and "then" are settled in terms o f social
parameters implicitly understood by those who use them. The implicit invocation of such
large scale patterns of social order in the micro-social pattens of discourse provides a
substantial basis for the cultural understanding of social interaction.^^
These patterns can be found in the interactional structure of legal disputes. Matters
o f "jurisdiction" and "legal standing," for example, involve explicit questions about the

S^See R. Brown and A. Gilman, "The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity," Language and Social Context,
ed. Paolo Giglioli, (1972. New York: Penguin Books, 1990) 252-82 passim.
^^Cf. Silverstein, "Indeterminacy," 55-76 passim; Silverstein, "Minimax," 79-89 passim.
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context of a given legal dispute. These legal categories pertain directly to questions about
who is authorized to speak such a given legal dispute, and hence they constitute a set of
indexical relationships crucial to the legal process. M oreover, burdens o f proof are
unevenly distributed in legal conflicts. This makes it possible for the courts to reach
decisions in the event that empirical evidence proves inconclusive. Burdens of proof are
often described as problems of evidence, but the assignment of a burden of proof to one or
another party is also an attempt to distribute the responsibilities for moving the legal
discourse along in an orderly fashion.^® Burdens of proof serve to structure legal
discourse according to an implicit pattern of utterance and response, enabling one party to
structure its own case as a response to another. Hence, legal discourse is structured
according to a definite set of indexical patterns.
The indexical patterns implicit in legal discourse furthermore contain numerous
indirect references to an extended cultural order. Burdens of proof, matters of jurisdiction,
and issues of legal standing in a trial are all conventions dealing with context specific
questions about how to proceed in a legal dispute, but each also affects the role that larger
social issues take in the courtroom itself. Questions of jurisdiction involve a kind of
speaker addressee relationship, and burdens of proof involve a relationship between
utterance and response. Each of these conventions therefore constitutes an implicit indexical
relationship which can be mapped onto questions about large scale divisions of a social
order. Questions of jurisdiction are necessarily related to the social categories available to
the courtroom, and burdens of proof correspond to vested interests operating beyond the
scope of any given case. Each of these conventions therefore ties the cultural significance
of issues involved in a legal dispute to a specific set of role relations constituting the
structure o f the legal proceeding (as a discursive event). It is in this sense that James Boyd

S^Gaskins,

2 1 -3 0 .
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W hite refers to the law as a constitutive branch of rhetoric.®® Each legal dispute
presupposes an established set of role relations (a kind of speech community) which in turn
presupposes a regularized pattern of social organization (a culture).®* Hence, the context of
legal discourse certainly reveals many of the discursive properties normally associated with
questions about language and culture. In reference to the AIRFA these properties can be
used to generate questions about the legal identity fashioned for Indians under the auspices
o f the Am erican legal system. One can thus determine the structural patterns of culture
informing the history of Indian-white relations by examining the interactional relationship
between Indians and various federal authorities involved in different phases o f American
history.
The participants in a given discourse as well as third parties (such as ethnologists
and historians) may generate models o f culture by examining notions of an extended
cultural order implicit within an interactional text. A cultural order need not be described
explicitly, however, to structure the possibilities of a given interaction. M oreover, any
overt description o f a cultural order presupposes a context o f its own, and hence an overt
description of culture will in itself presuppose a system o f cultural order. One may always
look for a set o f cultural preconditions behind any given description of a culture. Overt
descriptions of culture frequently (perhaps always) reflect political manipulation, a prospect
which has led many to question the value of "culture" as a category of social analysis.®^

®®James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism. (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1990) xiv (and see chapter 1).
®*C.f. J. Gumperz, "The Speech Community," Language and Social Context, ed., Paolo Giglioli, (New
York: Penguin Books, 1972) 219-231 passim; J. Gumperz, "Types of Linguistic Communities," Readings
in the Sociology o f Language, ed., Joshua A. Fishman, (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968) 460-472
passim.
®^E.g. James Clifford and George F. Marcus, eds.. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics o f
Ethnography. (Berkeley, Las Angeles, and London: University o f California Press, 1986) passim; James
Clifford, The predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Centurv Ethnography. Literature, and Art, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1988) passim, but see especially chapter 12;
"Identity in Mashphee," 277-346; James A. Clifton, ed.. The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions &
Governmental Policies. (1990. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994) passim.
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Yet, it is always possible to reduce the strategic values underlying an explicit description of
a "culture" to another cultural order defining the interests served by that description. This
fact underscores a thesis most closely associated with the work of Marshall Sahlins, that
there is a culture o f "culture," so to speak, and that this culture o f "culture" provides
important clues into the historical trajectory o f a given form of social organization.®^
Discourse informed by explicit consciousness of cultural patterns may often appears
spurious and inauthentic, but there is always an implicit cultural pattern behind social
behavior, even in seemingly invented traditions.
This relationship between culture and discourse carries serious implications for
study of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. When under the provisions of this
act Indians, lawyers, judges, politicians, and various political activists talk about Indian
cultures, they effectively reduce these cultures to a stereotypical pattern of activity. Each
such description o f Indian "culture" must itself play a role in the cultural order of the
American legal system. This makes it necessary to relate ethnographic questions about
Indian worship of "Mother Earth", for example, to the rhetorical value that this concept has
in facilitating land claim s and other such political agendas.®'* Likewise, differences
between various Indian "cultures" generally reflects the political divisions of contemporary
Indian "tribes." Far from constituting a death knell to cultural theory, such matters simply
enrich the body of data available for cultural analysis. And anyone who wishes to feign
shock at the thought that Indian representations o f their own culture may reflect a degree of
political manipulation had best not look too closely at the course of western history.
The cultural significance of AIRFA dialogue can be found in a set of ostensibly
straight foreword arguments about its legal implications and its potential impact on Indian

®^Cf. Marshall Sahlins, "Goodbye to Tristes Tropes: Ethnography in the Context o f Modem World
History," Journal o f M odem History. 65 (1993) 3-4.
®^Sam Gill, Mother Earth Earth: An American Storv. (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press,
1987) passim; Daniel S. Wall, "Space, Time, and Cultural Landscape in the Political History o f Indianwhite Relations," Unpublished M.A. Thesis. (University o f Chicago, Spring, 1995) passim.
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culture. For example, each judicial opinion relating to the act itself presents an argument
which can be modeled in terms of a denotational text; but the ethno-historical significance
o f that argument must be related to an interactional text determining the social relationships
at play in the case itself. In Badoni v. Higginson. for example, the District Court o f Utah
denied that Navajo interests in Rainbow Bridge constituted a religious belief (because they
were not rooted in an organized religion).®^ This position involved both a factual assertion
about the nature of Navajo culture and an assumption of authority by the court to define the
norm ative relationship betw een individuals and religious institutions. The court's
description of Navajo religion could be considered either true or false, but its assumption of
authority over the structure o f religious devotion could also be accepted or rejected
independent of that truth value. Hence, AIRFA litigation provides both an interesting set of
arguments containing explicit claims about Indian culture and Indian law, and a set of
interactional texts containing implicit clues about the culture of Indian-white relations.
As sources of background information, interactional texts provide a likely source
for the changing value o f the AIRFA's basic rationale. The analogy between ritualized
forms of Native American behavior and Euro-American forms o f religion was no more nor
less plausible at the time of the AIRFA's passage than it was earlier in this century when
Indians could be jailed for such practices under the authority o f the the Religious Crimes
Codes (see chapter 2). N or did the logical implications of this analogy change radically
from the passage o f the act itself to the determination of the Lvng and Smith cases. What
had changed about the value of this analogy was the pattern of context informing official
im plem entation of Indian law. AIRFA proponents had wanted an explicit federal
commitment to maintain the integrity of traditional Indian cultures, but the Rehnquist Court
had denied government aid to individual Native Americans. Hence, the Rehnquist Court
had effectively answered a different kind of question than that informing the text of the

®5Badoni. 645-8 (D. Utah. C.D. 1977).
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AIRFA. In one respect the difference just mentioned involved an explicit difference in the
context of dialogue (the difference between discourse taking place in a court and a that
taking place in a legislative body). In another respect that difference was constituted
through ideological positions, as Congress sought to treat Indians as members of quasi
sovereign nations whereas the Rehnquist Court had addressed them as U.S. citizens. In
either event, a good deal of the discursive significance attached to the analogy between
Indian ceremonies and Euro-America religions had been determined by context specific
conventions for processing information about Indian culture. However (in)accurate it may
be to describe aspects o f Native American culture as forms of "religion"; various changes in
the use o f this descriptive orientation tell us a lot about the cultural patterns of Indian-white
relations. Such have been overdetermined by the indexical values associated with notions
of Indian identity and citizenship, and hence they reflect the patterns o f conflict over the
role that Indians may play in the contemporary history of America.

Chapter by Chapter Outline.
Chapter one is an attempt to situate the AIRFA within the overall histoiy of Indianwhite relations. It begins with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between legal
arguments and a sense of legal history. This discussion is intended to illustrate the
paradoxical relationship between the explicit text of a judicial opinion and the contextual
models implicit within it. Each such text is modeled as an explicit argument in favor of a
concrete legal outcome, but its contribution to the history of case law is more deeply rooted
in the contextualization strategies that it makes available to future litigants. The historical
significance o f an appellate decision therefore stems from the prospect o f reading it
according to a common set of ideological assumptions.
The rest o f this chapter will contrast the case law dealing with Indian-white relations
(as described through trust doctrine) to case law dealing with free exercise doctrine under
the First Amendment. Each of these case histories embodies a legal principle linked to the
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AIRFA, and hence each of them presents an alternative contextual model for a legal dispute
involving the AIRFA. The text o f the AIRFA itself never resolved w hich o f these
contextual models would inform its implementation, and it is important to see how each
contributed to the development of the act itself. The events presented in this chapter should
illustrate a theoretical approach to the interactional significance of legal argumentation as
well as provide useful background information about the history of Indian law in the
United States and the First Amendment.
Chapter two describes the efforts o f the Taos Pueblo in New M exico to reclaim a
lake from the national Forest Service. This path-breaking campaign provides an excellent
opportunity to discuss the role of "religion" as a category describing aspects o f American
Indian culture, and to assess the semantic implications of appeal to a principle of "religious
freedom" by Native Americans. The concept of "religious freedom" played a central role in
this cam paign, and the cam paign itself played a central role in developing a Native
Am erican rhetoric dealing with the subject. The history of the Taos campaign to recover
Blue Lake foreshadowed many of the difficulties associated with the principle of religious
freedom under the AIRFA, and the success of this campaign provides an interesting
contrast with the (non)impact of the AIRFA.
Chapter three is an analysis o f the relationship between "religious freedom" and
cosm ological principles implicit in governmental structures. The essay is intended to
explore the limitations that appeal to "religious freedom" has, given the fact that such a
principle presupposes a num ber of culturally specific political institutions. This may
indicate something about the degree to which Native American culture is (in)compatible
with the terms available under normal standards of Constitutional law. Hence, a number of
the difficulties associated with the AIRFA can be ascribed to differences between Native
and Euro-American forms of social organization. Indian tribes had already felt the impact of
these long before the AIRFA's passage. Each of the points m ade in this chapter are
illustrated by legal conflicts and Congressional discussions pertinent to the American Indian
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Civil Rights Act of 1968, and so the chapter closes with a discussion o f this act as well as
the the legal conflicts which led up to it.
Chapter four covers passage o f the AIRFA itself, and includes a discussion of its
initial (lack of) impact on federal policy. Special attention will be given to the conflicting
interpretations of the AIRFA which em erged between different branches of the federal
governm ent during the process o f securing its passage. The Senate Select Committee on
Indian affairs wanted a relatively strong piece o f legislation that would mandate real
changes in federal policy as an extension of trust doctrine to the protection o f Native
American religions. The Executive branch, however, wanted the AIRFA to do no more
than affirm that Indians would be accorded the usual right o f free exercise included in the
First Amendment. AIRFA proponents in the House of Representatives secured its passage,
but weakened the bill in the process o f satisfying critics. An official 1979 report, mandated
within the act itself, attempted to resolve many of these conflicts by articulating a general
theory of Indian culture that would enable a strong reading of the act while at the same time
limiting the scope of potential Indian claims. The report opens with a historical narrative
outlining the context of Indian-white relations, and articulating a theory of cultural
differences based on distinct cultural perspectives on space and time. This narrative
conveys a distinct pattern of role relations between Indians and the federal government, one
which its social theory reduces to an overly simplistic notion of both cultures. Hence, the
most systematic exposition of the policies mandated within the AIRFA failed to resolve the
basic tensions implicit within the act itself.
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Chapter I:
Legal Argumentation and the Ritual
Production of Indian Rights.
The law indeed works by argument, and does so under circumstances where agreement
cannot be compelled by resort to logic or to data. It is thus a branch of rhetoric, conceived
o f both as the art of persuasion - necessary when intellectual or other compulsion is
impossible - and as the art of deliberation, that is, as the art of thinking well about what
ought to be done when reasonable people disagree. It can also be a branch of rhetoric in a
third sense, which can be called constitutive, for through its forms of language and of life
the law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it creates a set of actors and speakers and
offers them possibilities for meaningfol speech and action that would not otherwise exist; in
so doing it establishes and maintains a community, defined by its practices of language. At
every stage the law is in this sense an ethical and political activity and should be understood
and judged as such.®®
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation.

The text o f the AIRFA employs an awkward analogy between various aspects of
Indian culture and Euro-American notions of "religion," and AIRFA proponents could not
successfully defend this analogy in efforts to enforce the act through litigation. Few denied
that Indian cultures actually possessed religious features, but many were unwilling to
extend a legally enforceable right o f free exercise to those aspects of Indian culture that
involved unusual religious claims (e.g. sacred site claims). Participants in AIRFA-related
discourse therefore exhibited substantial differences o f opinion over the historical
significance of the act itself and the legal significance o f its specific provisions. These
differences seldom found direct expression in the denotational content o f AIRFA-related
debates. Instead they emerged out of the contextualization strategies employed by those
debating the meaning of the act. Those who advocated a strong interpretation o f the act
generally viewed potential Indian claimants as members o f semi-sovereign nations which
were themselves wards of the federal government. This position effectively minimized the

®®James Boyd White, Justice as Translation, xiv.
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role that the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment played in defining the sense of
religious freedom that would apply in AIRFA-related cases. Those who advocated a weak
sense of the act generally viewed Indians as United States citizens, and sought to interpret
the act according to traditional standards of free exercise. Hence, the two most prominent
interpretations of the AIRFA rested on two very different contextualization schemas; one
involving a relationship between collective governmental agencies, and one involving a
limit on governmental authority over individual conscience.
Neither interpretation of the AIRFA could have been excluded by the text o f the act
itself, nor could either interpretation be viewed as an inaccurate description of the legal
status of Indian concerned over its implementation. Each interpretation served to over
determine the specific legal significance that the AIRFA could play in the lives of Native
Americans. Hence, each interpretation of the AIRFA emerges out of a complex relationship
between a denotation text which employed notions o f "religion" to describe aspects of
Indian culture, and an interactional text which presupposed a stance toward the ongoing
relationship between Indians and the American legal system. The following section is an
examination of the historical precedent for both of these contextualization strategies and the
relationship that each could play in the history of the AIRFA. This will entail a comparison
of the case law dealing with Indian tribes and the case law dealing with the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendment as each were understood in 1978.

Between Text and Context: The Performative Side of Legal Argumentation.
An established set of ritual procedures underlies the production of any legal
argument. The substance of laws and constitutional provisions are generated by fiat,
receiving a cosmological significance sometimes described as "the will o f the American
people." Such pronouncem ents are generally rooted in im ages of a hom ogeneous
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population residing within a bounded space at a "homogeneous empty time."®^ The
Am erican legal system establishes this image of cultural unity through recourse to its
appellate system, a set of institutions which provide for the resolution of conflicting legal
positions by imposing a hierarchy of legal interpretations.®^ These social institutions form
an important part o f the context of legal discourse in America, and they provide important
constraints on the patterns of reasoning available to participants in any given legal dispute.
These constraints make their appearance through a series o f pragmatic presuppositions,
some o f which are likely to appear as vacuous premises from the standpoint of abstract
reason. A long-standing precedent, for instance, may appear to be simply wrong-headed
and yet continue to receive deference in legal briefs, judicial opinions, etc. Such
conventions may seem foolish or gratuitous to laymen, but for those involved in legal
professions such deference is simply a pragmatic necessity. Where such weaknesses in the
logical rigor of legal discourse appear they generally correspond to moments in which the
interactional text of a given argument is maximally salient to the flow of discourse. It is at
such moments that the individuals involved in a particular dispute give voice to the
institutional structure of the American legal system.
The American legal system clearly poses no threat to the truism that all reasoning is
ultim ately circular. An opinion authored by members of the U.S. Supreme Court is
virtually guaranteed to have an explicit circular quality. Such opinions are ostensibly posed
as arguments in favor of a specific legal action (condemning someone to prison, awarding
dam ages to an injured party, etc.), but any case making it to the Supreme Court must
involve some constitutional principle as such. Hence, the role of the Supreme Court is
actually to supply something equivalent to the major premise of a syllogism rather than to

®^Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
(1983. London and New York: Verso, 1992) passim.
®^C.f. Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modem Discourse. (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1992) 19-20.
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establish the soundness o f its conclusion, or "result." In fact, the "result" of a legal case is
significant precisely to the degree that it instantiates the principles affirmed in the legal
opinion itself.®^ For example, there is no inherent reason why anyone other than the
litigants involved in the Sm ith case should have been concerned over the denial of
unem ploym ent benefits to Alfred Smith and Galen Black, but the rationale offered by
Supreme Court in favor o f this decision gave its result a degree of significance far beyond
that experienced by Smith and Black themselves. Thus, it appears that in direct contrast to
intuitive notions of how an argument works, it is the argument itself which constitutes a
significant historical event within a legal opinion, and not its concrete "result." It is as if the
entire process proceeds by misdirection; as the higher courts argue for a concrete outcome
while using that outcome to persuade people in the value of their own assumptions.
The circularity o f higher court opinions has its counterpart in the reasoning
process used in lower courts. In his book. An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Edward H.
Levi described legal argumentation as "reasoning by example:"

"It is a three step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition
descriptive o f the first case is made into a rule o f law and then applied to a next similar
situation. The steps are these: Similarity is seen between cases; next the rule o f law inherent
in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case.
This is a method of reasoning which is necessary for the law, but it has other characteristics
which under other circumstances might be considered imperfections.
It is the apparent randonmess o f this process which constitutes the "imperfections" of
which Levi speaks. The jum p from a given case to a legal principle appears arbitrary from
the standpoint of abstract reason, as is the selection of a case history which is supposed to
bear out the principle. This weak link in the denotational text structure of legal reasoning
corresponds to historical transformations in the principles of case law. W hereas the
denotational text of a legal opinion offers up a logical demonstration in favor of a given

®^A thesis put foreword by James Boyd White in Justice as Translation. 91-93.
^®Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1949) 1-2.
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judgem ent, the assumptions used in this demonstration appear arbitrarily linked to a body
o f previous cases. A body of case law is held together by a judicious sense of the
sim ilarities betw een each case m entioned within it, but it is always possible to find
alternative principles o f case law based on an alternative selection of cases.
As if the preceding were not sufficient cause for concern, nothing appears sufficient
to prevent the continual changes observed in case law. According to Levi, the formation
and application of legal concepts follows a circular process in which rules pass through
three successive stages of analogical reasoning:

The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are compared.
The period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several phrases may be tried
out; the m isuse or m isunderstanding of words itself may have an effect. The concept
sounds like another and the jum p to the second is made. The second stage is the period
when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by exam ple continues to
classify items inside or out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown o f the concept,
as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive
influence o f the word is no longer desired.
The process is likely to make judges and lawyers uncomfortable. It runs contrary to the
pretense o f the system. It seems inevitable, therefore, that as matters of kind vanish into
matters of degree and then entirely new meanings turn up, there will be an attempt to escape
to some overall rule which can be said to have always operated and which will make the
reasoning look deductive. The rule will be useless. It will have to operate on a level where
it has no m ea n in g .. . The statement o f the rule is roughly analogous to the appeal to the
meaning o f a statute or of a constitution, but it has less of a function to perform. It is
window dressing.7*
Whereas changes in legal precedent may appear vacuous from the standpoint of deductive
reasoning, (or inductive reasoning for that matter) this does not mean such changes are
entirely random. In fact, the appearance of randomness in such cases can only follow from
inattention to the interactional significance of any principles at issue. The logical gaps
which appear in the relationship between a particular case and a legal principle are similar to
those which occur for scientists in the jum p from empirical data to the formation of an
hypothesis. As Charles Sanders Peirce argued, the formation of an hypothesis must
proceed through some plausible linkage (what he called an "abduction") even though this

^ ’Levi, 8-9 A footnote referring to John Stewart Mill's work, A System o f Logic, has been omitted from
the last sentence.
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type of connection plays no role in demonstrating the truth of the hypothesis i t s e l f T h a t
such a link should fail to appear in the explicit demonstration o f a scientific hypothesis or
legal argument constitutes a problem in the denotational text models used to evaluate both
types of discourse. This lack of a rational warrant appears to detract from the propositional
rigor o f judicial opinions, leading to tautological inferences and the endless historical
transformations of case law.
In such transformations an important part of the discursive process is dropped from
the focus o f attention dealt with in a denotational text. As Levi notes, this apparently
vacuous process is liable to make the participants in a legal process uncomfortable. Hence,
people frequently attempt to address the weak points of legal argumentation through ad hoc
principles, effectively providing a metalinguistic commentary on legal discourse without
improving its logical rigor. These meta-linguistic principles address the subject matter of
abductive inferences in terms of denotational text sentences, but the relationship between
these timeless principles and the dynamic process of legal discourse remains unclear. Such
statements provide an ideological objectification of the discursive framework involved in
case law, in effect; transforming heuristic principles into cosmological statements. Hence,
the social structure which guides a legal proceeding is typically projected onto the universe
itself, generating ideological notions of "justice," "liberty," etc. Such ideological categories
purportedly denote abstract concepts of great objective significance, though in effect they
generally reflect the interactional patterns of a given cultural order.
In its own way, the ideological "window dressing" o f legal argumentation does
provide a link between the interactional significance of a legal text and its denotational text
structure. They may be be thought of as instances of linguistic ideology. A linguistic
ideology constitutes "a set o f beliefs about language articulated by the users as a

^^Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed., Charles Hartshome and Paul
Weiss, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960) 5.112-131 passim.
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rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use."73 As such, an
ideological position about any pattern o f discourse (such as legal reasoning or historical
narrative) constitutes a position describing that pattern in denotational terms. W hether or
not this kind of ideological position effectively characterizes the interactional structure of a
given cultural framework, adherence to it does effectively provide a individuals with a
definite stance within that framework. Thus, ideological statements will normally address
the social categories available in a given language or culture, often providing the
interactional value o f a social category with an illusory sense o f objectivity. Hence, behind
each of the fictive principles invoked to rescue case law from its historical context lies an
interactional schema (an indexical relationship) which is in fact salient to the process of
legal dispute.
Such ideological statements appear necessary because the conventions of legal
argument are slow to address the dynamics of non-propositional discourse, or interactional
texts.74 Simply put; the courts are slow to recognize any convention of discourse that does
not take the form of a proposition, even when that convention takes place within the courts
themselves. This "linguistic unifunctionalism" informing the conventions of legal discourse
makes it necessary to fill in the gaps o f legal reasoning with apparently objective statements
about the cosmological nature of legal principles, and of law as such.^^ Such a position
may be suspicious when fram ed in terms of an explicit ideological proposition, but the
indexical relationship behind it may yet structure the rhetorical options available to
participants in a legal dispute. Judges and lawyers make use o f such principles through

^^Michael Silverstein, "Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology," Papers from the Parasession on
Linguistic Units and Levels, eds., P. Clyne, et. al. (Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1979) 193. See
also Bernard Weissbourd and Elizabeth Mertz, "Rule-Centralism Versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of
Legal Ideology Through Language," Law & Society Review. 19 (1985) 623-59 passim.
^'^Mertz and Weissbourd, 623-59 passim.
^^Mertz and Weissbourd, 649.
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perform ative discourse, that is; by effectively assuming a posture consistent with the
cultural categories available to them through the interactive framework of a legal disputeJ^
Because the ideological nature o f a tim eless legal principle corresponds to the
ideological nature o f folk models about linguistics, historical narrative, social organization,
etc., the invocation of an ideological position in case law may (depending on the visibility
o f the case) contribute to the construction of master-narratives common throughout other
areas of American culture. Hence, ideological positions about the nature of legal reasoning
draw support from discourses occurring outside o f the courtroom, thereby providing a
stable link between the micro-social interactions found in a given legal dispute and the
patterns o f a larger cultural system. In this respect an ideological position may form the
interactional link between an indexical relationship and an abstract cultural order. Such a
position m ay also provide the link between the interactional text and the denotational texts
o f a written legal opinion, because any viable legal strategy must take notice of existing
cultural norms. Each such ideological position therefore dictates the range o f plausible
assumptions that someone may draw from in the process of constructing a legal argument.
The "result" of a given court case will normally prove acceptable to those who share the
court's expectations about the social identity of its participants, in which case it will find a
welcom e place in subsequent historical narratives, social comm entaries, further case
histories, etc. Thus, legal history shares a common ideological orientation with other
aspects o f historical narrative, and it is through the ideological positioning o f legal
disputants in some form of master-narrative that a legal outcome serves to shape the
organization of society and the course of history. W ithout this step a legal decision is an
event significant only to its own participants, but positioned within an appealing masternarrative a legal decision may in effect transform the prevailing cultural order.

^^C.f. James Boyd White's discussion of justification and performance in Justice as Translation. 105-109.
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The Ideological Dimensions of Indian Identity.
The kind of process outlined in the preceding remarks can be seen clearly enough in
the cases associated with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, but many of the
ideological themes associated with the AIRFA became enshrined during a much earlier
phase of Indian law. Interaction betw een Indians and whites has been structured
throughout American history along the lines of an ideological contrast between change and
stasis. This contrast between past and future is normally tied to value assumptions in
historical narratives. Thus, for example, visions of a better future dominate a great deal of
the Euro-American historical consciousness.^^ Such visions of progress may be reversed,
however, leading to a "declensionist " view of h

i s t o r y

Appeal to tradition is frequently

tied to the latter view, as a means of halting the decline of history. Such value statements
constitute a kind o f meta-historical thesis, or historical ideology; they contribute to a stance
toward the nature of history as such.^^ M oreover, such a meta-historical thesis need not
always be explicit; they appear implicitly in a broad range of historical narratives concerned
with more concrete subjects.
The contrast betw een a positively valued future and a negatively valued past
emerged in early European discourse about colonization of the American hemisphere and
treatment of its indigenous population. Just as the American hemisphere represented the
colonial future o f Europe; its indigenous population was taken to represent Europe's
uncivilized past. Thus, Euro-American mythology typically assigned Native Americans a

^^Cf.George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live Bv. (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1980) 22-24; and Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language. (1959. New York: Anchor Books,
1981)6-9.
^^Cf. William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," The Journal of American
History. 78 (1992) 1352 and passim.
^^Cf. Elizabeth Mertz, "The Uses of History: Language, Ideology, and Law in the United States and South
Africa," Law & Society Review. 22 (1988) 661-85 passim-, Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essavs in
Cultural Criticism. (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978) 1-25 passim; Karl
Lowith, Meaning in History. (Chicago and London: Phoenix Books, 1949) 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
fixed place along a temporal dimension serving as an ideological prototype of past stages in
the history o f humanity. This ideology cast Euro-Americans as agents of progress an
assigned Native Americans a negative value as the representatives o f an uncivilized past.^O
The image of an uncivilized barbarian was o f course counterbalanced with images o f the
"noble savage" in which Native Americans emerged as exemplars o f a more perfect past.^i
A related version of this declensionist narrative emerged with the rise of Native American
literature; one emphasizing the positive value of indigenous land rights, and advocating a
strong environmental ethic in contrast to the destructive forces of European

im p e r ia lis m .^ ^

As Christopher Vecsey put it: "Perhaps Indians have taken the role o f nature lover as way
of identifying themselves as Indians. That is to say, it is Indian' to revere nature. Doing so
is a political, ontological statem ent."83 Thus, Indians have countered the the EuroAmerican rhetoric o f "progress" with a native "environmentalism," and thus fashioned a
source of ethnic identity out of the ideological basis for an ostensible description American
history.
Both notions of "progress" and notions o f "environm entalism " constitute an
ideological position about the value of American history from the standpoint o f Indianwhite relations; and while neither position could be adequately justified on empirical

8®See for example the famous references to American living in "a state of nature" in Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan. Ed., C.B. Macpherson, (1951. New York: Penguin Books 1968) 187; John Locke, Two
Treatise of Government, (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1960) 286,294,
317-18, 334-337, 338-40.
8*E.g. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The First and Second Discourses Together With Replies to Critics and
Essav on the Origin o f Languages, ed. and tr., Victor Gourevitch, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1986) passim.
82see for example Russell Means, "Same Old Song," Marxism and Native Americans, ed.. Ward Churchill,
(1983. Boston: South End Press, 1992) 19-33 passim; Peter Nabokov, ed.. Native American Testimony: A
Chronicle o f Indian-White Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-1992. (1978. New York: Penguin
Books, 1991) 381-403 passim.
83christopher Vecsey, "Environmental Religions," American Indian Environments: Ecological Issues in
Contemporary Native American History, ed., Christopher Vecsey and Robert W. Venables, (Syracuse, New
York: Syracuse University Press, 1980) 6.
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grounds, each of them also provides an indirect source of identity for both Native and nonNative Americans. Each of these positions appears to take a particular value as the objective
basis for contrasting the ethnic identities o f Native and Euro-Americans, whereas in reality
the rhetorical value o f this contrast changes freely from one context to another while
preserving its structural properties.*^ Adherence to one or the other ideological position
therefore constitutes an indirect or constitutive index of Native or Euro-American political
identity.85
As an indirect index of Indian identity, the contrast between progressive whites and
environmentally friendly Indians can seriously affect the outcome of any legal or political
conflict. Such contrasts are frequently limited to the presuppositional aspects of political
discourse, loading the political identity o f participants in a given dispute with implications
far beyond those necessary to establish who is talking to whom. And yet, it is because the
implications o f this contrast are established through an indexical relationship that its use
becomes a powerful tool in political discourse. In identifying the participants in a given
dispute through such terms one assigns a definite political value to the interests associated
with either side, but without asserting any explicit proposition about those interests.
D ifferent variations o f this contrast between Indians and whites therefore rest in the
background o f numerous legal and political disputes involving Native Americans.

Indian Identitv and the Legacv of John Marshall.
Images of a dynamic white and a static Indian identity have occupied a prominent
place in U.S. law throughout American history. This is clearly seen in a trio o f cases
defining the relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government. In the 1823

8^C.f. Susan Gal, "Bartôk's Funeral: Representations of Europe in Hungarian Political Rhetoric,"
American Ethnologist. 18 (August, 1991) 440-58 passim.
85c.f. Elinor Ochs, "Indexing Gender,” Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin, eds.. Rethinking Context:
Language as an Interactive Phenomenon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 335-358; Wall,
"Space, Time and Cultural Landscape," passim.
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case o f Johnson v. M cIntosh the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide the nature of
Indian land title in the United States. In the majority opinion for this case C hief Justice
John M arshall explained that the doctrine of discovery gave the United States " . . . an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
co n q u e st. . ."*^ Having established a legal groundwork for advances on Indian territory,
M arshall explained that Indian land title was not thereby cancelled, and barring proper
action by the U.S. governm ent, Indians would retain legal title to the lands they
occupied.87 The M cIntosh decision therefore denied legal title to land privately purchased
from Indians living in Indian territory.88 While the decision preserved the territorial claims
o f an Indian tribe, it did so by denying the capacity of Indians to sell their own lands
w ithout an action by the Federal government. By preserving the boundaries of Indian
territory from private encroachment in this particular manner, the Marshall court denied a
significant form of agency to Indians while at the same time securing a legal framework for
further U.S. advances into Indian territory. Hence, the outcome of M cIntosh ensured the
march of history across the American continent.
If McIntosh made it clear that the Federal government reserved a right to extinguish
Indian land title, the case did little to clarify the relationship between Indian tribes and state
governments. So, in 1831 the Cherokee Nation brought suit against the state of Georgia
which had recently extended its laws into Indian territory. The Supreme Court then refused
original jurisdiction on the grounds that the Cherokee Nation did not constitute a foreign
state in the sense required by the Constitution.®^ In his majority opinion for the Cherokee
Nation case John Marshall fashioned a new political identity for Indian tribes:

BGjohnson and Graham Lesee v. William McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 587 (U.S. 1823).
8^McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 587-94 (U.S., 1823).
8*McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, 603-4 (U.S., 1823).
*^The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters, 15-19 (U.S., 1831).
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"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether these tribes which
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy,
be denom inated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. M eanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relationship to the United States

resembles that of a ward to his guardian."'^
This celebrated passage forms the basis for trust doctrine, a principle which remains the
cornerstone of Indian law up to the present day.^* M arshal's comparison of the
relationship between Indians and the Federal government with a fiduciary responsibility
implied a clear political hierarchy, but it did little to clarify the responsibilities of the Federal
government. His analogy was flawed from the start, because sovereign nations such as the
United States cannot easily be compelled by law to live up to such a

r e s p o n s ib ilit y .^ ^

Not

surprisingly, early perspectives on trust doctrine rested on little more than a vague sense of
cultural superiority, and that superiority usually meant the right to take away Indian land.^5
As wards of the federal government, Indians constituted little more than children; and
attempts to change their cultures could be understood as a process of education. The
Marshall court had once again created a legal framework for the march of history through
Indian territory, and it fashioned that framework by modeling the relationship between
Indians and the federal government after the image of a relationship between a parent and a
child.
The decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia certainly had a substantial impact on
Indian law, but it did not do much to resolve the conflict between Indian tribes and state
governments. This was no small matter in the early years o f the Republic wherein Federal

^®Cherokee Nation (emphasis added), 5 Peters, 17 (U.S., 1831)
^*See "Notes: Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law," Harvard Law Review, 98 (1984) 42240 passim.
92sewell, 438-499.
93"Notes," 426-427.
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and State governments struggled to define their own spheres of authority. So, Georgia's
attempts to expand its jurisdiction over Indian territory soon led to another conflict between
Federal and State authorities. When a missionary named Samuel W orcester was sent to the
Cherokee nation under the authority of the President of the United States he was eventually
prosecuted for failure to secure a perm it from the state of Georgia.^^ He challenged
Georgia's jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, and John Marshall (a staunch Federalist) wrote
the majority opinion for the Court ruling in W orcester's favor. This effectively answered
the question raised originally by the Cherokee nation and provided another lasting principle
of Indian law: any tribal authority not explicitly extinguished by Federal legislation remains
with the tribe itself, leaving state governments without any jurisdiction over tribal territory.
The denial of state jurisdiction over tribal land holdings has led to significant legal
victories for both Indians and the Federal government. Often the one has led to the other as
victories by tribal entities are often quickly followed by advances in Federal jurisdiction.
For example, in 1883 a Lakota named Crow Dog was tried under state jurisdiction for the
murder of another Lakota on a reservation in South Dakota. The Supreme Court declared
that the District Court of South Dakota did not have the necessary jurisdiction to hear the
case and subsequently overturned Crow Dog's

c o n v ic t io n .^ 5

public outrage over Crow

Dog's release soon led to passage of the M ajor Crimes Act which redefined seven different
crimes as Federal offenses when committed In Indian t e r r i t o r y O v e r the years since then
the American public has called upon the Federal government to fill numerous gaps In State
jurisdiction over tribal territories, and to provide a general source of government authority
on Indian reservations. This pattern of relations has served to strengthen ties between tribal
interests and the Federal government and led to a gradual re-definition o f trust doctrine.

^'^Samuel A. Worcester v. The State of Georgia, 6 Peters, 515 (U.S. 1832).
Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556-72 (1883).
^^Francis Paul Prucha, Documents o f the United States Indian Policy. 2nd Edition, Expanded. 1975.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) 167-68.
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Vague notions o f cultural superiority have gradually been replaced with a theory that the
Federal government's fiduciary responsibilities stem from its control over Indian land, (a
perspective dubbed "control theory").^^
There is little evidence for trust doctrine in the text of the Constitution. Neither the
M arshall court, nor many of the subsequent courts using trust doctrine have consistently
attempted to ground that relationship in the text of the Constitution.^® Thus, Vine Deloria
Jr. has argued that the trust relationship rests on extra-Constitutional authority, and he has
repudiated attempts to reduce the legal status of Indian tribes to any doctrine of legal
t h e o r y . D e l o r i a thus Indian tribes as political entities which the M arshall court
acknowledged to exist as a matter of common sense, so to speak. This certainly reflects the
interpretive strategies employed by the M arshall court in its attempt to deal with the
Cherokee land cases. In each of these cases the Marshall court did not so much articulate an
explicit theory about any of laws that it was called upon to interpret as identify the parties
before it and clarify their relationship to the jurisdiction o f the U.S. Supreme Court, thus
accomplishing a great deal of his legal task by merely identifying the issues before it.^00
Marshall was therefore able to derive a set of pragmatic implications from the context of
each case simply by invoking the appropriate social indices for each of the relevant parties.
In fact, it is only through subsequent reflection on the interactional texts presented
in the Marshall trilogy that the outcome of these cases has been fashioned into a theoretical

97"Notes," 427-429.
^®David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal Plenary Power:' An Analysis of
Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty," 1886-1914," American Indian Quarterly, 18 (1994) 349-68
passim.
99vine Deloria, Jr. "The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights," The Plains Indians of the TwentiethCenturv. ed., Peter Iverson, (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 237-48 passim;
Vine Deloria, Jr., Beyond the Pale: American Indians and the Constitution, " A Less than Perfect Union:
Alternative Perspectives on the U.S. Constitution, ed., Jules Lobel, (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1988) 249-647 passim; Vine Deloria, Jr., "Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character o f Federal Indian Law, " Arizona Law Review, 3 1 (1989) 201-23 passim.
lOOMertz, "The Uses o f History," 677.
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doctrine. It is significant that Marshal's greatest contribution to the Indian law amounts to a
literal non-event. For, in describing Indian tribes as "domestic dependant nations" Marshall
was essentially placing the case before him beyond the authority of his own court, and it is
only because non-action by the U.S. Supreme Court acquires an interactional significance
by default that this decision m eant anything to those involved at the time. Moreover, the
effort required to transform M arshal's interactional texts into a legal doctrine (which is a
type o f denotational text) has produced some uncertainties. It is unclear, for instance,
w hether "trust doctrine" merely clarifies the implications o f tribal status as "domestic
dependant nation" or constitutes a countervailing principle,

Hence, later courts have

read a principle known as the doctrine of "plenary powers" into the M arshall trilogy,
declaring the Federal government immune to lawsuits from its Indian wards and asserting a
right to make unilateral changes in the provisions o f various Indian

tre a tie s .

Hence, the

prospect that the Federal government is responsible for the protection o f Indian tribes has
enabled the courts to defend actions clearly injurious to Indian tribes. In theory "trust
doctrine" im plies "plenary powers," but in practice the exercise o f plenary powers
constitutes an escape from the trust responsibilities of the federal governm ent. Had
M arshall produced an explicit theory of Indian law this inconsistency m ight have been
resolved but, as it stands, both principles have become theories only through attempts to
read a legal precedent back into the interactional text of Marshal's judicial opinions.
Any notions o f precedent found in the Marshall trilogy are closely tied to images of
historical progress. It is an historical ideology that informed Marshal's treatment of the
Cherokee land cases, and it is a similar ideology that guides placement of these cases in the

*0*Hence, when Vine Deloria refers briefly to the overall significance o f the Marshall cases he simply
refers to "Trust doctrine." See for example, "Trouble in High Places," State of Native America. 272-73.
Yet, when Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle examined the impact of the cases in detail they suggest that the
two principles are "contradictory," because Trust doctrine amounts to the denial of sovereignty to Native
American tribes whereas the doctrine of "domestic dependant nations" in effect recognizes a form of
sovereignty comparable to that o f a small European state, American Indians. American Justice, 25-33.
•02united States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone W olf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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history o f Indian law. Each o f the opinions authored by the Supreme Court in the Marshall
trilogy makes an im plicit appeal to an historical ideology contrasting progress and
civilization with savagery. W ithout completely denying that Indians had a history, (a
rhetorical option that was certainly available to him) Marshall placed the responsibility for
historical progress in the hands of American citizens.^^3 M oreover, his comparison of
"Christian" "discoverers" with "savages" living in the "wilderness" served to provide a
religious significance to the transfer of Indian lands to the United States.*®^ The mere use
o f such terms placed questions about Indian status within a familiar historical scheme at
least one level below and behind whites. Trust doctrine m atched the abstract spatial
dimensions of Indian territory with an abstract sense of time tied closely to images of the
United States and its future. Marshall made it clear that the initiative for change on the
American continent would come from from civilized Americans, and hence the language of
trust doctrine has transformed a historical ideology into a principle of l a w . *05 The salience
o f this same principle to contemporary Indian law remains contingent on continued
adherence to an historical ideology consistent with its terms.
M arshal's opinions facilitated the colonization o f Indian territory, but he did not
com m it the judicial branch to an active role in that process. Follow ing the Marshall
hearings, the Supreme Court has served throughout American history as a comparatively
stable source o f protection for Indian

in te re s ts .

By contrast, the m ajority of

encroachments on Indian territory and rights have come from the legislative branch of
g o v e r n m e n t . ‘07

Neither of these facts can be surprising, given the text of the Marshall

'O^Mertz, "The Uses o f History," 673-677.
'O'^Mertz, "The Uses o f History," 674.
'O^Mertz, "The Uses o f History," 673-677.
iOÔDeloria and Lytle, 57.
lO^Mertz, "The Uses o f History," 672.
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opinions. His view of history forces the legislative branch to act deliberately and explicitly
when lim iting the rights and powers of Indian tribe's. Absent any such legislation, Indian
tribes have commonly been able to defend their interests successfully in the American legal
system, effectively ". . . turning the 'white m an's' ideology of history to their own
a d v a n t a g e ." ‘08

Because the language of trust doctrine involves a relationship between

forms of government, it is tribes themselves which can make use of this ideology rather
than individual Native Americans. Thus in the twentieth-century the Federal government
has developed an elaborate set of adm inistrative policies for dealing with Indian
reservations, effectively putting into operation a control theory of trust doctrine. In direct
contrast to the assumptions of the Marshall court, its decisions have fashioned a permanent
role for Indian tribes in the American legal system.

Trust Doctrine and the Survival of Native American Tribes.
The transition from an historical theory of trust doctrine based on im m inent
assimilation to a theory about a continuing government interest in the welfare o f Indian
tribes was not altogether a smooth operation. Throughout the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies various changes in Indian policy indicate a continuing tension over the value of a
permanent relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government. This tension
rests on the implications of an indexical contrast between white visions o f progress and
Indian ties to the American landscape. Hence, the prospect of term inating the trust
relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal government constitutes nothing less than
the elimination of Indian tribes. Various attempts to eliminate the trust relationship have
threatened the legal basis on which Indian tribes may continue to exist. Contrasting
attempts to preserve trust doctrine under a control theory may in turn draw considerably
from the rhetoric o f Native American environmentalism. Contemporary threats to trust

lOSMertz, "The Uses o f History," 678.
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doctrine thus follow a narrative pattern emphasizing notions o f progress which had
originally been used in its own construction, whereas its defenders employ a sim ilar
schematic arrangement of space and time in combination with a different value orientation.
The history of Indian law has been described in term s of a cyclical pattern,
alternating betw een attem pts to protect and to destroy Indian culture and / or
sovereignty.*®^ For most of American history the protective phases of Indian law have
involved objectives limited to the survival of Indian tribes as such, and attempts to eliminate
Indian tribes have generally emerged out of the executive and legislative branches of of the
U.S. government. The specific history of the AIRFA fits neither of these generalizations,
though the law itself owes much to the contested nature o f Indian culture. M uch of the
rhetoric associated with the AIRFA echoes themes associated with one or another phase of
Indian policy, and the concerns addressed by the act itself fall into a range o f issues shaped
by the continuing alternation of hostile and protective forces in Federal Indian law.
Prior to the late twentieth-century the survival of Indian culture was primarily a
question about the survival of Indian tribes as discrete political units. Following a century
of efforts to acquire and limit the space of Indian country, the Federal government adopted
a strategy that would once and for all eliminate Indian territory along with the political
integrity o f Indian tribes. This led to the Dawes Act, a law which effectively transformed
the political objectives and interactional framework of Indian policy. Under the Dawes Act
the federal government would concentrate its attacks on Indian tribes on cultural patterns
defining tribal membership, effectively beginning a campaign of internal colonization.
Rather than acquiring further pieces of Indian territory the federal governm ent would
elim inate the social foundation of Indian tribes and render the reservation system
unnecessary. This was a classic example of the implementation of trust doctrine under
assim ilationist assumptions of cultural superiority. The rational warrant for this kind of

'®^C.f. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native American Societies in a
Modern Constitutional Democracy. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 13-14.
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action was precisely the relationship between ward and trustee outlined originally in the
Marshall trilogy.
The Dawes Act resulted primarily in economic and cultural devastation for those
Indian tribes subjected to its implementation.^

It had been intended from its inception to

force upon Indians a profound change in their way of life. Contrary to the expectations of
its advocates, however, the Dawes Act did not turn Indians into good agricultural capitalists
through its forced re-definition of their land claims. The problem with the expectations
associated with the Dawes Act was articulated quite well during its own era in a report
attached to the bill by dissenters on the House Committee on Indian Affairs. They charged
that rationale for the Dawes Act was based on a flimsy social theory, stating that "it does
not make a farmer out of an Indian to give him a quarter-section of land." ^ 1 ^ They further
asserted that Indian ideas about communal land ownership would prove too substantial an
obstacle for the act to achieve positive

r e s u lt s ,^

^2 Hence, this policy attacking notions of

communal land ownership would succeed only in emiserating the conditions of Indian life,
but its would not generate acceptance of a commodified sense of land ownership. As Karl
Polanyi argued, the destruction accompanied by measures such as the Dawes Act is not
primarily a function of the economic exploitation that accompanies their implementation; it
is a result of suppressing a cultural system forcibly under the gratuitous expectation that a
new market perspective will naturally take its place. ^ 13

* *®0n the effects of the Dawes Act, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Assault on Indian Tribalism: The
General Allotment Law (Dawes Act^ of 1887. ed., Harold M. Hyman, The America's Alternatives Series,
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1975) 28-31. Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the
American West 1846-1890. Histories o f the American Frontier, ed., Ray Allen Billington. (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1984) 268-269.
* **Washbum, 37.
* *2 Washburn, 35-40.
**3polanyi, 290-293.
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W ith the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act (or the Indian Reorganization Act) in
1934 Congress reversed the direction of Federal Indian policy. Under the Wheeler-Howard
Act the Federal government outlined a policy providing for the permanent survival of
Indian tribes. By establishing Federal responsibility to protect Indian communal land
ownership, and by giving Indians some official control o f their own political future; the
W heeler-Howard Act served to acknowledge Indians as subjects involved in the shaping of
their own history. This in itself implied a great deal that is anathema to traditional Indian
culture, particularly given the economic transformations deemed necessary for the success
of tribal entities. Tribal governments accepting the provisions of the Wheeler-Howard Act
were reformed along with the overall stmcture of Federal administration. Implementation of
the act required individual tribes to accept a democratic form of government, thus replacing
many o f the traditional forms o f Indian authority.**'^ Some charged that the new
governments were essentially government managed examples of

c o m m u n i s m . **5

Others

maintain that the tribal governments formed during this era were explicitly designed to
em pow er business interests so as to foster land development, often in direct conflict with
traditional interests.*

In any event, the legitimacy of tribal governments formed under the

provisions of the IRA remains a subject of dispute throughout intra-Indian politics.
The W heeler Howard Act did give Indian tribes a respectable base of power from
which they could negotiate their own political future. Much that had been gained under the
W heeler-H ow ard A ct was soon threatened, however, with the end o f the Roosevelt
administration. Apparently, the lessons of the Dawes Act were not well learned, because
the Federal governm ent soon returned to a policy o f forced assim ilation during the

**4gee, Rebecca L. Robbins, "Self Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and future of
American Indian Governance," The State o f Native America. 95.
*'^E.g. Ramon Roubideaux, "Con. (in "Debate over IRA)" Native American Testimony. 328-29.
*'^E.g. Robbins, 92-98; Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Resistance to Genocide.
Ecocide and Expropriation in Contemporarv North America. (Monroe, Main: Common Courage Press,
1993) 145-47.
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Termination era o f the nineteen-fifties. Under this policy the Federal government paid any
Indian tribe deemed self sufficient a lump sum of money and then promptly terminated its
special relationship with the tribe and its members. The impact o f termination policy was
far from beneficial, and the Federal government soon moved toward another approach to
Indian

t r i b e s . * *2

By

1968

Lyndon Johnson articulated a principle of self-determination, a

policy which was reaffirmed by Richard Nixon in

1 9 7 0 .* * ®

Self-determination has a fairly obvious rhetorical significance, but its actual policy
implications have never been particularly clear. Much as it is generally safe to say that the
W heeler Howard Act was beneficial to Indians insofar as it ended the policy of General
Allotment, the policy of Self-determination is clearly beneficial only insofar as it constitutes
an end to the termination era. By the late nineteen-seventies the preservation of autonomous
Indian governm ents had become a basic assumption of national policy. The specific
implications of Indian self-determination remain unclear, however, though they have
expanded beyond the minimal implications of a control theory. Congressional action
consistent with the policy of self-determination has added a legislative basis for tribal status
in contemporary Indian policy, but neither this nor the case law affecting Indian tribes rests
on a secure textual basis in the Constitution. Indian claimants must are therefore particularly
vulnerable to ideological reconstructions o f their legal standing in a given dispute. The
status of an Indian tribe remains somewhat tenuous in contemporary Indian law, and the
rhetoric surrounding Indian policy frequently eclipses the actual policy questions at hand.
Moreover, the fate of Indian tribes remains subject to alteration by the new legislation,
placing the rights of Indian tribes as such at the mercy of the continuing democratic
process. Even as Indian tribes explore new possibilities of self-government, their legal
status remains a highly contestable source of authority.

" ^ S e e Deloria, Custer. 54-77.
>>8prucha, 248-249, 256-258.
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During the self-determ ination era Congress has entertained a num ber o f bills
addressing Indian interests beyond the mere survival o f Indian tribes as such. The
American Indian Religious Freedom Act is a prime example of this kind of legislation. It is
the prospect of appeal to trust doctrine (more appropriately to the prospect of invoking the
social identity dictated by trust doctrine) which would eventually drive a great deal of the
interests associated with AIRFA litigation. Yet the significance that Indian tribes play in
shaping the Federal interest at stake in the AIRFA has never been very clear. Thus, Indians
attempting to receive Federal relief under the provisions of the AIRFA have frequently been
unable to invoke the indexical patterns dictated by trust doctrine. The courts generally
treated AIRFA claimants as individual U.S. citizens rather than as m em bers o f semiautonomous nations invoking federal trust responsibilities. To understand the ambiguous
relationship between the AIRFA and Federal trust doctrine, one must therefore address a
range of individualistic themes associated with the Bill of Rights.

Free Exercise and the Balancing Test.
Notions derived from free exercise doctrine had a profound affect on the case
history associated with the AIRFA. As had been the case with trust doctrine the principles
governing case law in free exercise disputes emerged out of a historical process, and they
continue to have a transient existence. This fact is somewhat obscured by efforts to cast
them as timeless legal principles. Such principles exhibit a certain heuristic value as they
emerge into legal discourse, but nothing stops the courts from setting these principles aside
once they prove inconvenient. When the AIRFA became law the courts generally employed
a formula known as the balancing test in cases dealing with questions o f free exercise. In
following this procedure a court would weigh the government interest at stake in a given
case against the religious needs of a litigant claiming a right of free exercise. Under the
balancing test a good deal of the outcome of a given case clearly hinges on the personal
judgem ent of the appellate justices hearing it, a fact which serves only to heighten the
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impact of any personal or structural biases affecting the court's orientation toward minority
religions. M ost o f the cases associated with the AIRFA would involve a pattern of
reasoning tailored to meet the criteria spelled out in this approach; but these same cases
would begin to strain the courts' willingness to stand by the balancing test, eventually
leading the Supreme Court to all but renounce it in the Smith

c a s e .* *9 i n

this respect the

AIRFA set the stage for the final phase in the history of the balancing test, and the two
would eventually share the same fate at the hands of the Supreme Court.
The balancing test emerged out of the demise of an earlier distinction between belief
and action, which had been enshrined by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Revnolds
V.

United States (1878), a dispute involving the Mormon practice of polygamy. In keeping

with his M orm on faith George Reynolds had taken a second wife, and was accordingly
charged w ith

p o l y g a m y . *2®

His lawyers argued that no intent to break the law could be

attributed to Reynolds, because such a marriage constituted a religious duty for members of
the M ormon Church.*2* The Supreme Court decided against Reynolds, however, and in
the majority opinion. Chief Justice Waite introduced a distinction between belief and action
into the subject of religious freedom. Borrowing from the work of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, Waite argued that the principle o f religious freedom was intended to
apply only to questions of belief. Through such a principle; "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation o f social duties or subversive o f good

o rd e r.

"*22 Chief Justice Waite moved on

*'^Sm ith, 494 U.S. 882-890 (1990).
*20Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145-53 (1878).
*2'R eynolds, 98 U.S. 161-62 (1978).
*22There is an interesting poetic feature to this argument inasmuch as Waite's statement of this general
principle follows a historical analysis o f the struggles undertaken by Madison and Jefferson to ensure
observation o f both religious freedom and a separation o f church and state in the state o f Virginia. Yet, the
language with which Waite summarizes this relates directly to "Congress," implicitly transforming the
context of debate from that o f the famous Virginia resolution to a dialogue directly relevant to the Supreme
Court o f the United States. (Note that it was a Federal law which was at issue in Reynolds, given the fact
that the events in question took place in Utah territory, which would not become a state until January 4,
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to describe law s against polygamy as valid statutes relating to actions rather than
b e lie fs .

*23 Thus, the court faced the prospect of accommodating a particular individual's

actions on the grounds that they had been religiously motivated, a prospect which the court
easily rejected:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the
United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in
name under such circumstances. *24
The R evnolds decision matches a certain intuitive understanding of the First
Amendment as a body of principles relating to ideas, and to those conditions necessary to
ensure the free and safe communication of ideas. The court's distinction between belief and
action thereby continued a trend towards privatization of religion which can be detected in
the form ulation of the text of the First Amendment itself. In protecting the state from
practices based on the religious beliefs of individual citizens the Revnolds case further
enshrined the artificial distinction between the recognizably "religious" beliefs protected by
the First Amendment and the cosmological principles presumed by the First Amendment
itself. This distinction between belief and action effectively defined any conflict between the
State and a religious sect over a religious practice as a secular matter, even when, as in the

1896.) This is not to say that Waite could not have inferred the relevance of this principle to his own case
from a careful reading of the material relevant to Virginia; but that instead of making such an inference on
logical grounds he did so through an interactional text, generating a trope in which Madison an Jefferson
spoke directly to the case at hand. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 164 (1878).
*23Reynolds, 98 U.S. 164-67 (1878).
*24Reynolds, 98. U.S. 166-67 (1878). It is worth noting that while the belief action distinction may have
emerged out of conflict between the Federal government and the Mormon church over polygamy; this
distinction did not continue to define the boundaries of Federal interest in the subject. In 1882 Congress
would pass the Edmunds Act, disenfranchising those who believed in the practice of polygamy as well as
imposing more substantial penalties for those who practiced it. See Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune
and None of Mv Own": A New Historv o f the American West. (Norman and London: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991) 174.
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case of the Revnolds decision, a good portion of the rationale for the State's own interest is
intimately bound up with the development of religious

t r a d i t i o n s . * 25

The Court's reasoning in the Revnolds case did more to underscore the potential
threats posed by an open ended interpretation of Free Exercise Clause than it did to resolve
them. The distinction between belief and action rendered the Free Exercise Clause
redundant, given the fact that laws affecting beliefs rather than actions would be covered by
the Free Speech clause of the same amendment which could be called upon to ensure free
e x p re s s io n .

*26 Only by looking into areas of activity motivated by religious doctrines

could the courts' give the Free Exercise clause any substantive domain not already covered
by the protection of expression. The principle announced in the Revnolds case appeared to
prevent just such an inquiry, thus rendering the Free Exercise clause ineffective as a means
of protecting Americans from dangerous religious practices.
In 1940 the Supreme Court would begin to venture towards a more substantive
interpretation of the Free Exercise clause, and thereby renew the potential threat that
religious freedom holds for "the law of the land." In Cantw ell v. C onnecticut the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision convicting Jehovas' Witnesses o f violating
a law prohibiting solicitation without official approval from the State's secretary o f the
Public Welfare Council, and in the instance of Cantwell himself; a conviction for inciting a
breach of the peace. *27 In the majority opinion for the case Justice Roberts would revisit
the distinction between belief and action produced over a half century earlier by the
Reynolds court:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
One the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance o f any creed or the

*25ln the language of the Court, "Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless,
in most civilized nations a civil contract, and usually enforced by law." Reynolds, 98. U.S. 165 (1878).
*26see Lupu, 938; Stephen L. Pepper, "The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on
Recent Cases," Northern Kentuckv Law Review. 9 (1982) 265-66.
*27cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 300 (1940).
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practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted
by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. *28
As in the Reynolds case, the argument presented in Cantwell suggests that the court was
reluctant to extend free exercise protections to actual religious practices. In declaring the
Connecticut law prohibiting unauthorized solicitation unconstitutional, the court was careful
to indicate that law s prohibiting fraud could still be enforced against religious
organizations. *2® And in declaring that Cantwell him self had not incited a breach of the
peace, the court merely reviewed the facts of the case and decided that he had not exhibited
any profane or indecent behavior. *5® The Court did not declare that fraudulent claims or
indecent behavior would be protected in the event that such behavior constituted a form of
proselytization; but it did reject regulations pertaining directly to the latter based on vague
concerns about the prospect of fraud or indecency.
The C antw ell decision did not extend free exercise relief to a broad range of
religious practices, but the court's willingness to entertain cases involving religious
practices in itself constituted a radical break from the rationale guiding free exercise cases in
the wake of the Reynolds decision. Following Cantwell, people would test the Supreme
Court's willingness to extend free exercise protection to a great variety of activities. So, the
rationale offered in the Cantwell decision did generate more substantive notions free
exercise doctrine, leading to an approach that could not be reduced to other provisions
within the First Amendment. This course renewed the dangers inherent to the Free Exercise
clause by extending its denotational scope to a broad range of social practices. As the
Supreme Court began to flesh out the new possibilities suggested in Cantw ell, it would

*28CantweIl, 310 U.S. 303-4 (1940).
>29cantwell, 310 U.S. 304-6 (1940).
'3®Cantwell, 310 U.S. 307-11 (1940).
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also have to find a new means of narrowing the potential scope of free exercise claims; it
would have to construct a new "gatekeeper doctrine." *5*
The process of defining the Supreme Court's new approach to free exercise began
in earnest during the early nineteen-sixties . In the 1961 case of Braunfield v. Brown the
Supreme Court ruled against a free exercise challenge to Pennsylvania's Sunday closing
laws. The petitioners in this case were orthodox Jews who argued that they should not be
forced to close their places of business on Sundays, because they were obliged to refrain
from work on Saturdays in observation of the

S a b b a th .

*52 Enforcement of Sunday closing

laws against such individuals would force them to choose between operating at an
economic disadvantage and violating their own religious beliefs. *53 Although the Supreme
C ourt did not agree with the petitioners. C hief Justice W arren's m ajority opinion
underscored the possibility that such religious practices could find protection under the Free
Exercise Clause. Citing Cantwell. Warren wrote that freedom of belief was absolute, but
that the issue at hand involved the more constricted form o f protection afforded the practice
o f religion. *54 W arren characterized the chief source of conflict between free exercise
principles and legislative bodies in terms of indirect burdens generated through legitimate
public interests. *55 He wrote:
Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which imposes
solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification.
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though
the burdens may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct
by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance
the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious

*5 ' Lupu, 937-39 and passim.
*52Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 600-2 (1961).
'33Braunfield, 366 U.S. 602 (1961).
>34Braunfield, 366 U.S. 603-7 (1961).
>35Braunfield, 366 U.S. 606-9 (1961).
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observance unless the State may accommodate its purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden.*56
In keeping with this approach the Court decided against the petitioners on the grounds that
granting exem ption to Orthodox Jews would impede the purpose of Pennsylvania's
Sunday closing law s. *57 Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's estim ate of
Pennsylvania's interest, arguing that exemptions were quite feasible and consistent with the
intended purpose of Sunday closing laws. *58 While the Braunfield case produced neither a
concrete outcom e that could be described as an extension of religious freedom, nor a
complete consensus within the court, it did provide an important step in defining the criteria
by which the Court would come to evaluate religious practices.
In the 1963 case o f Sherbert v. Vem er the Supreme Court would apply m uch the
same criteria to the claims of a Seventh-Day Adventist. In keeping with her own faith Adell
H. Sherbert refused to work on Saturdays, resulting in termination of her employment at a
mill in South

C a ro lin a .

*59 When she applied for unemployment compensation she was

denied benefits on the grounds that she had refused to accept employment without good
cause.*40 Sherbert had appealed the decision to the South Carolina Supreme Court on the
grounds that it violated the Free Exercise clause.*4* Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court,
Justice Brennan would again cite Cantwell, declaring that; "The door of the Free Exercise
Clause stands tightly closed against any government regulation of religious b e lie fs as
such. "*42 Turning to the Braunfield decision, he wrote; "On the other Hand, the Court has

*56Braunfield, (reference to Cantwell omited), 366 U.S. 607 (1961).
137Braunfield, 366 U.S. 608-9 (1961).
*58Braunfield, 366 U.S. 614-15 (1961).
139sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 399-400 (1963).
*40sherbert, 374 U.S. 400-1 (1963).
'4>Sherbert, 374 U.S. 401-2 (1963).
*42sherbert (emphasis in original), 374 U.S. 402 (1963).
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rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation o f certain
overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord
with one's convictions,

[it]

is not totally free from legislative

r e s t r i c t i o n s .'"

*43 Following

these remarks, Brennan moved on to frame the case in terms quite similar to those used in
Braunfield:
Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no
conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach o f state legislation. If,
therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary
represents no infringement by the State o f her constitutional rights o f free exercise, or
because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified
by a compelling state interest in the regulation o f a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate.'*44
Brennan then proceeded to argue that denial of unemployment benefits did in fact constitute
a burden on Sherbert's right of free exercise, and that South Carolina did not have a
compelling interest in its unemployment policy, or at least not one that would preclude the
kind o f exemption sought by

S h e r b e r t . *45

Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court, reversed the

decision o f the South Carolina Supreme Court, and provided one of the earliest cases
wherein a religious practice received the protection accorded by the Free Exercise Clause.
The outcome o f Sherbert v. V em er posed a number of vexing problems. Brennan
may have borrowed from the B raunfield case in constructing the majority opinion for
Sherbert. but he was not altogether convincing in his attempts to show that the outcome o f
Sherbert was consistent with the earlier decision. Using the position taken by the court in
B raunfield. that Sunday closing laws could not admit to exceptions w ithout unduly
straining the government's own interest (a point he had him self contended at the tim e);
Brennan argued that Sherbert differed from Braunfield in the empirical sense that such an
accommodation was indeed possible with respect to South Carolina's policies regarding

*43sherbert, 374 U.S. 403 (1963).
*44sherbert, (reference to NAACP v. Button omited), 374 U.S. 403 (1963).
>45sherbert, 374 U.S. 403-9 (1963).
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unemployment

c o m p e n s a t i o n . *46

Brennan’s rationale effectively cast a key feature of any

decision regarding free exercise in the form of an empirical question, one which would
have to be decided on a case by case basis; but this also meant that important aspects o f a
free exercise case were left to the discretion of the Court itself. W ithout declaring in
principle what would constitute a "compelling state interest," or how much trouble the
government could be expected to take in accommodating a right of free exercise, the criteria
outlined in Sherbert generated a discursive vacuum within the denotational text structure of
cases dealing with a right of free

e x e r c i s e . *47

Implementation of such a criterion would

therefore call increasing attention to the interactional contributions of appellate justices.
The very requirement that a justice should balance the interests of the government
against the free exercise interests of a claimant constituted the principle discursive weakness
o f the balancing test. The notion that justices can actually "balance" such interests is
nothing more than a rather stylized metaphor, because the literal significance of this term
would require that some absolute unit o f measure could be used to "weigh" one legal
interest against another. In actual practice justices faced incom m ensurable claims in
virtually every case, however, and hence each actual instance o f balancing invited
participants to assign their values to the interests at hand. W here diversity of expectation
existed in relation to a free exercise case, which is assuredly the reason that such cases
occur in the first place; there is little hope that a principle of law could be founded on the
personal credibility o f individual justices. In any event, following the introduction of the
balancing test the case history of free exercise doctrine soon began to fill up with decisions
backed by little more than common sense appeal and the credibility of appellate justices.

146sherbert, 374 U.S. 408-9 (1963).
*47For example. Justice Stewart agreed with the decision reached in Sherbert. but he argued that the new
decision could not be squared with the outcome in Braunfield. a fact which he seems to have regarded as a
virtue. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. 417 (1963). Likewise, Justices Harlan and White rejected attempts to
reconcile the cases with one another, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 421 (1963).
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The first prong of the balancing test could also be taken to imply a kind of sub
phase in which the court determines whether or not a given practice constitutes a form o f
religion - as opposed to deciding in one and the same moment that such a practice does
exist and that it has been burdened by a government policy. Justices have been unable to
deal effectively with this question on its own terms; however, perhaps because raising
questions about the religious nature of a practice simultaneously raises the prospect o f
arbitrary distinctions between religious and non-religious behavior, and because this calls
upon justices to second guess the sincerity of claimants,

Rather than articulate tenuous

Judgements about the viability of a religious tradition and the sincerity of its practitioners in
the actual text of a judicial opinion, justices have often conceded the religious nature of a
given practice only to articulate an argument denying relief on some other grounds. Hence,
the class o f practices acknowledged by the courts to be religious in nature appears quite
large indeed under the balancing test, but those practices actually afforded free exercise
protection are generally clustered around prototypical notions of religious belief.
The balancing test emerged as a means o f addressing the indirect burdens that
governm ent action could place on religious practitioners. In its willingness to review laws
and policies passed for generally valid purposes the Supreme Court greatly expanded the
potential scope of free exercise cases. The test itself placed the courts in a position to
actively structure the relationship between religious practitioners and governm ental
agencies, because it enabled judges to determine when governm ent policies would be
required to accommodate religious practitioners. This expansion o f free exercise doctrine
m atched coincided with an expansion of federal trust doctrine. In at least one respect the
AIRFA could be seen as the logical outcome of both developments; it explicitly required
governm ent agencies to weigh their own interests against those of traditional Indian
practitioners in the process o f formulating their own policies. In another respect, however.

*'**C.f. Marc Galanter, "Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point," Wisconsin Law
Review. (Spring, 1966) 255-64.
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notions of trust doctrine were inconsistent with the balancing test, because trust doctrine
called for the federal government to express a positive interest in helping Indian tribes
whereas the balancing test assumed an adversarial relationship between individual claimants
and governmental policies. The adversarial stance presumed in the balancing test naturally
reflected the interactional patterns o f a free exercise dispute in which each o f the parties
were assumed to be at cross-purposes. Application of the balancing test therefore served to
isolate the legal interests of both parties in a free exercise dispute, and hence its use in
AIRFA related cases precluded the very prospect that Indian claimants were themselves
entitled to active government support rather than mere accommodation.
The balancing test differed greatly from trust doctrine in another respect; it
addressed the institution of religion rather than the overall integrity of a tribe. The values
most likely to receive protection under the balancing test, those deemed most crucial to the
free exercise interests of religious practitioners, could generally be isolated from other
social interests. In many respects such values were closely related to the very sense of
belief originally set forth in the Revnolds case. The courts would not protect actions which
were not rooted in religious belief. Hence, those seeking free exercise relief for a social
practice had to base their case on claims about the religious beliefs reflected in those
actions. Social practices reflecting political and economic values might not receive
protection under the balancing test, unless they could be related to the maintenance of a
religious community.
The 1972 case of W isconsin v. Y oder constituted the most likely precedent for
tribal litigants pursuing A IRFA -related cases. This case involved a challenge to
W isconsin's com pulsory education law s, stem m ing from the Amish practice of
withdrawing their children from public schools beyond the eighth grade. Testimony given
in the lower courts established that the Amish religion involved adherence to a distinctive
pattern of living, one that generally required inhabitance within a distinct form of
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com m unity,

Lawyers for the Amish respondents Jonas Yoder and W allace M illner

further argued that attendance in a public school beyond the eighth grade threatened the
values espoused by the Amish faith, and that such school attendance made it impossible for
young adolescents to enter into their accustomed places within the Amish

c o m m u n ity .

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents, claiming that the government interest at stake
in the case was insufficient to warrant a substantial burden on their right of free exercise.
On behalf of the Court Justice Burger wrote:
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion. W e can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however
strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to
the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
Burger went on to distinguish between the "religious" motivations o f the Amish and those
issuing from more secular interests (such as those guiding Henry David Thoreau's decision
to live at Walden Pond).’^^ Granting the Amish position that school attendance beyond the
eighth grade constituted a serious threat to the practice of this faith, and that an exception
for Amish children would not prevent the state o f W isconsin from satisfying its ow n
interests in public education; the Court then ruled in favor of the respodents.153 Hence, the
Y oder case provided another precedent for the use o f the balancing test in free exercise
jurisprudence, and demonstrated the Court's increasing willingness to expand the actual
protection offered under that test.
In Yoder the court went so far as to protect an entire community and a distinctive
pattern o f living from an otherwise valid state law. This kind o f protection could have

•49wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 209-10 (1972).
'50Yoder. 406 U.S. 211-12 (1972).
151 Yoder. 406 U.S. 215 (1972).
'52Yoder. 406 U.S. 215-17 (1972).
'53Yoder. 406 U.S. 218-36 (1972).
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potentially brought a wide range of practices under the scope of the Free Exercise clause.
As a means of narrowing the scope of potential cases, the Court could indicate little other
than its requirement that such practices must stem from a form of religious belief. This kind
o f approach effectively raised a number of semantic difficulties associated with the
significance of "religion" (chapter 3). Justice Douglas charged in his dissent that; although
the Court had rightly rejected the distinction betw een belief and action outlined in
Revnolds. thereby expanding the range of free exercise protections; its own distinction
between "religious" behavior and that motivated by a mere philosophy of life constituted a
"retreat" from the broad-minded approach taken in the Seeger decision (see chapter 3). This
distinction between "religious" behavior and non-religious behavior appeared rather
arbitrary when dealing with nominally secular philosophies, as in Justice Douglas' dissent;
but such a distinction had become critical to the balancing test inasmuch as it constituted a
gatekeeper doctrine, a means of narrowing the scope of prim a fa c ie claims associated with
the Free Exercise clause.
Yoder thus established a precedent protecting the integrity of an entire community,
but that precedent was itself predicated on the possibility of determining that an explicit
religious value would be imperiled by any governm ent action which threatened that
community. Thus, it could be as a precedent for cases involving Indian comm unities,
providing that they could establish differentiate between the religious values at stake in a
given claim and those reflecting the economic and political interests of the tribe. The
prospect of using the balancing test thus seemed plausible to many Indian "traditionalists,"
who saw themselves as the spiritual backbone of tribal communities. In claim ing free
exercise relief, however, Indian litigants acted as United States citizens rather than as
members o f a semi-sovereign nation. Thus, in many respects the balancing test invited
judges to isolate the interests advanced by Indian litigants and distinguish them from both
the interests of the governm ent itself and the com m unities from which they came.
Reference to the balancing test thus enabled practitioners of traditional Indian ceremonies to
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represent their interests as plausible cases involving a right of free exercise, but the inability
to distinguish Indian cases from other free exercise cases ultimately prevented Indian
claimants from making full use of their trust relationship to the federal government.
As a document applying Euro-American notions of religious freedom to the context
of Indian-white relations, the AIRFA was influenced by the case law involving both trust
doctrine and the Free Exercise clause. Each of these two bodies of case law could be used
to generate plausible scenarios for conflict between Native Americans and federal agencies.
AIRFA proponents were clearly informed both by the notion that indirect burdens on a
right of free exercise should be balanced against government interests and the notion that
the federal government was itself responsible for protecting the cultural integrity of Native
American tribes. In one respect these notions appeared to complement one another; they
both led to an expansive notion of Indian religious freedoms. In another respect they were
inconsistent with one another; each presupposed a different model of the relationship
between an Indian claim ant and a federal agency. Hence, the text of the AIRFA was
informed by two very different contextualization schemata; two very different notions of
the dialogue taking place between Indians and federal agencies in American history. What
remains to be seen is the process by which these contextual models became fused in a
common rhetoric of religious freedom.
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Chapter II:
Taos Blue Lake and the Rhetorical Foundations of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act.
The Sun Dance and all other sim ilar dances and so-called religious cerem onies are
considered 'Indian Offenses' under existing regulations, and corrective penalties are
provided. I regard such restriction as applicable to any dance which involves . . . the
reckless giving away of property . . . frequent or prolonged periods of celebration . . . in
fact any disorderly or plainly excessive performance that promotes cruelty, licentiousness,
idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family w e l f a r e . '5 4
-Circular released by the Office of Indian Affairs on April 26,1921.
Since 1906, the Taos Pueblo Indians have hoped that the Blue Lake area would be
returned to them so that they could enjoy their freedom of unrestricted worship in the
traditional manner. This bill would assure them their hopes. It would also protect the
cultural survival o f the Taos Pueblo I n d i a n s . '55
-Statement of the Under Secretary of the Interior delivered May 13,1969.

Each of these texts represents the disposition of a federal bureaucracy towards
behavior tentatively identified as part of an American Indian religion. But whereas the
Indian Affairs circular of 1921 articulates a general strategy for prevention o f that behavior,
the Interior department's statement of 1969 supports a specific measure for the protection
of at least one Native American religion, that of the Taos Indians. The two statements differ
as much in tone o f presentation as they do in their intended consequences. The author of
the first passage could hardly admit to the religious nature of Indian ceremonies long
enough to indicate that something should be done to stop them. This stands in sharp
contrast to the second passage in which the author affirmed the religious character of the
subject and evoked the principles of a civil liberties tradition in a single phrase. The latter

'54circular No. 1665 (April 26,1921) Quoted in Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Report. P.L. 95-341. Washington, D.C. (August, 1979) 6-7.

'55u.S. Congress^ Senate, Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Taos Indians - Blue Lake
Amendments. Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, on S. 750 and H R, 471, (July 9 and 10, 1970) 13.
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statem ent more than departs from the previous ethos of overt religious oppression, it
articulates a deliberate political interest in the safeguarding o f Taos religion. Hence, the
statement of 1969 anticipates later attempts to apply the concept of religious freedom to a
broad range of Native American interests under the AIRFA.
The return of Blue Lake to the Taos Indians of New M exico was accomplished in
1970 largely on the basis o f arguments stressing its religious significance. Such an event
could hardly be conceived in an earlier era when the Office o f Indian Affairs was busy
putting Indians in jail on the suspicion that they may be practicing just such a tribal religion.
So long as the prevailing interpretation of trust doctrine rem ained that o f imm anent
assimilation the prospects of Native American appeal to religious freedom were quite dim.
The ideological position presupposed by assimilationist policies placed Native American
culture, if not Native Americans themselves, outside of an "American" community vested
with a right of free exercise. As extra-Constitutional entities Native American tribes were
not subject to the Constitutional protections, and so the Free Exercise clause did not seem
to preclude the governm ent from prosecuting tribal authorities for practicing traditional
Indian cerem onies.'56
The significance of Indian rituals during the assimilation era could be dictated by the
ostensibly secular goals o f BIA policy. U nder these conditions Native Am erican
ceremonies constituted an obstacle to federal policy, and their nominal inclusion within the
category of "religion" implied a contrast with prototypically Euro-American forms of
religion. The Indian Affairs Circular of 1921, for exam ple, hedges about the matter;
implying that Indian ceremonial practices might be considered religions without actually
granting that they are such. Such statements treating Indian ceremonies as degraded or
m arginal forms o f religion would later provide a ready gloss for those practices when
Indians came to assert a positive interest in defending their ceremonial systems. These

156£)eioria, "The Distincrive Status o f Indian Rights," 241-45.
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pejorative references to Indian established a crucial historical precedent for identifying
certain aspects of Native American cultures as matters of "religion." This in turn made it
possible for Indian tribes to present their ceremonial practices in terms fam iliar to the
Am erican public, and it eventually enabled ceremonial practitioners to lay claim to the
Constitutional protection normally afforded religious institutions.
As the prevailing sense o f trust doctrine evolved into a perm anent relationship
between the federal government and Native Americans, the notion that Indian ceremonies
constituted a form o f religion would lead to substantive claims on the abstract principle of
free exercise. So long as Native Americans were "Americans" they could not be denied the
right o f free exercise, but the distinct nature o f tribal religions along with the distinct legal
status o f tribal governments combined to provide an unusual social context for appeal to
free exercise. The religious practices of Native Americans were already profoundly affected
by interaction with the federal government, a fact which initially laid responsibility for the
free exercise of Indian religions at the feet o f the executive and legislative branches of
government rather than the courts. This ensured that Native American appeals to religious
freedom would find a different footing within the institutional structure of American law.
Hence, Native American appeal to religious freedom developed out of an unusual sense of
both its denotational and interactional implications.
Blue Lake established a precedent for successful appeal to Euro-American notions
of religious freedom in defense of tribal interests. The Taos Pueblo drew loosely from the
language of the First Amendment in pursuing this campaign, and hence the tribe did not
have to address the technical facets of free exercise doctrine in a courtroom. Yet, the return
of Blue Lake provided a historical precedent which established at least an abstract sense that
principles of religious freedom could be applied to tribal interests. In presenting its interest
in Blue Lake as a matter of religious freedom Taos Pueblo employed the notion of religious
freedom in novel ways, thus presenting an argument that stretched the usual sense of what
the phrase "religious freedom" could denote in Am erican politics. M oreover, the Taos
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Indians obtained resolution of its case from Congress rather than a court, and Congress
placed Blue Lake under trust title, thus framing the legal significance of Blue Lake in terms
o f the trust relationship. This unusual case therefore provided an important bridge between
an era in which Indian tribes were beyond the scope of the First Amendment and an era in
which the First Amendment would provide the basis for an expansive set o f Indian claims.

Assimilationist Policies and the Suppression of Taos Religion.
The Taos campaign to recover Blue Lake established much of the groundwork for
later Native American approaches to free exercise, but the Taos Indians were also familiar
with the kind of legal sanctions once used to suppress Indian religion. BIA policies
amounting to overt suppression o f Native American religion were in effect from the
eighteen-eighties to the nineteen-thirties, ending only with John Collier's administration of
Indian A ffairs.'57 The circular of 1921 merely reiterated a long-standing policy, but it
came at a tim e which was particularly stressful to the Indians of Taos Pueblo.'58 In the
early nineteen-twenties Charles Burke, the Com m issioner o f Indian Affairs personally
confronted the Taos Indians over their ceremonies. In 1924 he travelled to the Pueblo itself
and denounced their ceremonial practices to the Pueblo elders, commanded them to give up
their religion, and eventually had members of the tribal council arrested and jailed in a
conflict over the education of Taos youth.'59 Hence, the 1921 statement from the Office of

*57see Sharon O'Brien, "A Legal Analysis o f the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," Handbook of
American Indian Religious Freedom. 28.
•58r .c . Gordon-McCutchan, The Taos Indians and the Battle for Blue Lake, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Red
Crane Books, 1991) 16. The following presentation of background material surrounding the events
surrounding the Blue Lake controversy will closely follow Gordon-McCutchan's historical account.
'5 9 cu i de Angulo, Jaime in Taos: The Papers of Jaime de Angulo. (San Francisco: City Lights Books,
1985) 57-62; Gordon-McCutchan, 16-17; John T. Whatley, "The Saga o f Taos Pueblo: The Blue Lake
Controversy," The Indian Historian. 2 (Fall, 1969) 23; Nancy Wood, Taos Pueblo. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1989) 69.
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Indian Affairs articulated principles of institutional violence associated with earlier phases
o f trust doctrine and with events central to the history of Taos Pueblo.
The imprisonment of Taoseno elders provides a telling example of the state of
Indian-white relations in the nineteen-twenties, and it illustrates the particular role that
religion played in conflicts between Indians and federal policies during that era. A great
deal of this conflict appears to have centered around the prospect o f education. The
boarding schools of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA) had been viewed as instruments
o f assimilation from the moment of their inception; they were as important for preventing
the transmission o f traditional Indian views to children as for any positive instruction that
might take place within them. *^0 The BIA quite deliberately separated Indian children from
their homes, their families, and the prospect of using their own languages. In keeping with
this policy, the BIA took children from the Taos Pueblo to be educated all across the
country.'6 ' This practice placed particular strain on the maintenance of the kiva societies at
Taos, because these secret societies had traditionally required up to eighteen months for the
training of young male

i n i t i a t e s . '6 2

Members o f the Pueblo resisted BIA policies by

removing Taos youth from schools for the length o f time necessary to complete kiva
training. This in turn led to government officials to imprison the Pueblo town council.
That religion is somehow at stake in this issue can readily be gathered from
statements about the religious significance of education made by both BIA officials and

•60Deloria and Lytle, 241.
' 6 ' Wood, 70-71.
'62john J. Bodine writes that the initiation period for these males at Taos typically took 6, 12, or 18
months to complete, depending on the kiva for which they were undergoing training. The significance of
Blue Lake can already be dimly seen already in this conflict. For the completion of any of these cycles was
always timed to coincide with an annual migration to Blue Lake. See "Taos Pueblo," Handbook of North
American Indians, gen. ed., William Sturtevant, Volume 9, ed., Alfonso Ortiz, (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution, 1979) 262. Elizabeth Brandt provides an alternative perspective on the difference in time spent
during initiation. She writes that kiva leaders are normally drawn from the ranks of long term initiates,
those taking a full eighteen months to complete the process of initiation, "On Secrecy and the Control of
Knowledge: Taos Pueblo," Secrecv: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed., Stanton K. Teft, (New York and
London: Human Sciences Press, 1980) 123-46 passi/n.
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Native Americans. Along with the communal status o f Indian land holdings, the BIA
identified any Native American practices it considered to have religious significance
impediments to "progress" in the years leading up to the Dawes

A c t . '63

This led the BIA

to target ostensibly religious practices for repressive sanctions, and the provisions of this
policy were strongly influenced by that same agency's plans for the education of Indian
youth. Indian Courts had been charged with the punishment of religious offenses since the
eighteen-eighties, and education clearly played a key role in in defining the provisions of
these Religious Crimes Codes (RCC). Indians were not only jailed for dances, but for
interference with the education of Indian youth. Sections 'a' and 'c' o f the codes provide a
number of clues as to the rationale behind imprisonment Indian offenders:

(a) Dances, etc. -Any Indian who shall engage in the Sun Dance, scalp dance, or war
dance, or any similar feast, so called shall be deemed guilty o f an offense, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished for the first offense by withholding of his rations for
not exceeding ten days or by imprisonm ent for not exceeding ten days; and for any
subsequent offense under this clause he shall be punished by withholding his rations for
not less than ten nor more than thirty days, or by imprisonm ent for not less than ten nor
more than thirty days.
"c) Practices of medicine men. -Any Indian who shall engage in the practices of so-called
m edicine men, or who shall resort to any artifice or device to keep the Indians of the
reservation from adopting and following civilized habits and pursuits or shall adopt any
means to prevent the attendance of children at school, or shall use any arts of a conjurer to
prevent Indians from abandoning their barbarous rites and customs, shall be deemed to be
guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, for the first offense shall be imprisoned
for not less than ten nor more than thirty days: P r o v id e d , that for any subsequent
conviction for such offense the maximum term of im prisonm ent shall not exceed six
m o n th s.'64
Again one should note that the author of this code could hardly admit to the religious nature
o f the behavior that he had targeted for criminal sanctions. And yet there can be little doubt
that he had assigned a religious significance to that behavior, a significance underscored in
the circular of 1921. Here BIA policy cast the significance o f Indian ceremonies and
spiritual leadership in terms o f a long standing m aster-narrative about the relationship

'63American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report of 1979,5-6.
'64u.S . Department of the Interior, Report o f the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs. (August 27, 1892) 29.
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betw een civilization and so called primitive superstition.'65 The assumption o f cultural
superiority implicit within this theme placed any relevant native practices within the
semantic dom ain o f "religion," but only by negative juxtaposition with valued religious
trad itio n s.'66 The language used in these codes therefore provided N ative Am erican
religions with a role comparable to that used by the Marshall court in defining the status of
Indian tribes, effectively putting into practice an assimilationist theory o f trust doctrine.
Hence, Indian religion would be understood in the familiar terms of a historical contrast
betw een prim itive culture and Euro-American civilization, effectively placing Indian
ceremonies on par with other areas of Indian culture targeted for change. The religious
significance of Indian dances as well as the practices of medicine men therefore emerged
out of the indexical patterns of Indian-white relations. W hatever the term "religion" could
be meaningfully said to denote in reference to Native American culture, the use o f the term

'65jam es Ax tell writes that early French missionaries did not at first believe Native Americans possessed
religion, and tended to regard them as superstitious heathens. The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures
in Colonial North America. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 7-19. See also Francis
Jennings, The Invasion o f America: Indians. Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. (1975. New York and
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976) 43-57. This view o f Native Americans was complemented by
colonial attitudes toward Africans, who formed the prototypical "heathen" for British sensibilities. See
Winthrop D. Jordan, The White Man's Burden: Historical Origins of Racism in the United States. (London,
Oxford, and New England: Oxford University Press, 1974) 10-13. The presumption of religious superiority
towards "primitives " in general combined with visions o f secular development under the ideology of
American imperialism, creating a sense that a growing U.S. could serve as the salvation for Native
Americans. See William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Wav of Life: An Essav on the Causes and
Character of America's Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative. (1980.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 27-30. About the turn of the century, these presumptions o f
superiority combined with a sympathy for the condition of reservation Indians to create a renewed push for
assimilation. See, Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians. 18801920. (1984. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 15. By defining aid to Native American
communities in terms o f a progress in which Indian ceremonial practices were built by definition into the
bottom end o f the scale, policy makers could interpret direct attacks on select aspects of Native life as
genuinely beneficial reforms.
166use o f terms such as "superstition " or "heathen" serve to remove the beliefs and practices to which they
are applied from the realm of plausible belief systems. In the words of Thomas Hobbes; "Fear of power
invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed. Religion; not allowed.
Superstition. And where the power imagined is truelly such as we imagine. True religion. " Leviathan. 124.
It is this same line of reasoning that leads Axtell to note that the term "superstition" normally serves to
denigrate someone else's beliefs, 13.
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effectively conveyed a something about the interactional significance of native ceremonies
as an obstacle to the program of assimilation.
For the BIA religion was only indirectly at issue, as a point of theoretical contrast to
native practices which were in direct competition with its own policies. Section 'c' of the
code articulated a policy against "so-called medicine men" and added to this section a list of
activities which would interfere with the education planned for Indian children and for the
tribes as a whole. It might perhaps have been more appropriate to speak o f genuine
"medicine men" and a "so-called school," but in any event it is clear that that the Office of
Indian Affairs held these practices to be incompatible. Moreover, the high strategic value of
education is reflected in the comparatively stiff penalty provided for second offenders in
section 'c'. The BIA's education policy was an important plank in the plan for eradication
of Indian cultures, and the agency viewed continuation of traditional Indian ceremonies and
healing practices as obstacles to that end. Hence, BIA's education policy required the
forced suppression o f Indian "superstitions," resulting in this case in the forcible
confinement of the Taoseno council members.'67
Over the centuries since the Spanish first came into the Southwest the Taoseno have
understandably developed a reluctance to communicate information about their religion to

*67The imprisonment of Indians for religious offences involves a kind of performance trope. Commentators
have generally embedded the imprisonment of the Taos elders in a narrative relating to early BIA policies of
assimilation. This creates the impression that imprisonment of the Taos elders constituted an instrumental
activity designed to aid an established authority in efforts to achieve an end value distinct from the
significance o f the imprisonment itself. Such accounts thus convey the explicit policy stance o f the bureau
itself in explaining its reasons for imprisoning the Taos elders. Yet, the ability to forcibly imprison any
practitioners o f traditional Indian ceremonies, ostensibly posed as an instrumental practice, could actually be
seen as the real end value behind the action. In this respect the imprisonment of Taos elders could be seen as
a performative demonstration of the cultural superiority assumed in assimilationists policies. In proving the
capacity for domination o f Indian religious authorities, such institutional violence demonstrated, as a
practical fact, a form of superiority presumed in an assimilationist perspective. Hence, use of force in the
implementation of BIA policy demonstrated the sense of authority presupposed in forming the policy itself.
The confinement of Taos authority figures therefore provided a kind of "transcript," to borrow the language
of Alan feldman, demonstrating Commissioner Burke's sense of the relationship between his agency and
American Indians. Hence, the denotational texts describing BIA policy at the time may have assigned the
decision to imprison native practitioners an instrumental value as a means of furthering other goals, but the
actual implementation of the Religious Crimes Codes would have a more immediate interactional
significance insofar as the practice itself served to affirm the ideological position defining BIA authority
over Indians in the first place. C.f. Allen Feldman in Formations o f Violence: The Narrative o f the Body
and Political Terror in Northem Ireland. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 1-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
outsiders.'68 This secrecy about sacred matters has therefore had a certain strategic value,
one which did not emerge with the Office of Indian Affairs. At the time that Elsie Clews
Parsons studied the Taos Indians the sense of fear associated with information about sacred
matters had become so pervasive that potential informants feared that death by supernatural
causes would follow disclosure of secrets.'69 Moreover, Taoseno members found telling
such secrets faced a more tangible corporal punishment in the form of a whipping and a
fin e .'70 When a Taos man who had been working on a history of the Pueblo died.

168Naturally, Taos problems with outside Interference In their religion did not begin with the BIA, and the
behavior of Spanish missionaries must also have added to Taos concerns over the need for secrecy. In the
eyes o f many scholars this long history of abuse explains the secretive nature common to Pueblo
ceremonial systems. See Gordon-McCutchan, 6; Edward P. Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America.
(1970. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1983) 97; Edward H. Spicer, Cvcles of Conquest:
The Impact of Spain. Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest. 1533-1960. (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1962) 185-86; John J. Bodine, "Blue Lake: A Struggle for Indian Rights,"
American Indian Law Review. 1 (1973) 25. As It stands now the need for secrecy must be considered a
major feature of the Taos religion Itself, rather than a function of continued friction with outsiders. The
degree to which this aspect of Taos culture may be due to past abuses remains an open question, one that
that Involves far more titan just the specific case of the Taos Indians. See, for instance, Howard Stambor's
plea for a general study of the Impact of religious oppression on current Indian practices "Manifest Destiny
and American Indian religious Freedom: Sequohvah. Badonl. and the Drowned Gods," American Indian Law
Review. 10(1982) 60-62.
Elizabeth A. Brandt offers another Interpretation of Taos approaches to secrecy, stressing the
function of Internal constraints over control of knowledge rather than concern over the actions of outsiders.
She argues that the primary reason for limiting the flow of Information to outsiders Is that this flow of
such Information to outsiders constitutes a loss of control over ceremonial knowledge, leading to the
prospect that such Information will come back to unauthorized members of the Pueblo and disrupt the
appropriate patterns o f ritual authority, "On Secrecy and the Control of Knowledge" 123-146 passim.
O f course. It Is possible to stress both aspects of secrecy at Taos. C.f. Carol Chlago Lujan, "A
Sociological View o f Tourism In an American Indian Community: Maintaining the Cultural Integrity of
Taos Pueblo," American Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 17 (1993) 104. Concern over actual
oppression by outsiders coincides with the need to control the availability of ceremonial knowledge within
the Pueblo Itself. Hence, approaches stressing conflict with outsiders and those stressing control over the
Internal distribution o f ceremonial knowledge are consistent with one another In many respects. Both
concerns may serve as adequate motivation for the same behavior, and the distinction between them may or
may not arise depending on the salience of cultural boundaries to any particular situation. In fact, any
problems related to the need to distinguish one or another form of motivation should Indicate the tenuous
nature of cultural boundaries, or rather; the contextual status of tropes wherein cultures are Imagined to have
boundaries.
*69Elsle Clews Parsons, Taos Pueblo. General Series In Anthropology, Number 2. (ed.), Leslie Spier
(Menasha, Wisconsin: George Ban ta Publishing Company, 1936) 15.
'70parsons, 14. This Is also supported by Merton Leland Miller, A Preliminary Studv of the Pueblo of
Taos New Mexico. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1898) 42.
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members of the tribe are reported to have burned the text.'7 ' The publication o f Parson’s
own book on Taos Pueblo caused considerable concern among the Taoseno, possibly
leading to sanctions against a suspected

i n f o r m a n t . '72

Hence, Taos authorities met the

institutional force imposed by outsiders with institutional sanctions over its own people.
In contrast to the concealment of religious matters in specific areas o f Taos culture,
another more general response to BIA policies involved a direct clash over the importance
of religion to native culture. In the atmosphere of general repression prominent during the
nineteen-twenties community leaders from the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico collaborated to
produce the following statement:

Our religion to us is sacred and is more important to us than anything else in our life . . . .
Our happiness, our moral behavior, our unity as a people and the peace and joyfiilness of
our homes, are all part of our religion, and are dependent on its continuation. To pass this
religion, with its hidden sacred knowledge and its m any forms of prayer, on to our
children, is our supreme duty to our ancestors and to our hearts and to the God whom we
k n o w .'73
The passage is most significant in view of the fact that it meets the BIA's policy of religious
intolerance in its own terms. The statement clearly affirms a stake in religion as such, and
frankly commits to its continuation through the education of Indian children in traditional
Pueblo ways. The release of this manifesto was a response to a policy which had already
labeled and targeted various practices as having a religious significance, and so the
statement's frankness did not necessarily entail a disruption of concealment strategies. In
accepting the adequacy of the term "religion" as a description of their ceremonial practices,
however, the statement bypassed a major source o f contention. The word "religion" is itself
quite heavily loaded in Euro-American traditions, and for the most part it is entirely absent

'7 'Parsons, 16.
'72srandt, 128n.
'73This passage comes from Joe S. Sando, The Pueblo Indians. (San Francisco: The Indian Historian
Press, 1976) quoted in Gordon-McCutchan, 17. A complete version o f the statement was made available in
1992 in another publication by Joe S. Sando, Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian Historv.
(Santa Fe, New Mexico, Clear Light Publishers, 1992) 92-96.
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in Native American

l a n g u a g e s . '74

Such lexical asymmetry may not necessarily indicate a

significant difference in social morphology, but the articulation o f any Indian political
agenda in terms of "religion" places such questions momentarily out o f the picture.
Elsie Clews Parsons tells us that on being asked to identify Indian religion a Taos
native responded by saying that it was "life."'75 Such cryptic statements only allude to the
kind of problems entailed by the use of the term "religion" in the context o f Indian beliefs
and social organization. Robert S. Michaelsen writes that "modem western" cultures tend
to break up various segments of their social systems into isolated spheres o f activity, and
yet this tendency is lacking in traditional Indian

c u ltu r e s .

'^6 Whereas religious activities

are not part of an isolated sphere of traditional Indian culture, use of the word "religion" to
describe an Indian practice implies a relatively exclusive category of activity. Moreover,
legal and political norms for dealing with religion in America often rely heavily on the
ability to distinguish religious activity from other areas of social life such as economics or
politics. The Pueblo statement attempted to expand the scope of denotational reference
comprehended by the term "religion" by explicitly relating it to all aspects of Pueblo life,
thus finessing the awkwardness o f discourse about "Pueblo religions" as such. Having
formed its response to BIA authority by first conceding to the basic vocabulary of EuroAmerican social organization, the Pueblo Indians could neither operate within the normal
constraints of that category nor directly address its applicability to their own interests.
Accordingly the Pueblo statement printed above includes an attempt to redefine religion as a
category referring to all aspects of life.

'74 The observation of this fact is common-place in scholarship on Indian religion. On its relevance to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, see Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Litigation," 49.
'75Elsie Clews Parsons, Pueblo Indian Religion. Volume I (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1939)
preface.
'76Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation," 49.
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"Religion" certainly represents a plausible gloss for a number of Indian practices, it
may even be the most appropriate English term available for them; but the usage remains
problematic. If indeed many Indian practices may be placed in the nominal category of
"religion," one could not use the customary sense of the relationship between this term and
other W estern categories of social organization as an accurate guide in assessing Indian
perspectives. Moreover, the commitment to defense of an Indian religion is itself a long
way from acknowledging the specific significance that religion holds within a civil
libertarian tradition. Native Americans appeals to a sense of religious freedom are therefore
likely to denote an odd range of legal interests. The peculiar denotational scope o f Native
American appeals to "religious freedom" is matched, however, by the peculiar context of
Indian-white relations, particularly insofar as such claims may be affected by trust doctrine.
Trust doctrine provided the basis or an immediate government interest in the spiritual
welfare of Indians, leading initially to abusive policies such as the Religious Crimes Codes.
W hen re-framed in terms of the values associated with religious freedom, trust doctrine
would provide an unusually direct government interest in the welfare o f Taoseno religion.
Whereas the rhetoric o f religious freedom normally relates to an exclusive set of activities
and entails a limit to government interests, its use by Native Americans would apply to a
broad range of activities and tie them to a positive government interest in the form of trust
doctrine.
Taos officials and their legal representatives fashioned the details of this rhetoric
through debates over the status of Blue Lake. Over the course of events surrounding Blue
Lake various lawyers, Taos Indians, tribal members, elders, and other locals acted in ways
which transformed the tacit logic of Indian-white relations, creating a climate of opinion
under which Indian "religion" might be understood in a positive light. This rhetoric turned
on a vocabulary which, like that used in the Religious Crimes Codes, failed to accurately
represent the social organization o f the Pueblo itself. Complying with terms supplied
largely by representatives of the federal government, the Taoseno would extend the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
denotational scope of the term "religion" to fit their own interest in Blue Lake, and in doing
so lay the foundation for future government interest in Native American "Religion."

A Brief History of Blue Lake.
At its beginning the conflict over Blue Lake had little to do with the rhetoric of
religion much less religious freedom. The issue began and remained in substance a dispute
over environmental policy toward the lake and its watershed. Initial removal of Blue Lake
from the tribe's control was not even the result of any special malice by federal officials.
Whereas the Spanish and Mexican governments had d e fa c to recognized Taos ownership
over any territories occupied and used exclusively by the Pueblo, the United States
Government recognized the Taos claims to only about 17,000 acres of land formally
acknowledged under the Spanish. Since Blue Lake lay outside of the Spanish land grant,
the treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo left the tribe without legal title to an area which had
traditionally been left to their c o n t r o l . '^7 So, at the turn of the century the legal status and
future of Blue Lake lay in an ambiguous position. Continued Taos control over the lake
became unlikely as Americans grew increasingly more active in the region. Increased nonIndian activity in the area of Blue Lake furthermore disturbed the ceremonial practices of
the Taoseno who had long regarded the lake to be sacred along with its

w a t e r s h e d . '78

So,

by the turn o f the century, events at Blue Lake had become a major source of concern to
members of the Pueblo.
Members of the Pueblo had expressed their concerns to govemment officials during
the Roosevelt administration, and federal authorities apparently subsumed these complaints
under its own concerns over environmental conservation through the creation of forest
reserves. A mutual concern over the destructive impact of future development provided a

'77gee Pueblo o f Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 666-82
(September 8, 1965).
'78see Gordon-McCutchan, 9-10.
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reasonable link between the interests of conservationists and those of the Taos Indians.
This led to the creation of the Taos Forest Reserve in 1906, which effectively negated any
tribal claims to aboriginal title. W hile this move clearly subordinated the Taos interests in
Blue Lake to the environmental policies o f the Forest Service it appears that the initial
Taoseno outlook was positive. The Taos Indians did not not fully understand the legal
im plications o f Roosevelt's action, and they were given to believe the area would be
managed under principles consistent with their own interests. Moreover, the Forest Service
initially m anaged the region so as to protect the area's sanctity for the tribe's own
p u r p o s e s . '79

So, the creation of the reserve compromised the abstract legal position of the

Taos Pueblo even as the move offered a tangible source of protection for the lake and its
watershed.
W hatever informal understandings guided the early policies at the forest reserve, it
was not long before differences between the interests of the Forest Service and those o f the
Taos Indians became evident. Under the Forest Service a multiple use policy served as the
guiding principle o f m anagement, and this entailed both recreational use and careful
harvesting of the area's natural resources.'80 W hereas the Taos Indians considered any
commercial use of the sacred Lake and its watershed completely unacceptable, the principle
ecological concerns of the Forest Service lay in the need to preserve the area's natural
resources for the purpose of sustained use by a diverse number o f outside interests.'8 ' Far
from synonymous, it was soon evident that the ecological perspectives of the Forest
Service and the Taos Indians were diametrically opposed.
U nder the sustained yield policies of the Forest service the significance of Blue
Lake was largely a question of potential development. By structuring an ecological policy

*79Gordon-McCutchan, 10-14.
' 8®Gordon-McCutchan, 12.
' 8 ' Gordon-McCutchan, 7-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
around a concept of natural resources the conservation practices o f the Progressive era
defined environmental problems in terms of market

c o n d i t i o n s . '8 2

The Forest Service

accordingly brought a centralized planning system which was intended to preserve natural
resources for future economic

u s e . '8 3

M oreover, Forestry policy was often open to

influence from a range o f commercial interests, and at times this could produce the very
resource depletion that such policies were designed to

p r e v e n t . '8 4

The assumption of

federal control over Blue Lake thus entailed an opportunity for outsiders to begin modest
commercial exploitation of the area around the lake. In sum, the Forest Service deliberately
produced changes in the lake environment whereas the Taos Indians had preferred at least
to prevent artificial changes from taking place.
Contemporary environm entalists as well as Indian activists are quick to call
attention to the problems associated with progressive era conservationism. Today many
w ould characterize conservationist policies as m ovem ents tow ard efficiency, thus
highlighting the fact that such policies have been largely concerned with the means to better
use o f resources rather than with preserving an intrinsic environm ental

v a l u e . '8 5

Environm entalists often employ a distinction between ends and means to distinguish
themselves from conservationists. Environmentalists (including many Indians for whom
adherence to an environmental ethic constitutes source of ethnic identity) hold that nature
has an intrinsic value. Both environmentalists and Indian activists are therefore quick to

'82Arthur F. McEvoy, "Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture: Ecology, Production and
Cognition in the California Fishing Industry," The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modem
Environmental Historv. ed., Donald Worster, (1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 219224.
' 830ordon-McCutchan, 6-9; McEvoy, 219-224.
' 840ordon-McCutchan cites at least one incident in which the transfer of land near Blue Lake to the Forest
Service led prepared the way for a clear-cut. Throughout later debate over the status of the lake the
possibility of foresting the region remained a serious incentive to the department o f Agriculture's position
that Blue Lake should not go to the Pueblo. 36 and passim.
'85ciayton R. Koppes, "Efficiency, Equity, Esthetics: Shifting Themes in American Conservation," in
Worster, 232-233.
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condemn any approach to the natural environm ent that reduces it to "instrumental"
v a l u e s . '86

Hence, the tensions that emerged between the Taos Indians and the Forest

Service over m anagement o f Blue Lake foreshadowed many of the larger divisions
reflected in contemporary debate over environmental ethics.
D istinctions between instrumental and end values generally reflect a kind of
hindsight, reflecting on practices wherein the initial relationship between means and ends
seem ed

u n c l e a r . '87

A sense of history is therefore crucial to the abstract ideological

position distinguishing utilitarian from end-values. Such a process is particularly evident in
the history of Blue Lake wherein the initial innovations for dealing with the lake acquired
implications which increasingly drove a wedge between the interests of the tribe and those
o f Forest Service. The eventual position taken by the Pueblo, that their own interests were
inconsistent with the management principles guiding the Forest Service, would rest on a
record o f missed opportunities for agreement between the two parties. It is the actual
experience of working with the Forest Service which drove the Taoseno to articulate a
staunch position about the intrinsic value of the lake. The history of controversy over Blue
Lake has in turn provided an exem plary illustration of the values associated with
contemporary Indian environmentalism.
In contrast to the Forest Service's visions of development, the Taos Indians were
opposed to any alteration of the sacred landscape. For the Taoseno the problem at Blue
Lake was never a question of efficiency. The lake was crucial to Taos cosmology, and
tribal members made an annual pilgrimage to its banks. This pilgrimage was always made
in closely guarded secrecy, making it difficult to find ethnographic material describing the

*86cf. Russell Means, "Same Old Song," 19-33 passim; Lynn White Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our
Ecological Crisis," Science. 155 (March 10,1967) 1203-1207 passim; Donald Worster, "Hoover Dam: A
Study in Domination," Under Western Skies: Nature and Historv in the American West. (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)71; Charles L. Woodard, Ancestral Voice: Conversations with N.
Scott Momadav. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 69-71.
'87chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John
Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver, (1969. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971) 275.
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importance of the event. John J. Bodine, an anthropologist who had completed a doctoral
dissertation of Taos Pueblo, has provided the best explanation for the importance of the
lake in Taos life. He summarized the Taos interests in Blue Lake in terms of four points;
The Taos people needed to "control of the entire region" around the lake; the complete
ecological balance of the area had to remain undisturbed in order to protect plants used in
ritual; they had to prevent non-Indian presence at secret rituals (because non-Indians would
act as sources of contamination and diminish the spiritual power of the ceremonies); and the
tribe needed to protect its religion as an integral part of the Pueblo's

c u ltu re .

*88 These

general remarks indicate the degree of stress caused by outside presence at Blue Lake, and
even by the proceedings necessary to impress Taos needs on public officials. Hence, the
tribe held a vital interest in the lake and its surrounding region, one which could not be
fully communicated. So long as Blue Lake remained in the control o f the Forest Service
this vital interest in Blue Lake was protected only by an informal understanding of the sort
quickly lost in a Bureaucracy such as the Forest service.
In 1910 the assistant commissioner of Indian Affairs, F. H. Abbott, proposed the
creation of an executive order reservation at Blue Lake using 3,200 acres of public land and
41,440 acres of national forest. This plan was stifled by the Forest Service, and a second
attempt was likewise rejected by officials in Indian Affairs anticipating the objections of the
Forest Reserve. In 1916 Eliot Barker assumed control of the Carson National Forest and
pursued a vigorous multiple use policy at Blue Lake. He cut trails into the area, stocked
Blue Lake with fish for recreational harvesting, and forced the Taoseno to allow cattle
grazing on one side of the lake; thus ending exclusive use of the watershed by the Taos
In d ia n s .

*89 Such actions naturally fueled tribal interest in changing the legal status of the

lake, even as their initial efforts to accomplished this met with failure.

'88Bodine, (1973) 30.
*89see Gordon-McCutchan, 15-16.
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Another threat to the Taoseno came in the wake of United States v. Sandoval, rising
out o f subsequent attempts to legitimize squatters' claims to Pueblo lands via the Bursum
B ill.*90 'When the United States assumed control over New M exico many local residents
argued that the Pueblo Indians had effectively become United States citizens, (though the
states of both New M exico and Arizona continued to deny Pueblo voting rights well into
the nineteen-forties). *91 For a time this placed the Pueblo Indians in an awkward situation;
they possessed neither the complete rights of state citizenship, nor the corporate rights
afforded Indian tribes under federal trust status. *92 In the 1913 case of the United States v.
Sandoval the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Pueblo territories did in fact constitute
Indian lands governed by principals of trust status. *93 This decision provided Pueblo
lands with much the same protections that had obtained in the original Cherokee land cases,
effectively preventing the transfer o f individual title to non-Indians. Absent a clear legal
precedent affirming the trust status of a pueblo tribe, non-Indian residents on Pueblo lands
could plausibly claim to have secured title to the land on which they lived. The Sandoval
decision, however, effectively denied many non-Indians legal title to their homes, many of
which had been occupied by the same families for generations. Local efforts to remedy this
situation by securing title for the squatters living on Pueblo lands through federal legislation

*99Gordon-McCutchan, 17.
*9*See Willard H. Rollings, "Indian Land and Water: The Pueblos of New Mexico (1848-1924)," American
Indian Culture and Resource Journal. 6 (1982) 4-5; Daniel McCool, "Indian Voting," American Indian
Policy in the Twentieth-Centurv. ed.. Vine Deloria Jr. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 106-

16 passim.
*92Rollings, 4-5.
*93The case involved a challenge to Congressional legislation prohibiting sale of liquor on an Indian
reservation, which the State of New Mexico argued constituted an infringement upon its own police
powers. Writing for the Court, Justice Van Devanter declared that "The question to be considered, then, is
whether the status o f the Pueblo Indians and their lands is such that Congress competently can prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood." In answering this question in the affirmative the Court also provided an implicit answer to the
claims of squatters living on Pueblo lands. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28-49 (1913).
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would in turn threaten the territorial integrity of Pueblo tribes all across New M exico and
Arizona.
Taos Pueblo stood to loose a considerable amount o f its lands in the conflict over
squatters rights. Its leadership had at one time allowed a substantial number o f non-Indians
to live in the area to help defend against raids by other tribes.*94 Estimates as o f 1898
suggested that the Taos Indians occupied only about half of their actual land grant, placing
the other half in the hands of Anglo and Mexican squatters. *95 Following the Sandoval
decision Senator Holm O. Bursum drafted a bill that would have enabled squatters to
establish title to any lands on which they could prove occupancy since June 10, 1910. *96
The Senate passed the Bursum bill without a vote, but it was recalled from consideration in
the House at the request Senator W illiam Borah.*97 The Bursum Bill eventually died in
subsequent committee hearings, and in 1924 it was replaced by the Pueblo Lands Board.
The Pueblo Lands Board was authorized to determine whether or not various non-Indians
had maintained continuous occupancy on Pueblo lands since 1902, and to compensate any
parties for lands lost over the conflicting claim s.*98 in theory the Pueblo Lands Board
provided a reasonable means of accommodating non-Indians residing in Pueblo territory
without presenting a direct threat to the integrity of Pueblo lands. In practice the Pueblo
Lands Board often cheated Pueblos out of valuable resources, and this was particularly true
of its dealing with Taos.
W hen the Bursum Bill gave way to the Pueblo Land Act the Taos Pueblo offered to
concede the claims made by squatters on their land if the Pueblo Lands Board would

*94Miller,

16.

1 9 5 M ille r , 1 6 .

*96see U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol.

62

(September

*97see U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol.

64

(December

*98pueblo Lands Act. Statutes at Large. 4 3

11, 1 9 2 2 ) 1 2 3 2 3 -2 5 .

2 1 , 1 9 2 2 ) 8 0 6 -9 .

(1 9 2 4 ).
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recommend a transfer of Blue Lake from the Forest Service to the Interior Department as an
executive order reservation. Thus, the Taos Indians proved flexible and persistent in their
attempts to secure Blue Lake. Ironically, the chairman of the Lands Board saw the Taos
offer as an opportunity to prevent the annual religious ceremonies at Blue Lake, because the
transfer of jurisdictions would enable the Interior Department to exercise direct control over
activities conducted at the

s i t e . *99

By this time the ceremonies at Blue Lake had become the

subject of numerous rumors, creating an atmosphere of general suspicion among outsiders.
Left to their imagination by the secrecy of the annual ritual taking place at Blue Lake, the
non-Indian public had dreamed up stories about everything from a history of human
sacrifice to the practice of communal orgies.200 Public opinion at the time generally
favored the suppression o f Taos religion. The federal bureaucrats, however, were
apparently less flexible in their approach to the issue than the Taoseno as the Lands Board
made no such recommendation; though they did accept the tribe's concessions regarding
local claims on their land without disclosing the reason for it to the public at large.20*
W hen the tribe appealed directly to Commissioner Burke for title to the area, the
Department o f Agriculture, objected out of concerns over the value o f its

t i m b e r . 202

Thus

Taos Pueblo forfeited substantial legal claims in an unsuccessful effort to barter land claims
for control of Blue Lake.
In 1927 Taos lawyers worked out a cooperative agreement for use of Blue Lake
with the Forest Service. This agreement left control of Blue Lake in the hands of the Forest

*99See Gordon-McCutchan, 18.
200GQj.don-McCutchan, 18; Wood, 72-73; Parsons, 99. Amid all of the controversy over the nature of the
ceremonies conducted at Blue Lake, John Collier and James W. Young were invited to witness the
ceremonies at Blue Lake, but they were prevented from completing the entire pilgrimage. Collier's
experience is related in his book. On the Gleeminp Wav: Navajos. Eastern Pueblos. Zunis. Hopis.
Apaches, and Their Land: and Their Meanings to the World. (1949. Denver: Sage Books, 1961) 120-128.
201 See Pueblo o f Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 685 (September
8, 1965).
202gee Gordon-McCutchan, 18-19.
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Service, but it also committed the Forest Service to policies consistent with the Taoseno
sense of proper treatment o f Blue Lake. For example, mining was prohibited by executive
order for 30,000 acres of the Rio Pueblo Basin. The Pueblo had no mechanisms by which
to enforce the terms of the agreement, however, and so it broke down over time as a result
of infractions by the Forest Service. The agreement allowed the Forest Service to take
measures normally associated with care of national forests, but they took additional steps
which were insulting to the tribe. The Forest Service allowed numerous visitors to the area
without informing the tribe, and they constructed a cabin within sight of the lake itself.
Taos leadership thus began to look for more substantial means of protecting Blue Lake.
U nder the cooperative agreement protection o f this sacred site was contingent on
bureaucratic policies easily changed through administrative discretion. A more secure
source of political power would have to come from a source other than the specific policy
provisions of the Forest

S e r v ic e .2 0 3

The Taoseno soon received help from John Collier, the very Commissioner of
Indian Affairs responsible for the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier had once lived in
Taos, and he been active in the struggle to defeat the Bursum bill. Before his appointment
as Commissioner o f Indian Affairs Collier had formed the Indian Defense Association, an
organization active in Senate investigations relating to the activities of the Pueblo Lands
Board. These investigations revealed that the Board had regularly paid the Pueblos far less
than the market value for lands lost to squatters.^O'^ In 1933 Congress approved funds
compensating various Pueblos for the remaining value of lands lost under the provisions of
the Pueblo Lands Act, and Taos pueblo secured a provision authorizing a fifty year permit

203See Gordon-McCutchan, 20-22.
-®^See Pueblo of Taos v. The United States o f America, 15 Indian Claims Commission, 666 (September
8, 1965); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 24 Indian Claims Commission, 406 (February
10, 1971); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 24 Indian Claims Commission, 414 (February
10, 1971).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
for use o f the lake and its

w a te r s h e d .2 0 5

The permit was finally established in

1940,

largely through the efforts of Collier himself, granting the Taoseno limited use of Blue
Lake and m uch o f its watershed. Relations between Taoseno and the Forest Service were
heavily strained under this agreement, however, and Taos efforts to obtain portions of
w atershed not included in the permit were blocked consistently by the Department of
A griculture. Hence, Collier's solution to the Taoseno's problems at Blue Lake proved
unsatisfactory; they lead only to further conflict with the Forest S e r v i c e . 2 0 6
In 1946 Congress passed the Indian Claims Com m ission Act, enabling Indian
tribes to sue the federal government over a variety of issues including treaty

v io la tio n s .^ ^ 7

This act authorized only monetary compensation for successful lawsuits, but Taos Pueblo
made novel use the Commission to secure moral backing for its claims on Blue Lake. The
Pueblo council authorized its lawyers to take its case before the Indian Claim s
Commission. These lawyers gained a favorable ruling regarding the facts of their case from
the Indian C laim s Com m ission, but they did not seek to recover any m onetary
c o m p e n s a tio n .2 0 8

Instead Taos Pueblo used the findings of the Indian Claims Commission

to build its political case for restoration of trust title over Blue Lake.209 This strategy
would eventually prove successful, though it would require an extensive public relations
campaign.

205see section four o f the Statutes at Large. 48 (May 31, 1933) 109-10.
206see Gordon-McCutchan, 23-43.
20'2lndian Claims Commission Act. Statutes at Large. 60 (1946).
208xhe Commission determined that Taos Pueblo possessed aboriginal title to Blue Lake and the
surrounding region when the United States assumed control over New Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, and that the tribe had retained exclusive use o f the region until it was placed under the control of
the Forest Service in 1906. See Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 15 Indian Claims
Commission, 666 (September 8,1965); Pueblo of Taos v. The United States of America, 22 Indian Claims
Commission, 444 (February 18, 1970).
209see Gordon-McCutchan, 44-63.
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"Religion" and the Rhetorical Packaging of Taos Interests.
Blue Lake embodies a concrete value within the Taos universe, representing the
source of life and the site o f emergence.210 Naturally, the Taoseno can relate Blue Lake to
a body of abstract values defined in terms their own cosmology. In order to compel
changes in federal policies affecting the lake and its watershed the Taos Indians had to
resort to abstract sources of rhetorical value salient to other Americans. Such abstract
values would have to denote ideas appealing to the Am erican public and to some
institutional base of authority within the framework of American politics. Taoseno attempts
to articulate their interest in Blue Lake therefore required both a translation from concrete to
abstract values and a problematic inference across culture schemes.^!! Likewise, changes
in the official institutional structure surrounding control of Blue Lake would entail changes
in the abstract values governing policies affecting the Lake.
The initial transfer of Blue Lake and its watershed to the National Forest Service
effectively defined the region as a natural resource whose value could be defined by market
conditions. Forest Service policy differed from normal m arket conditions, however, in its
attempts to discount the present value o f Blue Lake for the use of future generations.
Assumption of control over the lake had initially been attractive insofar as it served to
centralize authority over and provide a shelter from exploitation by private interests. By
placing the lake into a forest reserve the Roosevelt administration could therefore be seen as
offering a shield against aspects of the market system. The policy did little to prevent the
comodification of resources at Blue Lake, however, though it did provide a forum wherein
the Taoseno could assert a collective interest in the region and negotiate that interest with
government officials. W hen dialogue with the Forest service proved ineffective, the tribe
attempted to find another means of negotiating the status of Blue lake with outsiders.

2tOparsons, I I ; Miller, 42.
21^ On the distinction between abstract and concrete rhetorical values, see Perelman and Tyteca, 77-79.
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eventually settling on efforts to obtain trust title to the region. This would effectively give
the tribe direct control over the Blue Lake and its resources, placing them in a position to
define its significance in terms consistent with their own cosmology, and to dictate the
values guiding any human interaction with the lake itself. Appeal to religious freedom
would provide outsiders with a rough sense of the values defining Taos interest in Blue
Lake and allow the tribe could interact with the lake and its its environment in terms of their
own cosmology.
If appeal to "religious freedom" did not clarify the exact nature of Taoseno interest
in Blue Lake, this abstract principle had the negative virtue of excluding many of the things
to which the Taoseno were themselves opposed. W ithin the proper context, religious
values would constitute a limit on market sensibilities for most Americans, and notions of
religious freedom would be readily understood as a limit to government interest. Therefore,
appeal to "religious freedom" could successfully imply the conditions o f sanctity and
secrecy defining Taos interest in Blue Lake, even if the abstract values denoted by the
phrase itself did not really match those normally used by Taoseno themselves. Moreover,
the implications of appeal to "religious freedom" had the additional virtue of generating
potential allies in the non-Indian public. Given the combination of spiritual concerns with a
specific environmental feature, this strategy had a certain additional appeal to both religious
and environmental

o r g a n iz a tio n s .2 1 2

So, an appeal to "religious freedom" could generate a

plausible case for Taos interest in Blue Lake, and the language of this appeal placed the
Taoseno in a position to gamer much needed support from outside g r o u p s . 2 i 3

2 ' ^Gordon-McCutchan, 137.
2^2sonie measure of the success of this campaign can be gathered from the appearance of favorable media
coverage both before and after passage of the Blue Lake Amendment. See "Taos Pueblo Indians Seek Sacred
Lake," Herald Examiner. (April 16,1966) B-2; Keith Green, "As History Sees It," Taos News, (April 19,
1966); "The Indians Need Blue Lake," New York Times. (July 17, 1968); "Restore the Taos Lands,"
Washington Post. (July 30, 1968) A8; Warren Weaver, Jr. "Nixon to Sign Pueblo Bill," New York Times.
(December 3, 1970); Jack Waugh, "Indians Smile at Last," Christian Science Monitor. (December 4, 1970)
2; "New Era in Indian Affairs," Time. (December 14,1970) 49.
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The term "religion" remained an imperfect gloss for Taoseno interest in Blue Lake,
however, and this generated a number of problems for the campaign to obtain trust title.
Many conservationists, for example, were quite displeased with the notion that Congress
might set aside a segment of public land for the specific use of an Indian tribe.
Organizations such as the National Wildlife Organization, the New Mexico Wildlife &
Conservation Association, Inc., and the Sportsmen's Legislative Action Committee of New
Mexico opposed the move, arguing for a continuation of established conservation policies
in conjunction with an exclusive use agreement between the Forest Service and the
P u e b l o . 214

These organizations voiced a number of concerns, one being that wealthy

members of the tribe really wanted to use the lake for commercial

p u r p o s e s .2 i5

Congress

eventually resolved the prospect that Taos leaders might use Blue Lake for commercial
gains by arranging to have the lake and its watershed designated a wilderness region even
as it was given over to the

tr ib e .2 1 6

This provision effectively bound Taos interests in the

Blue Lake and its watershed to behavior consistent with the rationale offered by the tribe in
support of their case. Yet, many conservation organizations continued to oppose Taos
efforts until the very end. As Stew art Udall would later comm ent; "To most
conservationists, once land was designated as a national forest or a national park it became,
for them, a different kind of sacred ground . . ."217

214Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (1970) 198-34.
215Tao.s Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (19701 198-34. See also Gordon-McCutchan, 102-103.
21 ^Gordon-McCutchan, 155; The act itself reads in part, "The lands held in trust pursuant to this section
shall be a part of the Pueblo de Taos Reservation, and shall be administered under the laws and regulations
applicable to other trust Indian lands: Provided, that the Pueblo de Taos Indians shall use the lands for
traditional purposes only, such as religious ceremonials, hunting and fishing, a source of water, forage for
their domestic livestock, and wood, timber, and other natural resources for their personal use, all subject to
such regulations for conservation purposes as the secretary of the Interior may prescribe. Except for such
uses, the land shall remain for ever wild and shall be maintained as a wilderness as defined in section 2 (c) of
the act of September 3, 1964 (78 stat. 890). Statutes at Large. 1438 (1970)." Indians-Pueblo de Taos-Lands.
Statutes at Large. 84, sec. 4b 1681 (1970).
2*7stewart L. Udall, Foreword to Taos Pueblo and Its Sacred Blue Lake, by Marcia Keegan, (Santa Fe.
New Mexico: Clear Light Publishers, 1991) 7.
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The secretive nature o f Taos religion presented another problem to the activists
working on their case.2i8 Many of the tribe's supporters were unsure how to represent
this facet of Taos interests. Dean Kelly, from the National Council of Churches wrote that
discussing the question of secretiveness before a Congressional subcommittee would prove
counter-productive:
I agree that the details of their ceremonies are the Indians' business and not
outsiders', but it is not necessary to make more of an issue of it than the Indians do, and
they have occasionally divulged some details to non-Indians or permitted non-Indians to
see their ceremonies.
It is unreasonable to expect people to give a 'blank check' to the Indians unless they
have enough of a glimpse of what is involved to make it convincing. I felt the same until
the Tribal Council told me enough about their religious uses of the land to give some
texture to their claims. I would be surprised if the committee found the 'secrecy' argument
ingratiating. It may be cogent; it is largely true, but it does not tend to elicit cooperation.
Instead it tends to 'turn o ff even those disposed to help the I n d i a n s . 219
One of the tribe's lawyers, William C. Schaab, answered Kelly's concern over Pueblo
secrecy regarding the significance of Blue Lake. Schaab argued in favor of raising the issue
as an important way of explaining its religious significance, and as a way of explaining the
reluctance o f Taos elders to provide detailed information on the

s u b j e c t .220

Schaab

obtained permission from the Pueblo council to decide whether or not to raise the issue of
secrecy before Congress, and he considered the subject ar too important not to

a d d r e s s . 221

Although the need for secrecy would eventually prove to be an important plank of
the campaign for Blue Lake the issue clearly cut against the tribe interests in many ways.
The clearest statement on the tribe's religion actually came from a letter written by the
anthropologist John J. Bodine during the final hearings in 1970. In the letter he explained
that no particular member of the tribe knew the full extent of their rites and doctrines.

21 ^Gordon-McCutchan, 130.
219Dean M. Kelly, to William C. Schaab, esq., 28 March, 1968, Paul J. Bernal Papers. # 46. State Record
Center and Archives. 404 Santa Fe, New Mexico.
220\villiam C. Schaab, to Dean M. Kelly, 1 April, 1968, Paul J. Bernal Papers. # 46. State Record Center
and Archives. 404 Santa Fe, New Mexico.
221 Schaab to Kelly.
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because that knowledge is broken up into various discrete offices. He also mentioned the
existence o f a num ber o f m inor shrines around the lake routinely visited by individual
priests at various times during the year, and that the tribe had been reluctant to reveal the
full importance of these shrines because that in itself "would cripple their

f a ith ." 2 2 2

Blue

Lake occupied a crucial place in the cerem onial system practiced at Taos, but its
significance to that ceremonial system could not be reduced to a single body of doctrines.
M oreover, ceremonial experts guarded any explicit knowledge that they possessed about
the details o f particular shrines and cerem onies, because the ritual efficacy o f such
cerem onies required an elem ent o f secrecy. This placed the Taoseno in an untenable
position from the standpoint o f free exercise doctrine, because in order to gain federal
protection for their ceremonial interests they would have to satisfy Congress that they were
indeed practicing a form of religion at Blue Lake.
Today Bodine's letter serves as the most clear public statement about Taos interest
in Blue Lake, explaining the reluctance of the tribe to communicate its significance fiilly to
Congress and dem onstrating that this reluctance was itself one o f the reasons why
Congress should act in favor o f the Pueblo. Complete disclosure o f the religious tenets
violated by Forest policy was, according to Bodine, neither feasible, nor consistent with
the very interests that the Taos Indians were concerned to defend. Bodine's letter itself
threatened the principle o f secrecy governing the ceremonial system at Taos, and he was
well aware of

th is .2 2 3

Bodine had been careful to reveal ju st enough information to help

the Taos case, and so he appears to have played a positive role in the history o f that
P u e b lo .2 2 4

Bodine's letter served to resolve the issue o f secrecy in favor of the Taos

222see Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (1970) 299. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, vol. 116 (December 2,1970) 39596-8.

222Taps IndlanizJBk£Lakg Amgndments. (1970) 300.
224(1 appears that Taos elders have looked on Bodine's intervention with approval, because he would
eventually author a pamphlet distributed by the Pueblo to visitors, John J. Bodine, Taos Pueblo: A Walk
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Indians, though it probably did little to alleviate any genuine concerns about the tribe's
motivations.
Part o f the tribe's rhetorical strategy for casting Blue Lake as an issue involving
religious freedom lay in the conscious construction o f a metaphor describing the region as a
c h u r c h .2 2 5

Through reference to a church the tribe's lawyers could effectively touch upon

a sense o f sacred space familiar to most Americans. Somewhere in the transition from
abstract space to actual geography, how ever, this strategy produced some rather
problematic implications. A number of congressman expressed misgivings about the kind
o f precedent established in returning Blue Lake to the Taoseno on the basis o f an appeal to
religious freedom. Senator Lee Metcalf, for example, offered the following remarks:
The Blackfeet Indians have this same worship in Glacier National Park and I would
suggest, if this bill passes in the way it came out of the House, there are Indian tribes all
over America just waiting at the barrier to have bills introduced to get thousands of acres of
land that they can justifiably claim has a spiritual relationship to their t r ib e .2 2 6
M any were also concerned about the precedent set by this action as a resolution to a case
heard by the Indian Claims

C o m m is s io n .2 2 7

Hence, they asked why Taos religion could

not be accommodated by smaller concessions of land which would have been adequate had
Blue Lake literally represented a "church" to the Taoseno. William Schaab wrote:
Many people, including senator (Clinton P.) Anderson, have legitimately asked
why the Indians need 48,000 acres for religious purposes. The American concepts of
'church' and 'shrine' do not clearly reflect the Indians' religious view of the Blue Lake
area; their frequent use has tended to suggest that the Indians' religious attachment relates to
small areas within the total watershed rather than to the watershed as a whole. It has also

Through Time. A Visitor's Guide to the Pueblo, Its People and their Customs and their Long History,
(Santa Fé, New Mexico: Lightning Tree - Jene Lyon, Publisher, 1977).
225Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Litigation, " 65-68.
226united States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs o f the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Taos Indians-Blue Lake. Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, on H R. 3306, S. 1624 and S.
1625, (September 19 and 20, 1968) 62. See Also R.C. Gordon-McCutchan, 140-143.
227ja o s Indians-Blue Lake. (1968) 62. See Also R.C. Gordon-M cCutcha:, 140-143.
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been unsatisfactory to explain the Indians' attachment to the land in terms of interference
with their economic use of the a r e a . 228
As can be seen, the very suggestive qualities which made this metaphor attractive to the
Taoseno effectively inhibited their ability to communicate the full significance that Blue
Lake and its watershed had in their cosmology. Describing the area as a church allowed the
Taos Indians to present their interest in terms familiar to a predominantly Christian public,
but this same metaphor invited a counter-argument inasmuch as the idea of 48,000 acre
church seemed a bit of a stretch.
Bodine's letter also provided an answer to these concerns, arguing that the Taos
case was entirely unique in view of the complete reliance of the Pueblo on the physical and
spiritual integrity of the region around Blue Lake. Bodine argued that Blue Lake constituted
a unique feature of the Taoseno cultural landscape, and that the Taos claim to Blue Lake
itself was unique among tribal religions:
I made a very bold statement when I said that if these lands are not returned Taos
culture would be destroyed. I was asked by my doctoral examining committee in 1966 the
following question: If you had complete power over the Taos and wished to destroy their
culture what would you do? I replied unhesitatingly that I would destroy Blue Lake. The
question may sound facetious and the answer absurd. But neither is ridiculous. You
(Senator Lee M etcalf) pointed out at the hearings that when property is taken from an
individual according to our custom he is compensated for his loss with a cash settlement.
And so we have properly settled most Indian claims. Let us suppose that we decided to
confiscate all the property owned by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and
properly compensated them for it. Would Catholicism cease to exist? Obviously not. As
most religions are capable of doing, they could erect churches elsewhere. Even more to the
point is that Navaho Mountain is sacred to the Navaho, just as peaks in Glacier are sacred
to the Blackfeet, but their entire religion does not depend on those particular shrines and
therefore they differ from the Taos case. All of Taos religion is dependent on Blue Lake
and its associated shrines in the 48,000 acres in question. They have no other 'church' nor
any possibility of constructing one. Therefore monetary compensation for Blue Lake is out
of the question. It provides them with no alternative whatsoever. There is only one Blue
Lake just as there is only one M e c c a . 2 2 9
Thus, Bodine effectively answered questions about the prospect of monetary compensation
by distinguishing the Taos claim to Blue Lake from all other Indian claims. Taos Pueblo

228schaab to Kelly.
229 Taos Indians - Blue Lake Amendments. (197) 298-3(K).
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could not be adequately compensated for the loss of Blue Lake, but neither could the return
o f Blue Lake to the Pueblo to Taos constitute a significant precedent, because no other
Indian tribe was so dependent on the spiritual significance of one particular geographic
feature.
Others answered questions about the precedent set by the return o f Blue Lake to
Taos Pueblo in moral terms, arguing that it was simply the right thing to do. Morris Udall,
for example, responded to concerns over precedent by stating simply that "you never set a
bad precedent when you do what is

r i g h t . "230

The opposition had raised concerns over the

practical consequences of the precedent, and Udall's statements served to call attention to
the m oral dimensions associated with this same term. Swayed by these and other
arguments. Congress passed legislation amending the act of 1933 (see above) to place the
48,000 acres in question under trust title. This legislation presented Richard Nixon with a
welcome opportunity to demonstrate his goodwill and commitment to an Indian policy
based on self-determination. He signed the amendment into law on December 15, 1970,
creating Public Law 91-550. The return o f Blue Lake could have sym bolized selfdetermination in one other respect as well, because whatever the merits of the legislation; it
carried few general implications for Indian policy. In passing the Blue Lake amendment
Congress did not commit itself to responding in like form to further cases emerging out of
the Indian Claims Commission, or to any future cases involving questions of religious
freedom. In the future Congress would have the latitude to reverse its priorities in the face
of new demands, and this facet in itself quietly answered many concerns over the precedent
set by Blue Lake.
As an historical event, passage of Public Law 91-550 appeared to set an impressive
precedent protecting the religious freedom o f Native Americans, but many aspects of this
event could not be generalized beyond its immediate context. The interactional value of the

23°U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, vol. 115 (September 9, 1969) 24882.
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Blue Lake am endm ents alleviated many o f the burdens normally associated with the
rhetoric o f religious freedom. The Taoseno called upon abstract notions of religious
freedom, but they did not invoke the Free Exercise clause. A free exercise dispute would
have placed Taos law yers in an appellate court, and effectively placed them in an
adversarial relationship with the federal government. Instead, the return of Blue Lake took
the form o f a positive government interest entailed by trust doctrine, as reflected in the
provision that Blue Lake and its watershed would be held in trust for the tribe by the federal
government.
Notions of "justice" and "religious freedom" may have motivated this legislation,
but they were not anchored to concrete bases of institutional authority. Those Congressmen
who voted in favor of the Blue Lake Amendments were not responsible for determining the
merits o f the Taos claims according to a set theory o f case law such as the balancing test.
This gave individual Congressmen considerable latitude to exercise their own judgement
w ith respect to the authenticity o f the tribe's self-representations. M oreover, each
Congressm en w ould have the latitude to change their priorities in future cases. Any
Congressmen persuaded in the authenticity of Taos statements about the significance of the
lake, could simply vote in favor of the provision without demonstrating to an appellate
court that he had been fair to the opposition or that his decision was in accordance with the
principles established in past precedent. With passage o f the Blue Lake amendment,
however. Congress appeared to concede a basic point to its wards in Indian country; that
they too possessed a right of religious freedom, and that Congress had a tangible interest in
protecting this freedom. Passage of the Blue Lake amendment would therefore serve as a
key event in the development of free exercise doctrine as it would relate to Indians.
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Chapter III
Religious Prejudice As Principle: The Limitations of a Civil
Libertarian Approach to Indian Law.
Congress Shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people to peaceably assem ble, and to petition the governm ent fo r a redress of
grievances.231
-First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
No Indian Tribe in exercising powers of Self government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and
to petition for a redress o f g r i e v a n c e . 2 3 2
-Indian Civil Rights Act, 1968.
Today the Blue Lake Amendments are generally considered a successful example of
legislation protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans. Congress had specifically
tailored the provisions o f this legislation to meet the needs o f Taos Pueblo, however, and
so the P.L. 91-550 lacks the open ended consequences o f a more general law or
C onstitutional principle. As a historical event, passage o f P.L. 91-550 signalled a
revolution in the trust relationship between Indians and the federal government. During the
assimilationist era the trust relationship effectively defined all conflict between BIA policy
and Indian traditionalist as secular matters, and thus shielded such policies from application
o f the Free Exercise clause. Now the trust relationship had been used as a basis for
protection o f a traditional Indian religion, thus providing a novel rem edy for a threat to
religious freedom. The trust relationship had provided a novel context for arguments
claim ing a right o f religious freedom , and this had enabled Congress to exercise
considerable discretion in its evaluation of Taos claims. Hence, Congress had been able to

231United States Constitution. Amendment I.
222civ ii Rights-Riots-Fair Housinp-Civil Obedience. Statutes at Large. Title n, sec.

2 0 2 , 94 ( 1 9 6 8 ) .
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finesse the awkward relationship between Indian ceremonies and Euro-American notions
about "religion."
Long before passage of the Blue Lake Amendments tribal governm ents had
themselves begun to face tough questions about the management of religious diversity. The
notion that a citizen might have rights against his government, and that these included a
right to practice a religion other than that practiced by his fellow tribesmen, could not easily
be squared with many Indian notions of tribal membership. Often tribal authorities took the
position that the heterodoxical practices of individual members posed a serious threat to the
cerem onial foundations of their social order. Hence, the notion that mem bership in a
religious community could be separated from membership in a civil community appeared
quite foreign to many Indians. This among other things, posed a great deal of difficulty for
BIA officials and tribal authorities working in the wake of the IRA, as each sought to put
into practice a theory o f government combining elements of both social contract theory and
Native American traditions.
The relationship between religious an political institutions became a crucial site of
conflict for the newly revitalized tribal governments. The growth of the Native American
Church com bined with emerging sectarian conflicts between Christian (or syncretic)
Indians living on the reservations to create a series of legal conflicts regarding tribal
authority over religious matters. This would eventually lead to the cases of T oledo v.
Pueblo de Jem ez. decided on March 8, 1954, and Native American Church v. N avajo
Tribal Council, decided on November 17,1959. In each of these cases, the courts made it
clear that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the actions o f tribal governments. These cases
helped give rise to new legislation creating the jurisdiction necessary for enforcement of the
Bill of Rights in Indian country. If these native experiments in free exercise litigation
proved anything, however, it was that the principles embodied in the Bill o f Rights posed
an unusual set of problems for Indian tribes. Each o f these cases had revealed the intimate
linkage between traditional ceremonial practices and the authorities of tribal governments.
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W hen Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968 (ICRA) the inability to
distinguish the institutions of tribal politics from those forming tribal religions made its
difficult for Congressmen to formulate a strategy for incorporating the First Amendment
into the jurisdiction of tribal governments. For many tribal governments it would prove
difficult to accommodate basic American principles o f civil rights, and for the U.S.
Congress it would prove difficult to accommodate the structures of a tribal government
while seeking to ensure observation of the Bill of Rights.
Aspects o f conflict surrounding the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 would
foreshadow later problems associated with the AIRFA. Like the Blue Lake Amendments,
passage o f the ICRA extended Euro-American notions o f religious freedom into Indian
territory. In contrast to the example of Blue Lake, however, the ICRA created a standing
set o f legal principles and thereby provided an open ended prospect for future litigation.
Congressmen therefore had to contend more seriously with the differences between Indian
and Euro-American forms of social organization when considering the provisions of the
ICRA. To complicate matters further, the ICRA played a controversial role in the general
history of Indian-white relations. Proponents o f the bill had argued that it would constitute
a major step toward extending civil rights to Native Americans whereas critics have argued
that passage of the ICRA constituted an attack on tribal customs and a imposition on the
proper jurisdiction o f tribal governments. O f course, both positions may adequately
characterize the facts associated with the ICRA, but between them lies a vast difference in
world views. In any event, passage of the ICRA would underscore a number of problems
implied w henever Euro-A m erican notions of religious freedom are applied to Indian
practices.
A quick look at the passages above will reveal one major difference between the
First Amendment and its counterpart in the Indian Bill of Rights; the latter contains no
Establishment clause. The passages differ in yet another respect, for the First Amendment
applies primarily to federal and state jurisdiction (via the Fourteenth Amendment in the
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latter case) whereas the Indian Bill of Rights refers directly to the powers of Indian tribes.
It would be easy to view the ICRA as though it were merely the tribal equivalent to the
Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating most of the provisions o f the Bill of Rights into the
limitations o f tribal authority; but the ICRA poses a distinct set of questions regarding the
historical trajectory and legal status of Indian tribes as such. It is within this highly
contested interactional framework that Congress formed the specific provisions of the
ICRA. The fact remains that the ICRA leaves open the possibility that a tribal government
may support a form o f religious establishment, and in doing so the bill accommodates
aspects o f Native American social organization seemingly forbidden by an ideological
orientation normally associated with civil libertarian traditions. The concerns leading to the
ICRA are worth examining, because they would appear again to haunt Indian litigants
concerned with the implementation of the AIRFA.

Cultural Presupposition and the Denotational Scope o f "Religion" in the First Amendment.
As noted earlier (chapter 2), notions about "religion" in general, and "religious
freedom " in particular, are only salient in reference to particular patterns o f social
organization. Hence, legal discourse about "religious freedom" contains a number of clues
about the role o f religious institutions in America. The courts lack recourse to an objective
definition of

r e lig io n .2 3 3

Neither is such definition available to the social sciences, which

is to say that the term "religion" itself cannot be made intelligible as the object of a single
theoretical

r e d u c tio n .2 3 4

Yet, a certain degree of ethnocentrism regarding the nature of

"religion" may seem unremarkable as long as it does not appear outside of the cultural
context which gives rise to it in the first place. Hence, American courts can generally get by

233Lupu, 957-58.
234rhis amounts to a rejection of the doctrine that religion is itself a complete phenomenon which could
not be reduced to areas of human experience. See, for example, Robert Segal and Donald Weibe, "Axioms
and Dogmas in the Study o f Religion," Journal o f the American Academy o f Religion. 57 (1989) 591-605

passim.
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with using notions about religion tailored to the experience of a predominantly Christian
public. W hen dealing with distinctly non-Christian traditions the courts sometimes equate
religion with Christianity, thereby leaving such traditions beyond the scope o f the First
Amendment; and sometimes they use Christianity as a kind of prototype on which to model
its approach to other

re lig io n s .2 3 5

Hence, the best case scenario for unusual free exercise

claims involves a metaphorical understanding of the issue wherein Christianity supplies the
source, or phoros, of the court's tropical

u n d e r s ta n d in g .2 3 6

Perhaps the best example o f such reasoning comes from the 1968 case o f United
States

V.

Seeger. Here the United States Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the

constitutionality of a provision for conscientious objector status included in the Selective
Service Act of 1948. This provision restricted the status of conscientious objectors to those
w ith a belief " . . . in relation to a Supreme

B e in g ." 2 3 7

Justice Clark wrote the majority

opinion for the case, which included this rather interesting rationale:
W e have concluded that Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather
than the designation 'God' was merely clarifying the meaning o f religious training and
b e lie f so as to embrace aJI religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief'in relation to
a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place
in the life o f the possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God o f one who
clearly qualifies for that exemption. Where such beliefs have a parallel position in the lives
o f their respective holders we cannot say that one is 'in relation to a Supreme Being' and
that the other is n o t . 2 3 8

235Lupu, 958.
236rhis is a reference to a common distinction in metaphor theory. Inasmuch as metaphors involve the
tropical use o f a word, a turning o f its sense into something other than its common usage, one must
observe a distinction between the normal sense of the term and that which informs its metaphorical usage.
In Cognitive theory, the former is referred to as the target domain and the latter the source domain. See
George Lakoff, Women. Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the M ind. (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 380-96. Drawing on Aristotelian models, Perelman an
Tyteca refer to the normal sense of a term as the theme and the source of the tropical understanding the
phoros, 373. It is worth noting that the relationship between source and target domain in cultural semantics
{phoros and theme according to rhetorical models) is also implicit in analogical reasoning. This semantic
distinction may therefore appear in either the premise structure of an argument (analogy) or in the phrase
structure of a sentence (metaphor).
237United States v. Seeger, 85 U.S. 850 (1965).
238seeger, 85 U.S. 854(1985).
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Notwithstanding the Court's poor reasoning, this passage does provide an excellent
example of the use of analogical reasoning in a First Amendment

c a s e .2 3 9

Here the Court

essentially determined the religious nature of Seeger's own beliefs by drawing an analogy
between those beliefs and those expressly covered by the statute in question, beliefs which
might be expected from those o f Jewish or Christian faith.
In one respect the Seeger case represents a poor example of the use of analogical
reasoning in free exercise cases, because the Supreme Court's analogical interpretation of
the phrase "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" directly contradicted the literal sense of
the phrase itself. The Court had viewed the statute in question as an attempt to achieve a
practical goal, the exemption of religious beliefs in general from military duty. The Court
then based its interpretation of the phrase in question on an analogy between the function of
Theism in reference to the exemption clause and the role that Seeger's own beliefs might
also play in reference to the same goal. In explaining the functional intent of the phrase the
Court had implicitly taken issue with the language of the statute in question. The Court had
essentially argued that the explicit language of the statute in question was more narrow than
it needed to be. Hence, the analogical reasoning used by the Court in Seeger actually
facilitated a complete transformation of the sense of "religion" included in the original
statute.

239(t is easy enough to see how the court could construe the rational purpose of the provision in question
as a mere attempt to exclude spurious claims to conscientious objection, but there are a variety of different
approaches to intentionality; all of which are problematic for one reason or another. Here the court has
attributed an instrumental purpose to Congress, which is a rather narrow sense of intentionality; one which
does not address the language of the statute itself. A popular legal textbook, for example, includes the
following study question in its treatment of the case; "Isn't the Court's description of what Congress meant
. . . exactly the opposite of what Congress said?" William Cohen and John Kaplan, Constitutional Law:
Civil Libertv and Individual Rights. Second Edition, University Casebook Series, (Mineola, New York:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1982) 451. One would imagine that most o f students reading this text would
answer that question in the affirmative.
It is not at all uncommon to find that a given reading of legal text has been constructed around
ideological assumptions pertaining to an intentional state (c.f. Elizabeth Mertz, "Linguistic Ideology and
Praxis in U.S. Law School Classrooms, " Pragmatics. 2 [1992] 325-43 passim). Likewise, the particular
bias in favor of a narrow instrumental model of intent is also widely prevalent throughout legal circles, and
it may be attributed to a kind of linguistic unifunctionalism. See Weissbourd and Mertz, 648-55 and
passim.
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The courts need not always contend with legislation including such explicit
definitions of the term "religion." Most free exercise cases involve a claim about religion
emerging from a source other than the legal statutes involved in the case. Indirect burdens
on the free exercise of religion typically involve legislation containing no explicit references
to religion. In such cases it is the free exercise claimant who raises the issue of religion,
and this leaves the courts room to define the scope o f meaning of "religion" as they see fit.
Hence, the courts are generally free address the scope of free exercise principles through
analogical strategies like that used in Seeger. but without facing the obstacle posed by of
explicitly narrow statutory language. At times such analogies have proven crucial to the
interests of minority religions, but there is considerable irony in the fact that protection for a
m inority religion may rest on a proximity between its conventions and those o f more
popular religious traditions.
One may gather from the preceding that the courts do not merely exhibit a kind of
intellectual inertia when dealing with minority faiths, but that their ability to conceive the
interest at stake in a minority religion is contingent on structural analogies between that
religion and those more commonly practiced in America. In one respect, this involves
questions about the implications of such an analogy. In another respect, this involves
pragmatic questions about the prospect of fitting a minority religion into an interactional
role envisioned within popular notions of American social order. Both constraints serve to
skew the legal significance of the term "religion," providing different aspects of nominally
religious behavior with a greater or lesser degree of protection under the First Amendment.
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The Establishment Clause and the Cosmology of the Constitution: A Persistent Paradox.
The prospect that a given set o f cosmological precepts may not be considered
"religious" does not always, or merely, indicate that the practice will fail to receive the
protection of the Free Exercise clause. It may also mean that a given set of cosmological
principles w ill escape the notice o f the Establishm ent clause. The cultural order
presupposed in government proceedings will itself contain a folk model of the universe.
Hence, the cultural presuppositions implicit in the text of the United States Constitution as
well as any other government document or political speech will contain indexical references
to a form o f cosmological order (natural rights, first principles, social contracts, etc.).
Thus, it is fair to ask if the Constitution does not itself presuppose a form of religion, even
as it forbids the establishment of religion? And it is worth inquiring as to whether or not
there are any consistent distinctions betw een the kind o f cosmology presupposed in
docum ents and proceedings related to the First Amendment itself and the kinds of
cosmological order discussed in such proceedings under the heading of "religion?"
Many assume that there is some layer of religious practice that is not covered by the
Establishm ent clause on the U nited States Constitution. Such notions are strongly
associated w ith m aster-narratives pertaining to the "original intention" behind the
Constitution. According to such theories the "founding fathers" did not intend for the
Establishm ent clause to forbid any general form o f support for religion, but that the
Establishm ent clause was originally designed to prevent the establishm ent of a state
church.240 Advocates of this position, known as "non-preferentialism," typically maintain
that non-sectarian forms o f government support for religion are not proscribed under the
Establishment clause. Non-preferentialists therefore maintain that government is free to aid
religious causes in general provided that it does not favor any particular sect over others.

240 See, for example, Russell Kirk, The American Cause. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957) 41 ;
Francis A. Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto. (1981. Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1982) 31-39;
Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. (New York and London: The
Free Press, 1990) 94-95.
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Under this theory the federal government would be free to incorporate religious prayers
into its functions (as it does indeed), for example, though it could not prevent individuals
from conducting prayers o f their own. Hence, the non-preferentialist position provides a
narrow construction to the sense o f religion in the text of the Establishment clause and that
implicit in the Free Exercise clause.
It is difficult to see how the text o f the First Am endment could produce this
asymmetric notion o f religion. As Justice Rutledge argued in his dissent for the the case of
Everson v. Board o f Education the same term covers both of the religion clauses in the
First Amendment. It is therefore inconsistent to read the Free Exercise clause as a provision
affecting "religion" in general while treating the Establishment clause as a proscription
against the relatively narrow prospect of a state

c h u r c h .2 4 l

The term "religion" denotes an

equally abstract value in both clauses o f the First of Amendment, and yet the need to
ground any government practice in a cosmological framework seems to require a relatively
narrow construction o f the Establishment clause. Hence, the denotational scope o f both
religion clauses in the First Amendment refer to "religion" in the abstract, even though the
interactional significance of each clause may be somewhat different.
The courts are not the only institutions to find that abstract notions of religion have
proven to be clumsy. The social categories used to differentiate between one religion and
the next appear to follow conventions developed in order to handle the sectarian disputes
characterizing various Christian denominations. Individual religions are typically defined in
terms o f beliefs, which is to say that a religion is characterized as a set of propositions - the
truth o f which is vouched for by its adherents. The difference between Theism and
Atheism, for example, can be characterized as a dispute over the truth o f the proposition
that "God Exists," (or that "a Supreme Being Exists," for those adhering to the precedent

241Everson v. Board o f Education o f Ewing TP, 64 S. Ct. 519-520 (1947). Others have attacked the
historical accuracy of non-preferentialist rhetoric. Leonard Levy, for example, demonstrates that early
American concerns over the establishment of religion could not be reduced to the question of a state church.
The Establishment Clause. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, and London: Collier Macmillan
Publishers, 1986) passim.
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established in Seeger.) Such an approach effectively characterizes individual religions in
term s of a personal orientation tow ards statem ents denoting som ething about a
cosmological order. As a body of doctrines, each religion embodies an argum entative
stance about cosmological themes. Each religion is therefore comprehensive inasmuch as it
provides a place for all possible objects of discourse, and yet each religion is also exclusive
inasmuch as it is inconsistent with alternative cosmological systems. Hence, the ability to
differentiate one religion from another emerges rather paradoxically out of the conventions
o f polemic discourse.
A number of problems, both practical and theoretical, can be seen to stem from this
tension between the reductive scope of a religious system and the prospect of a general
theory dealing with the variety of individuated religions. Clifford Geertz, for example,
began his famous essay on religion with the following selection from George Santayana:
Any attempt to speak without speaking a particular language is not m ore hopeless
than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in particular . . . Thus every
living and healthy religion has a marked idiosyncrasy. Its power consists in its special and
surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. The vistas it opens
and the mysteries it propounds are another world to live in; and another world to live inwhether we expect ever to pass wholly over into it or no-is what we mean by having a
religion.242
Having thus, indicated the exhaustive scope of any particular religious discourse, Geertz
proceeds to articulate and expound upon a general theory of religion, thereby reducing the
great variety of religious discourse to a single paradigm. He writes:
(1) A system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting
m oods and motivations in men by (3) form ulating conceptions of a general order of
experience and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of facticity that (5) the
moods and motivations seem uniquely r e a l i s t i c . 2 4 3

242ciifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essavs bv Clifford Geertz. (New York: Basic
Books, Inc. Publishers, 1973) 8 8 . The original passage is taken from George Santayana, "Reason in
Religion," The Life o f Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. One Volume Edition, Revised by the
author in collaboration with Daniel Cory, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955) 180.
243Geertz, 90.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
O f course, Geertz presupposes a distinctive order of reality inherent to the conditions of his
own discourse at the same time that he describes "religion" as a body of symbols defining a
distinct order o f reality. Geertz calls our attention to the layer o f symbolic discourse
associated w ith religious propositions, but the discursive conventions used in
dissem inating his views index an order of reality that one might also consider a form of
religion.244 One may notice for instance that his focus on the symbolic nature of religion is
particularly consistent with modem notions of social organization in which "man has
created God," so to speak. Such a position has indeed been spelled out in the form of an
explicit set of religious doctrines, that of Secular Humanism.245 So Geertz's definition of
"religion" is potentially self-referential, though this does not make his account incoherent.
One need not attribute any personal agenda to Geertz himself; the point is that he has
adopted a language which presupposes facets of a specific world view, and that world view
may at times conflict with the religions that Geertz himself seeks to describe.
A similar set of reflexive structural features creates a substantial problem for the
appellate courts dealing with First Amendment cases. The courts must protect the religious
freedom of American citizens while presuming the principles of a cosmological order which
could itself be described as a religious perspective. Perhaps the problem would not be so
distressing were it not for the fact that the First Amendment serves both to affirm a right of
religious freedom and to preclude its establishment as well. This entails a conceptual
dilem m a in that the affirmation of religious rights necessitates a working definition of
"religion," but any bias contained in a working definition of religion could be construed as
a covert establishment of religion. Hence, the courts must somehow maintain a distinction

244c.f. John R. Farella, The Main Stalk: A Synthesis of Navaio Philosophy. (Tucson. Arizona:
University of Arizona Press, 1984) 6.
245see, for example, Paul Kurtz, ed.. The Humanist Manifestos I & U, (1973. Buffalo, New York:
Promethius Books, 1984) passim. Note that the claim made above is not that the definition offered by
Clifford Geertz is intended as a piece of Humanist philosophy, but that the assumptions which make his
approach to religion possible are not without cosmological implications, implications which have been
spelled out in other contexts as a form of religion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 13
betw een the "religion" contem plated under the First Am endment and the potentially
"religious" perspectives implicit in the principles of the First Amendment jurisprudence.
The exclusion of "religion" from government activities may itself provide a clue into
the cosm ological order presupposed in American constitutionalism. As a critical part of
American social order much o f the historical and cultural implications of this principle are
commonly taken for granted. Leonard Levy, for instance, writes,
. . . the establishment clause functions to depoliticize religion; it thereby helps to defuse
potentially explosive situation. The clause substantially removes religious issues from the
ballot box and from politics. Mr. Dooley, Finnley Peter Dunne's irrepressible Irish wit,
whom Justice Frankfurter called 'a great philosopher,' said of church and state: 'Rellijon is
a quare thing, be itself it's all right. But sprinkle a little pollyticks into it an' dinnymit is
bran flour com pared with it. Alone it prepares a man for a better life. Combined with
poly ticks it hurries him to it.'246
The establishm ent clause appears in this passage as a limitation on the possibility of
arbitrary connections between religion and the government; a check against corruption of
both the state and the clergy. Yet, the assumption that such connections are themselves
arbitrary is itself a crucial commentary on the cultural order informing the construction and
implementation of the Constitution. Granting the assumption that no substantial meaning is
lost to the area of religion by removing official connections to politics, the Establishment
clause appears to be a fantastic innovation in the development o f human freedom. W here
this assumption is not valid the principle itself negates an essential component of religious
freedom. Thus, depending on the religion in question, the Free Exercise and Establishment
clauses of the First Amendment may serve contrary interests.
The fabled separation of church and state in American life would have a substantial
impact on areas of discourse in which religious authorities might be expected to have a say
in government policy. So, the exclusion of religion from political discourse may serve as
an index o f political interests inconsistent with religious authority. The terms of the First
Amendment may reflect a comodified sense of land tenure and labor relations, for example.

246Levy, ix.
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indexing a social order regulating public life according primarily to market values.247
W hen Taos Pueblo asserted both a political and a religious interest in Blue Lake, for
example, this violated the cultural sensibilities of Congressmen accustomed to land claims
defined according to economic values. One could interpret their subsequent complaints
about a 48,000 acre church, as a reflection of the vested interests of commercial enterprises
such as logging (see above). This is not to say that such complaints do not reflect genuine
value propositions about the role that religion should play in American society; it is only to
suggest that such propositions also reflect the relatively limited role that religion already
plays in American society. The Constitution can therefore be read as a blueprint for the
economic enterprises of a colonial elite, but more importantly, it may also be read as a
document presupposing a world view which was already quite distinct from that implicit in
Christian ceremonies.
In contrast to the industrial and political revolutions o f Europe; a place wherein
market values had to compete for a time with the claims of the church, nobility, and a host
of related institutions; little stood in the way of economic development in North America.
Whereas the French and British experienced the growth of Capitalism as a complex series
of internal reforms, their counterparts in North America had merely to dispossess the
n a t i v e s .248

This left Americans in an ideal position to fashion a political system based

largely on bourgeois social theory, itself a rationalization of bourgeois social

p r a c tic e .2 4 9

247c.f. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. (1957.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) 68-76.
248c.f. E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age o f Revolution: 1789-1848. (New York: New American Library, 1962)
182-183.
249on the relationship between social contract theory and the the actual conditions o f bourgeois social
organization, see C.B. Macperson, The Political Theorv of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke.
(1962. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 1-106 passim; Marshall Sahlins, Culture and
Practical Reason. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 50-54; Marshall Sahlins,
Stone Age Economics. (New York: Aldine, 1972) 1-39 passim.
On the relationship between such theories and American political discourse, see for example, Robert N.
Bellah, "The Revolution and the Civil Religion," Religion and the American Revolution, eds., Jerold C.
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The Constitutional perspective on the relationship between religion and government reflects
a historical subordination of both to market values. The presumption that links between
religion and the State constituted an arbitrary and dangerous political arrangement signals
the degree to which colonists had already grown accustomed to a public life free of direct
links to religious authority.
So, it appears that the separation of religious authority from the practice of
government is itself an index of the degree to which religion has become a privatized area
of American social practice. And yet, this separation of religion from government does
create a certain amount of tension for most Americans, and in practice the division has
never been complete. Alexis de Tocqueville once observed that:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government o f society, but it must
nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of political institutions o f that country; for if it
does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions. I do not know
whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion, for who can search the human
heart? but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican
institutions.250
Along a similar vein of thought Will Herberg suggests that; "America seems to be at once
the most religious and the most secular of nations."25i The Reverend Billy Graham must
have been pointing to much the same thing when he suggested in som ew hat more
derogatory terms that m odem W estern culture "has become a mixture o f paganism and
C h r i s t i a n i t y . "252

Although each of these remarks are framed in reference to something

along the lines of an essential national character (a theoretically disreputable venture
indeed), they may yet describe something important about the discursive conventions of

Brawer, Sidney E. Mead, and Robert N. Bellah, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) 55-73 passim; Michael
Parenti, Democracy for the Few. (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1988) 54-68 passim.
250Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexis De Tocqueville on Democracy. Revolution, and Society: Selected
Writings, ed. John Stone and Stephen Mennell, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) 93.
25'W ill Herberg, Protestant. Catholic. Jew: An Essav in American Religious Sociology. (1955. Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960) 3.
252Billy Graham, World Aflame. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) 42.
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Am erican politics. The formal separation of religion and government has not prevented
Americans from combining the two in a variety of informal patterns of discourse.
Official government institutions may even invoke explicit religious themes from
time to time. The phrase "In God We Trust" is printed on United States Currency, for
exam ple, and both Congress and the Supreme Court open with a prayer. Such obvious
references to religious themes constitute a kind of civil religion, a set of institutions that has
proven very difficult for Constitutional theorists to

g r a s p .2 5 3

This concept comes from the

writings of Robert Bellah, who defines "civil religion" as a "transcendent reality" which
inform s "the life of every

p e o p le ." 2 5 4

Bellah argued that institutions o f governm ent

presuppose a form o f cosmology, thus illustrating that such instances o f official religious
rhetoric reflect a systematic feature of political discourse. The invocation of quasi-religious
themes may therefore constitute a ritual performance every bit as powerful as one might
expect to find in a sectarian church.
Explicit references to religious themes are but the tip of the iceberg when it comes to
civil religion. Most political rhetoric carries an abundance of cosmological imagery, but this
imagery is normally implicit in government proceedings. The very notion that humans are
endowed with "natural rights," for example, serves to project the dimensions of bourgeois
social practice onto the universe itself. Such notions effectively transform the interactional
fram ew ork of American government into cosmological principles. The very distinction
between the civil religion normally implicit in government procedures and explicit sectarian
religion can therefore be eliminated by shifting the focus of analysis from sectarian disputes
to the significance o f a national agenda. Vine Deloria has written that in the context of

Yehuda Mirsky, "Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause," Yale Law Journal. 95 (1986)
1237-1257 passim.
254Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. Second Edition,
(1975. Chicago And London: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 3 and ix. See also Robert N. Bellah, "The
Revolution," in Religion and the American Revolution. 53-73 passim; Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E.
Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion. (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980) 3-23 passim.
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Indian-white relations American civil religion presence a crucial rational for the white
presence on this

C o n tin e n t.2 5 5

He attributes the apparent comprom ise between secular

institutions and sectarian theology to the denominational framework which informs many
discussions o f civil

r e lig io n .2 5 6

it is only in comparison w ith explicit sectarian disputes

that civil religion takes on the appearance of an unthreatening, non-denominational religious
sentiment; but for a nation's enemies civil religion is serious business. W hat differentiates
the significance of civil religion from that of sectarian denominations may in the end be no
more than a relative absence of polemic debate over its tenets, a condition which normally
leaves the cosmological significance of American government in the background of political
discourse.

Native and Immigrant Cosmologies in American Law.
The interactional framework of American civil religion does not readily reflect the
experience o f Native American social life. Hence, the prototypical notions of citizenship
informing American Constitutionalism do not speak directly to the concerns raised by many
Am erican Indian political activists. Vine Deloria argues, for example, that one must
distinguish between "political minorities" which are arbitrarily formed as part of a political
process and "permanent minorities" which are defined in terms o f biological criteria or
radical differences in culture (black people, Indians, women, etc.).257 The social contract
theory enshrined in the Constitution is explicitly designed to protect political minorities,
whereas history has demonstrated that other categories of minority status have a longevity

255gee Vine Deloria, "Completing the Theological Circle," Religious Education. 71 (1976) 278-87
passim; Robert S. Michaelsen, "Red Man's Religion / White Man's Religious History," Journal of the
American Academy o f Religion. 4(1983) 675-78.
^^^Deloria, "Theological Circle, " 287.
2^^Vine Deloria, "Minorities and the Social Contract, " Georgia Law Review. 20 (1986) 917-919.
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independent o f the specific checks and balances o f American

L a w .258

Likewise, the

m em bers o f such "permanent minorities" face dramatic forms of oppression not fully
contem plated under the normal functions of social contract

t h e o r y .259

The functional

significance of minority status differs according to the social and historical parameters
which give rise to it, whereas social contract theory (America's civil religion) presupposes
that the problems facing minorities are a function of individual interests. Hence, American
Constitutional theory has been slow to address political interests defined by ethnicity and
gender, and today the difference between these conceptions of minority status often defines
the difference between Liberal and Conservative political agendas.
As members of Indian tribes Native Americans also occupy a role which cannot be
reduced to that of either a "permanent" or a "political" minority. Trust doctrine emerged out
o f a case history rather than a Constitutional document, providing the political authority of
Indian tribes with an obscure textual basis (see chapter I), one that would be unfamiliar to
m ost Am ericans. So, whereas Indian tribes constitute a substantial form of American
government, the specific role that they play in defining the political interests of individual
Native Americans remains unclear to the American public. Therefore, Native American
issues relating to these semi-autonomous political entities are vulnerable to rhetoric which
positions them in terms of a typical debate between liberals and

c o n s e rv a tiv e s .2 6 0

Indian

gambling is often portrayed as a kind of affirmative action program, for example, rather
than a function of tribal jurisdiction (most gambling regulations are state laws). This
asymm etry between the legal rationale for tribal interests and the significance that such
interests take in popular debate cannot but work to the detriment of many Indian tribes.
W hereas the courts can be expected to observe the institutional role that tribes play in

258Deloria, "Minorities," 919-930.
259Deloria, "Minorities," passim.
260c.f. Vine Deloria, the chapter "The Red and the Black," in Custer Died For Your Sins. (1970. Norman
and London: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1988) 168-196.
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defining certain issues connected with Native American life, popular rhetoric frequently
ignores this distinction; and this rhetoric may have a significant impact on executive policies
and legislative decisions. Thus, the legal identity made possible under trust doctrine does
not speak to the context o f every political dispute involving Native Americans. Tribal
governm ents do occupy a significant place in American political law, but they do not
occupy a significant place in the American legal imagination.
Tribal politics contrast with the political assumptions of mainstream America, and
those assumptions are not without canonical expression in American state papers as well as
the writings o f key political theorists and the "founding fathers." This has often made the
reality o f tribal politics appear inconsistent with the precepts of American government; both
in the sense that many Americans find it inappropriate for the government to treat people in
collective terms, and in the sense that the rationale offered by many Indian tribes for their
own practices frequently conflicts with Euro-American norms of government. The same
juxtaposition o f cosmological systems has often made it difficult for Native American tribes
to cope with many of the norms of government imposed on them through the oversight of
BIA officials. The notion of individual rights poses a threat to the specific cosmological
order implicit in tribal patterns of government. Tribal practices generally lack the discursive
conventions characteristic of Euro-America's sectarian rivalries, and so it should come as
no surprise that tribal social structure generally lacks the conventions separating religious
and political institutions. Hence, the formation of governm ent structures capable of
protecting individual rights, including the right o f free exercise, presupposed social
distinctions not generally observed by tribal authorities. Such distinctions would slowly
becom e a part o f Indian life, however, as democratic institutions becam e a part of
reservation politics.
Federal support for tribal government under the IRA brought with it pressure to
observe secular conventions of government; Council hearings, tribal courts, official
budgets, etc. All of these institutions constitute a set o f rituals unconnected to the
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cosmological systems implicit within ceremonial systems normally observed by individual
tribes. O f course, each Indian tribe could build its own ties between the newly formed
secular institutions o f government and its own cosmological system.26i And with the
elim ination o f the Religious Crimes Codes each tribe could continue to articulate its
cosmological system through traditional rituals. In practice Indian tribes generally pursued
both approaches, leading them to observe two different sets of ceremonial systems: a set of
rituals associated with the nominally secular practice of government, and a set of rituals
associated with explicit mythological themes of tribal mythology. The ability to generate
discursive ties between these systems o f ritual organization may be sufficient to provide
each Indian governm ent with a cosm ological significance salient to its own culture,
generating a series of tribal civil religious, so to speak; but the development of distinct ritual
systems had already generated the foundations for separating Indian social life into distinct
spheres of "religious" and "political" activity. Thus, under the influence of Euro-American
notions of government Indian tribes came to possess a form of "religion," that is; a set of
practices that could be juxtaposed with other aspects of Indian social life.

Religious Freedom and Tribal Governments in the Early Twentieth-Century.
Tribal cosm ologies differ from those expressed in Euro-A m erican religions
inasmuch as those adhering to a tribal cosmology need merely participate in the rituals of
the tribe rather than attest to the truth of a select body of disputed doctrines. As these Native
A m erican cosm ologies cam e to be viewed as form s of religion this difference in
participation would lead to sects with a distinctive body of membership. The membership
in a tribal religion generally continued to correspond with the political membership of the
tribe itself, making it easier to draw links between the tribal religion and its official

261cf. Loretta Fowler, Arapahoe Politics 1851-1978: Symbols in Crisis of Authority. (Lincoln and
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982) passim; Loretta Fowler, Shared Symbols. Contested
Meanings: Gos Ventre Culture and History. 1878-1984. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) passim.
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government institutions. This in turn made it more difficult to deal with religious deviation
am ong the members o f a given tribe, because such differences in practices could not be
dism issed as a dispute between sects unconcerned with the welfare of the tribe itself. To
question the ceremonial practices of an Indian tribe was therefore to question its political
authority. Quite understandably, tribal officials have often viewed heterodoxical religious
practices as direct threats to the people whom they represent.
W hen a few residents of Taos Pueblo took up the ritual practice of ingesting peyote
(around 1910), for example, they met with near immediate resistance from the tribe's own
religious authorities. These authorities (the Tow n C ouncil, the Governor, and the
Lieutenant Governor of the Pueblo) argued that peyotists would neglect their ceremonial
duties in the kivas, disrupting the natural cycle of rainfall and threaten the existence of the
tribe

its e lf .2 6 2

Such differences among the mem bership of the tribe itself seemingly

constituted a serious threat to the Taoseno universe, ju st as had been the case with the
external conflict with the BIA and the Forest Service. John Collier would eventually
arbitrate the dispute, leading to a compromise in which the "peyote boys" agreed to keep up
with their kiva duties in addition to any practices associated with the controversial

d r u g .2 6 3

Collier's approach to the conflict illustrated a concern for the religious freedom of
individual Taoseno, but the event also illustrated that such religious freedom constituted a
threat to the ceremonial foundations of the tribe itself. In the end compromise was possible
only because the practices at issue could be viewed as something other than mutually
exclusive religious propositions, a fact owing to the difference between Indian and EuroAmerican "religions." It was not to be the last time that support for tribal self-government
conflicted with the freedom of conscience belonging to individual Indians.

262see Burton C. Dustin, Pevotism and New Mexico. Farmington, New Mexico: Vergara Printing
Company, 1960) 8-16; Omar C. Stewart, Pevote Religion: A History. (1987. Norman and London:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1990) 202-209.
263£)ustin, 8-16. Note that prior to the Collier administration Taoseno authorities found ready support from
Commissioner Edmund Burke over the need to suppress peyotism at Taos; Stewart, 208.
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The practice o f ingesting peyote, or Lophophora w illiam sii, has its origins among
native peoples o f Central America such as the Aztec and

H u ic h o l.2 6 4

The top of this

variety of cactus is normally dried out yielding something often described as a "button,"
and these "peyote buttons" contain several different alkaloids which are the source of a
variety of hallucinogenic

a f fe c ts .2 6 5

The natural habitat of this cactus extends into only a

small portion of the United States, being entirely contained within the borders

o f T e x a s .2 6 6

Yet, today the famed buttons are regarded as a kind of sacrament by members of the Native
American Church practicing throughout North America. The contemporary form of peyote
rituals can be traced to the practices of Kiowa, Commanche, and Caddoan natives settled in
Oklahoma during the late nineteenth-century who popularized a pattern of rituals associated
w ith the use of the peyote in North

A m e r ic a .2 6 7

Peyotism spread from these tribes

throughout North America, creating a novel form of religion as well a novel set of legal
disputes involving tribal, state, and federal officials.
Peyotism is a proselytizing faith, and its spread throughout the Indian population of
North America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated a pattern of
religious diversity unfamiliar to most tribal authorities. Peyotism incorporated nativistic
themes, but the practice of peyotism did not match the particular ceremonial framework
traditionally associated with any particular tribe. Hence, the appearance of peyotism at any
particular reservation posed a novel problem to tribal authorities unaccustomed to sectarian
differences. As peyotism grew into something of a pan-Indian religion it met with
considerable opposition from tribal, state, and federal officials. Federal attempts to pass a
national anti-peyote ordinance stimulated the incorporation of an official organization

2^W eston LaBarre, The Pevote Cult. Fifth Edition, (1938 Norman and London: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989) 7; Stewart, 16-30.
265L aB aue^ 7

266stew art, 10.

267Lagar^g

7 .9

. Stewart, 30-42.
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know n as the Native American Church in

1 9 1 8 .2 6 8

And while attempts to suppress

peyotism at the federal and state level have frequently been associated with a general
concern over the drug's narcotic affects, tribal efforts to proscribe its use generally dealt
with the ceremonial significance of peyote religion as a potential threat to traditional
ceremonial systems.
The Native American Church met with particularly staunch resistance on the Navajo
reservation. Navajo authorities arrested two peyotists in 1938 and charged them with
"possession of dope on the Navajo

R e s e r v a t i o n ."269

Jacob C. Morgan, then chairman of

the Navajo tribe, marshaled subsequent efforts to prevent the spread of peyotism on the
reservation, leading to a 1940 ordinance proscribing the use or possession of peyote on the
Navajo

r e s e r v a tio n .2 7 0

The introduction of peyote rituals into the Navajo Reservation was

not the only innovation then facing the tribe. In passing the ordinance the Tribal Council
expressed a similar concern over changes then taking place in the Squaw Dance part of a
ceremony known as the Enemy Way, and debate over the significance of peyote appears to
have been colored somewhat by general concerns over the integrity of the entire Navajo
cerem onial system.27l Such concerns were directly reflected in the wording o f the law
itself:
W HEREAS its use is not connected with any Navajo religious practice and is in
contradiction to the traditional ceremonies of the Navajo people;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that as far as the Navajo people are concerned
peyote is harmful and foreign to our traditional way of l i f e .2 7 2

268stewart, 222-25.
269stewart, 295; David Aberle, The Pevote Religion Among the Navaho. Second Edition, (1966. Norman
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982) 110.
270stewart,295-97; Aberle, 110-113; Peter Iverson, The Navaio Nation. (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1981)39; Garrick Bailey and Roberta Glenn Bailey, A History of the Navaios: The
Reservation Years. (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School o f American Research Press, 1986) 226-227.
271 Aberle, 112.
272Navaio Tribal Council Resolutions. 1922-1951, (n.d. Mimeo., Window Rock, Arizona: 107-8. Quoted
in Aberle 113.
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The ordinance went on to prescribe a sentence of up to nine months of labor a n d /o r a fine
of up to $ 100.00 for anyone convicted of possession on the Navajo

R e s e r v a tio n .2 7 3

Navajo response to the Native American Church placed BIA officials in a tenuous
position, illustrating the paradoxical effects o f a policy designed to support tribal
governm ents while ensuring that the actions o f tribal authorities were consistent with
dem ocratic principles of governm ent. Unlike previous Com m issioners, John Collier
viewed the practices associated with peyotism as matters involving freedom o f conscience.
Such a view could not have been more inconsistent with that of Navajo Council-members
who were trying to protect the ceremonial foundations of the Navajo community. Collier
deferred to the discretion of the tribe over the use of its own "police powers" and
recommended approval of the ordinance.274 He later stipulated, however, that no federal
employee (including Navajo policemen) could be used to enforce it.275 Hence, the 1940
ordinance remained on the books, but received only sporadic enforcement even after Collier
had left his position as Commissioner of the BIA. The Navajo Tribal Council held further
hearings on the matter, and members of the Native American Church sought to reassure
Council-members that their actions would not conflict with traditional patterns of Navajo
ceremonial organization.276
During the nineteen-fifties the Native American Church sought with the aid of the
American Civil Liberties Union to have the Navajo ordinance overturned as an infringement
on the right of free exercise. In 1959 the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals
delivered what was to be the final word from the courts on the issue. Justice W alter A.
Huxman wrote the opinion o f the Court in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal

273Navajo Tribal Council Resolutions, in Aberle, 113.
274stewart, 296-97; Aberle, 114.
275 Aberle, 114.
276stewart, 297-303; Aberle, 113-119.
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C ouncil. Citing Felix S. Cohen's influential Handbook o f Federal Indian Law. Huxman
established that (1) Indian tribes originally possessed all the powers o f a sovereign state,
(2) Conquest of Indian tribes negated "external powers" of sovereignty such as the power
to negotiate treaties with foreign nations but left the internal powers of self government
intact, and (3) the internal powers of tribal government were subject to change through
explicit means such as treaties or

le g is la tio n .2 7 7

Having thus recounted the basic tenets of

Marshal's theory, Huxman wrote:
No law is cited and none has been found which undertakes to subject the Navajo tribe to
the laws of the United States with respect to their internal affairs, such as police powers
and ordinances passed for the purposes of regulating the conduct of the members of the
tribe on the reservation. It follows that Federal courts are without jurisdiction over matters
involving purely penal ordinances passed by the Navajo legislative body for the regulation
o f life on the reservation.278
Thus, the case before the Tenth Circuit Court failed to meet the criterion spelled out in the
third prong of Cohen's narrative, leaving the matter solely at the discretion of tribal
authorities. Having thus established that no specific law provided his court with jurisdiction
to hear the case, he would go on to dispense with the First Amendment claims of the Native
American Church in like manner:
No case is cited and none has been found where the impact of the First Amendment with
respect to religious freedom and freedom of worship by members of Indian tribes has been
before the c o u rt.. .
No provision in the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations
nor is there any law of Congress doing so. It follows that neither, under the Constitution or
the laws o f Congress, do the Federal courts have jurisdiction of tribal laws or regulations,
even though they may have an impact to some extent on forms of religious worship.279
Thus, the court made it clear that no general appeal to the First Amendment would be
sufficient to gain free exercise relief for the Native American Church, at least not from
actions taken by the Navajo Tribal Council.

277Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 133-34 (Tenth Circuit, 1959).
278jyjative American Church, 272 F. 2d 134 (1959).
279Native American Church, 272 F. 2d 134-35 (1959).
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The Native American Church would eventually settle its differences with Navajo
authorities, but the decision reached in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council
would call public attention to the case law regarding provisions of the Bill of Rights in
cases involving tribal authorities. The dispute theoretically involved questions about
freedom of conscience and the integrity o f tribal institutions. Viewed in such terms, it
would have been very difficult to see how a federal court could fail to uphold the values of
the First Amendment, but of course the court itself did not have the luxury of approaching
the First Amendment from such a decontextualized vantage point. Huxman had in effect
dem onstrated his court's own lack of authority to hear the case, and hence denied the
interactional pattern necessary to consider the merits of any free exercise case dealing with a
tribal ordinance. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit decision would take its place in a string
of cases denying the relevance of the Bill of Rights to matters involving tribal authorities.
The idea that the Bill of Rights did not apply to tribal jurisdiction followed directly
from the principles of trust doctrine. Trust doctrine and the related principle of plenary
power effectively gave Congress the authority to do as it liked with Indian tribes, but it also
required explicit legislation from Congress for each such encroachment on Indian
sovereignty. This requirement even applied to Constitutional principles, and so until
Congress had passed legislation applying the Bill of Rights to American Indians they
would remain without any of the Constitutional protections enjoyed by other Americans. In
Talton

V.

Mayes, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply

to legislation passed by the Cherokee

N a tio n .2 8 0

in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine

Ridge the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth
Amendments applied to tribal legislation regarding taxation.28i And in Toledo v. Pueblo
de Jemez. The District Court of New Mexico ruled against a free exercise complaint quite

280ralton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
281 Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge, 259 F. 2d 553 (Eighth Circuit, 1958).
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sim ilar to that brought by the Native American Church against Navajo

a u t h o r i t i e s . 282 i n

this case Protestant members of the Pueblo had argued that its authorities;
denied them the right to bury their dead in the community cemetery; denied them the right to
build a church of their own on Pueblo land; prohibited them from using their hom es for
church purposes; refused to permit Protestant missionaries freely to enter the Pueblo at
reasonable times; deprived some of them of the right to use the comm unal threshing
machine which threatened the loss of their wheat crop. They (the protestant plaintiffs) also
allege that the Pueblo threatened them with the loss of their birth rights, hom es and
personal property unless they accept the Catholic r e l i g i o n . 2 8 3
In this passage one can see the influence of Catholic and Protestant churches
reproducing old sectarian disputes in Indian territory, but more importantly one can also see
the Pueblo's own struggle to maintain a kind o f ceremonial integrity in the context of a
small interdependent community (not to mention the vulnerability of Protestant members to
official coercion in such a com m unity). Pueblo Indians had long since learned to
accommodate their own ceremonies and those o f the Catholic Church, but the introduction
of Protestant views into the tribe generated a new pattem of sectarian disputes; and this free
exercise challenge to the tribal authorities at Jemez threatened to make such dissidence a
fundamental right and create an official place for such squabbles in the future. Only the
absence o f appropriate jurisdiction prevented this fundamental change in Pueblo social life,
and the specific finding that it lacked such a jurisdiction by the District Court o f New
M exico provided yet another precedent demonstrating the irrelevance of the federal Bill of
Rights to actions taken by tribal authorities throughout the United States. Huxm an cited
each of these rulings in the opinion rendered for Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, building up a case history supporting his own approach to the

is s u e .2 8 4

282xoledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. New Mexico, 1954).
283ioIedo, 119 F. Supp. 430 (1954).
284Native American Church, 272 F. 2d 134 (1959).
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The American Indian Civil Rights Act: Cosmology and Compromise.
If a case history demonstrating the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to tribal
jurisdiction could be seen as a warrant for a judicial decision denying Native Americans a
right o f free exercise, this same case history could also be seen as a reason for passing
legislation. Much as the decision in Crow Dog precipitated efforts to extend the long arm of
Anglo law onto the reservation, the decision in Native American Church sparked efforts to
ensure tribal respect for civil rights through federal legislation. The subject was the focus of
hearings for seven years before a Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights run by
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. Testimony before the subcommittee demonstrated
that substantial abuses were occurring throughout America's tribal courts, many of which
were attributed to the lack o f training and financial resources provided to the Indian court
system.285 Indian witnesses told Congress about a range of alarming practices ranging
from illegal extradition o f Native Am ericans to off-reservation authorities to court
procedures which in effect forced a witness to testify against

h im s e lf .2 8 6

Such graphic

testimony pertaining to the abuse of Indian prisoners combined with the realization that
Indian courts were not obliged to answer for these abuses to any higher jurisdiction,
creating a substantial case for new legislation.
Ervin originally submitted eight bills and one resolution on the subject of Indian
civil rights to the Senate, including one provision which would have literally incorporated

285wunder, 133-34. Some of the more graphic evidence o f abuse by both Indian and state officials came
from field hearings. For example, see testimony gathered at Sacaton, Arizona in U.S. Congress, Senate,
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the
American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session, (on November 25,29, and December 1, 1961)
357-420; See also testimony conducted at field hearings in Denver, Colorado; Pierre, South Dakota; and
Minot, North Dakota in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights o f the Committee
on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session,
(on June 1,2, and 6, 1962) 512-810.
286por these specific examples see Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of the American Indian. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First
Session, (on November 25,29, and December 1,1961) pages 371-72 and 366 respectively.
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the federal Bill of Rights into the jurisdiction of the tribal

a u th o r itie s .2 8 7

Ervin's proposals

drew harsh criticism from Native Americans concerned that such constitutional scrutiny
would prove anathema to the political authority of native "theocracies," lead to challenges
over the criteria used to define tribal membership, overtax the limited resources of tribal
courts with additional procedures, and force those courts to over-emphasize the value of
"confrontation and punishment" in dealing with legal

d is p u te s .2 8 8 i n

response to these

concerns Ervin amended his proposals creating a single bill, known as the "Indian Civil
Rights Act" or the "Indian Bill of Rights," which comprised six of the seven provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Titles II-VII). Title II o f the ICRA includes most of the
provisions o f the Bill of Rights, though not - as noted before; the Establishment clause.
There are other differences between the ICRA and the Bill of Rights. For example. Title II
om its aspects the Fifth and Sixth Amendment as well as the entire provisions of the
Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments in their

e n tir e ty .2 8 9

For the most

part, however, passage of the ICRA established a legal framework sufficient to protect the
civil rights of Indians from tribal authorities.
E rvin attached his proposal to the Civil Rights A ct of 1968, and argued
convincingly for its passage. The same case history cited by Justice Huxman in support of
the decision in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council provided Ervin with
material supporting the need for an Indian Bill of Rights. He entered his own version of
this case history into the Congressional record, adding remarks about additional cases
relevant to the subject and devoting a significant portion of his remarks to the Native
American Church and Toledo cases. Ervin's remarks included references to State v. Big

287wunder, 135-36.
288wunder, 136.
289civ ii Riphts-Riots-Fair Housing-Civil Obedience. Statutes at Large. Title H, sec. 202,94-95 (1968).
For a detailed comparison of the of the provisions contained in the federal Bill of Rights and those of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, see Wunder, 136-39.
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Sheep, an early peyote case which received an unfavorable ruling from the Supreme Court
o f Montana.290 He also cited the case of G lover v. United States in which the District
C ourt of M ontana had denied a petition for habeus corpus in relation to a drinking and
driving conviction on the Flathead Indian Reservation.^^) Ervin contrasted these and other
cases pertaining to tax laws and tribal membership with Colliflower v. United States, a case
which in his terms "virtually stands alone in upholding the competence of a federal court to
inquire into the legality of an Indian

c o u r t." 2 9 2

This single example provided Ervin with

the proverbial exception that proves the rule. The Colliflower decision made it possible for
him to contrast a long string of cases of which he disapproved with a single case upholding
constitutional values, thus effectively articulating his own sense of value through the
narrative form o f a misbegotten case history. Only one court in all the land had been able to
defend the civil rights of an Indian facing the wrath of a tribal court based on constitutional
principles, and it was up to Congress to come to the rescue.
Such a case history provided ample fodder for a political decision motivated by
m uch an historical ideology by now familiar to the history of Indian-white relations. Ervin
had framed the significance of his bill in terms of a projected historical narrative:
In introducing these proposals, I wish to emphasize that these bills should not be
considered the final solution to the many serious constitutional problems confronting the
American Indian. A system of law and order for the Indian tribes of America which is in
keeping with the rights and privileges other Americans enjoy, will take years to develop.

290u.s. Congress, Senate, Senator Ervin o f North Carolina, Congressional Record, vol. 113 (May 23,
1967) 13474. Note that State v. Big Sheep, was decided in 1926, not 1962 as indicated in the
Congressional Record, And that the controlling principle of case law in dealing with the Free Exercise
clause was still defined under the belief action distinction introduced under Reynolds (see chapter 1). This
fact was cited by the court in Big Sheep, indicating that the claim had dim prospects even in the absence of
jurisdictional questions. State v. Big Sheep, 243 Pacific Reporter, 1073 (Supreme Court of Montana,
January 26, 1926).
291 The motion for a writ of habeus corpus charged that the defendant had been convicted without legal
representation, but given the fact that the case took place on an Indian reservation the District Court ruled
that he had no right to representation, at least not one that could be enforced by a federal court. See
Congressional Record. 113 (May 23, 1967) 13474; Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Montana,
M issoula Division, 1963).
292congressional Record. 113 (May 23, 1967) 13474.
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The substance of these bills, however, is an exceedingly important and necessary part o f
this g o a l . 2 9 3
Presented in these terms the proposals would prepare the way for a future in which Indians
enjoy the same "rights and privileges" as other Americans, effectively providing a happy
solution to the plot formed in a dismal case history. Thus, Ervin characterized the conflict
in terms o f individual actors all o f whom were basically "Americans," thus effectively
eliding any questions about the relationship between Indian tribes and other government
entities. This sense o f the historical context behind the ICRA was clearly informed by the
world view described earlier as a form of American civil religion, a cosmology filled by
individuals vested with natural rights. And the historical significance of Ervin's proposals
could be derived from a narrative role projected into the future. Passage of the ICRA would
reverse the trend cases denying federal Courts jurisdiction to protect the civil rights of the
Am erican Indian, providing a glorious chapter in the progress of freedom, a them e
appealing to both liberals and

c o n s e r v a t iv e s .2 9 4

At stake in the passage o f the ICRA was the ability to create a legal foundation for
popular sentiments that the principles of Am erican jurisprudence were significantly
implicated in the relationship between Indians and their tribes. In a sense the Colliflow er
decision had been predicated on a sim ilar contextualization strategy. Justice M errill
Dunaway wrote the opinion for the court in Colliflower. arguing that because Indian courts
act in effect as a kind of federal agency, and as such; they are bound by the terms of the

293congressional record.

113

(May

2 3 ,1 9 6 7 ) 13473.

294xhe final text of the ICRA did not extend full Constitutional protections to Native Americans, due
largely to the fact that its only provision for enforcement lay in a writ of habeus corpus. See Statutes at
Large. Title II, sec. 2 0 3 , 9 5 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . This would allow individuals imprisoned by tribal authorities to obtain
their freedom in the event that their rights had been violated under the terms of the ICRA, but it would not
provide a remedy for civil claims emerging from tribal practices. It initially appeared that the courts might
miss this fact when the district court o f Arizona ruled that the Navajo tribe had acted improperly in
banishing a white lawyer from the reservation. See Dodge v. Nakai, 2 9 8 F. Supp. 1 7 (D. Arizona, 1 9 6 8 );
Dodge V . Nakai, 2 9 8 F. Supp. 2 6 (D. Arizona, 1 9 6 9 ) . In 1 9 7 8 , however, the United States Supreme Court
ruled against a Santa Clara woman who claimed that her rights had been violated when her children had been
denied membership in this patrilineal tribe. The Supreme Court thus clarified that the ICRA provided no
relief for such claims insofar as they did not involve criminal proceedings. See, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 4 3 6 U.S. 4 9 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
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federal

C o n s titu tio n .2 9 5

Read as such the interactional significance of a tribal court cannot

but implicate the moral responsibilities of the federal courts and every American. Hence,
the rationale for both the Colliflower decision and the Indian Civil Rights Act was rooted in
a need to enforce the cosmology of Western style constitutionalism on the actions of tribal
authorities. But whereas the Colliflower decision reflected an idiosyncratic position that the
federal courts already possessed the ritual authority to enforce this position, support for the
ICRA was predicated on the need to create that authority in through federal legislation.
Federal legislation is itself a form of ritual authority, and as M ertz has illustrated (see
chapter 1); it is the proper such of ritual authority for advances into indigenous territory
within the boundaries of the United States. Prior to the passage of the ICRA both Ervin's
position and that of Justice Dunaway could be dismissed as little more than a poetic trope,
but with the passage of this act it would become a poetic trope backed by federal law.
From the preceding remarks it appears that the campaign for an Indian Bill of
Rights shares some of the features o f a sectarian dispute, at least insofar as the images used
to support the bill were derived from a fundamental sense of cosmological order. Federal
and tribal authorities did not share a com m on set of assum ptions about the social
composition of legal authority and its relationship to a natural order, and had this been the
case neither Toledo nor the Native Am erican Church cases would have occurred. The
cam paign to pass an Indian Bill of Rights differed from a sectarian dispute, however,
inasmuch as it was not a function of theoretical polemics; supporters of the ICRA sought
direct control over the practices o f Native Am erican courts rather than theoretical
concessions about the shape of the universe. ICRA supporters did not frame their
differences in terms of an abstract dispute over the religious beliefs.. For those tribes

295colliflower v. Garland, 3 4 2 F . 2 d 3 6 9 (Ninth Circuit, 1 9 6 5 ) . Note also that a similar line of argument
had been attempted in connection to Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council. The defendant's in
this case sued then Secretary o f the Interior, Stewart Udall, arguing that his approval the anti-peyote
ordinance constituted an abridgement of the First Amendment. This attempt to address federal involvement
in a tribal anti-peyote ordinance, failed, however, when the court ruled that no federal officials had actually
endorsed the ordinance itself, James Oliver et. al. v. Stewart Udall, 3 0 6 F . 2 d 8 1 9 (Tenth Circuit, 1 9 6 2 ).
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whose political authorities were deeply rooted in a cosmological order other than that
presupposed in a civil libertarian tradition, however, the act had all the potential
implications of an attack on their world view. The ICRA would force Indian tribes to adopt
an orientation towards legal matters derived from an entirely different vision of social
organization and cosmology.
Congress dealt with the conflict between the prospect of an Indian Bill of Rights
and the religious concerns of Indian tribes, at least to the extent that it chose to omit an
Establishm ent clause from the provisions of the ICRA.296 This decision made sense in
view of the fact that a distinction between "religious" and "political" practices remained
foreign to many Indian tribes (particularly the Pueblos). And yet, the decision is also
something o f a paradox, given the fact that concern over tribal actions limiting free exercise
had played such a key role leading up to the ICRA in the first

p la c e .2 9 7

The principles

behind the Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause are frequently combined in
m aster-narratives explaining the significance of the First Amendment. Indeed, it is quite
common to speak o f them as though they constituted a single provision dictated by a single
principle. And this is precisely what one might expect, given the fact that the cosmology
implicit in American constitutionalism serves to isolate sectarian disputes, envisioning
"religion" as something that can be divorced from "politics." Thus, many would argue that
prohibition of an established religion is itself a cmcial guarantee against infringement on the
right o f free exercise. Hence, the omission of an Establishment clause constitutes no small
concession to the interests o f tribal cosmology.
So, it appears that Congress recognized the degree to which a total separation of
religious and political institutions would undermine the ritual foundations of Indian

29&See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill,
1982) 667; Robert S. Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of
1978," Journal of the American Academv of Religion, LU (1984) 95; Michaelsen, "American Indian
Relgious Freedom A ct Litigation," 51-52; Pevar, 242; Wunder, 136, 138.
297xjiis is a point raised by Cohen, 667n.
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governm ent as such. But to the extent that the ICRA does contain a version of the Free
Exercise clause the bill does require Indian tribes to work with some definite notions about
"religion," thus generating a conceptual isolation between a specific set o f rituals and other
aspects of social life. To the extent that tribal court's must be able to define "religion" in
order to protect free exercise they must be able to distinguish it from non-religious practices
in order to narrow the prospects for free exercise litigation. This same sort of distinction
would provide the state and federal courts of the United States with enough trouble once
they began to deal with the AIRFA, but for now the problem was passed off on to tribal
institutions. Hence, the ICRA does serve to generate a set of distinctions foreign to the
workings of tribal cosmology.
The simple omission of an Establishment clause provided a important compromise,
because had Congress insisted on such a clause it would have in effect canceled the
authority of many tribal institutions. Such a compromise could be made to the extent that it
functioned only within the context of tribal jurisdiction; but the pattem of events leading up
to passage of the ICRA nevertheless reveals an underlying conflict between Indian
cosmology and the social categories used in constitutional thought. The presumption by
federal authorities that the conflict related to political matters cast the difference between
these systems in terms other than the sectarian conflicts defining matters of "religion." For
many Indians this was and continues to be an arbitrary distinction.
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Chapter IV:
Sacred Geography and Historical Ideology in the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act.
W hen the domestic ideology is divided according to American Indian and Western
European immigrant, however, the fundamental difference is one o f great philosophical
importance. American Indians hold their lands - places - as having the highest possible
meaning, and all their statements are made with this reference point in mind. I m m ig ra n ts
review the movement of their ancestors across the continent as a steady progression of
basically good events and experiences, thereby placing history - time - in the best possible
light. W hen one group is concerned with the philosophical problem o f space and the other
with the philosophical problem of time, then the statements of either group do not make
m uch sense when transferred from one context to the other w ithout the proper
consideration of what is h a p p e n i n g . 2 9 8
Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion.
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 came up for a vote before Congressm en
familiar with a brand o f civil rights activism strongly associated with desegregation efforts
following the 1953 case of Brown v. Board of Education. This notable case had given birth
to the famous statement that "Separate educational facilities are inherently

u n e q u a l." 2 9 9

That concise principle would capture the imagination of civil rights activists for years to
come and define the terms of national debate over civil rights long after support for
affirmative action programs had replaced opposition to Jim Crow laws as the primary cause
o f liberal activism in America. Had the Supreme Court merely decided in Brown that the
system o f school segregation at issue had in fact perpetuated inequality, history might have
followed a very different course; but instead the Court declared that segregated schools
were "inherently unequal," thus displaying a kind of moral certitude regarding the case

298vine Deloria Jr., God is Red. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap,
299Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,

347

U.S.

1 9 7 3 ) 7 5 -7 6 .

4 9 3 -9 5 (1 9 5 4 ).

135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
before it through reference to a universal principle.300 The text o f the Brown decision
therefore seems to have offered the notion that separate facilities were "inherently unequal"
as a principle of faith.^o* And indeed this was a principle of faith that many were willing to
adhere to, as subsequent thought would decontextualize the notion into the basis for an
expansive philosophy of civil rights.
Despite the rhetorical stance taken by the Supreme Court in Brown, its decision was
a historically specific response to a historically specific form of persecution. The Court's
famous pronouncement may have been well suited to the context of civil rights activism in
the nineteen-fifties and sixties, but only a perverse inattention to historical context could
equate the moral significance of desegregation with that of later opposition to affirmative
a c t i o n . 202

An equation between either of these issues and the interests associated with

reservation life would seem even more implausible. And yet such an equation had been
made in 1968, (and it w ould again be m ade in 1990). Senator Ervin, him self a
segregationist, had championed the ICRA through rhetoric fam iliar to the civil rights
movem ent (and to conservatives supporting assimilation of Native Americans), but his
efforts actually preceded the major voices o f an American Indian civil rights m o v e m e n t . 2 0 3
Radical Native American political activism would reach its peak o f public attention during

390Recourse to the a-prioristic language implied by the phrase "inherently unequal" may be read in this
respect as a kind of affect display, signalling the surety of the court about its Judgement. Whereas the
notion that separate facilities are constitute an "inherently unequal" institutional arrangement would seem to
form a universal proposition easily applicable to a broad range of subjects, the interactional significance of
the phrase is perhaps best read as an index of the court's moral certitude in the context o f the Brown case
itself. C.f. William Labov's work on the affective significance o f adverbial quantifiers, "Intensity, "
Meaning. Form and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications, ed., Deborah Schiffrin, (Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1984) 48-67 passim.
301 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 19541978. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) 34-35. Wilkinson notes that members of the the Supreme
Court had expressed fears that a decision declaring segregation wrong in theory could be undermined in
practice, 24. He also notes that many defenders o f the Brown decision have been reluctant to undertake any
proof that Southern segregation was in fact harmful to Blacks, viewing this as an obvious fact, 34-36.
302c.f. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech: And it's a Good Thing. Too. (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 60-69,78.
303gee Wunder, \24-46 passim.
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the nineteen-seventies; and its leadership would pursue a set of interests entirely distinct
from those which defined the struggle over

d e s e g re g a tio n .2 0 4

Such activists often found

them selves at odds with both liberal and conservative political philosophies and the
constant preoccupation with equality that had grown to characterize debates between them.
W hereas early civil rights activists had pushed for a kind of equality (effectively
framing their political identity in terms consistent with social contract theory), and later
efforts would focus on problems associated with a more permanent minority status; Indian
activists typically presented a strong case for separatism throughout the nineteen-seventies.
In this regard Native American political activism could potentially be equated with later
developments in civil rights struggles such as the "Black Power" movement, except that its
own agenda was generally predicated on a distinct set of political relationships associated
w ith tribal sovereignty. The trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal
government effectively provided certain Indian claims to differential treatment under the law
with a stronger legal footing than had been the case for their largely Afro-American
counterparts. Thus, a good deal of Indian activism centered around interests defined in
varying degrees by tribal institutions, and many activists developed a rhetorical position
consistent with the basic ideological framework of trust d o c t r i n e . 2 0 5
Whereas the Marshall court had generated the legal foundations of trust doctrine out
o f rhetoric which placed a positive value on the future and defined the space of Indian
territory as an obstacle to that future; contemporary Indian activists sought to defend the
space of Indian territory from the oppressive march o f American im perialism . The
rhetorical dimensions of either position rested on a largely identical descriptive sense of
American history, one constituting a meta-historical thesis, or "philosophy

o f h i s t o r y . "206

204wunder, 144-46; Deloria, Custer. 168-96.
205Mertz, "The Uses of History," 678-81; Wall, "Space, Time and Cultural Landscape," passim.
206c.f. Lowith, \ - \ 9 passim; Hayden White, 1-25, 101-120 paw/m.
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Such a m eta-historical thesis (that "U.S. history is progress / imperialism") could be
employed as an implicit narrative theme prefiguring each o f the empirical events dealt with
in a given utterance or text. In this respect the rhetorical stance taken by many Indian
activists has not differed much from the structural pattem employed by Marshall, but they
have inverted the values associated with assimilationist versions of trust doctrine. Indian
political activists typically sought to impress upon others the distinctive virtues of an Indian
land ethic, fashioning a pan-Indian spiritualism out o f images such as "Mother Earth."20?
Hence, pan-Indian rhetoric transformed the space of Indian territory, once presented as an
obstacle to American progress, into a sacred bulwark against economic exploitation of the
American landscape. By reversing the values attached to the structural framework of
Indian-white relations in this manner, Indian activists began to develop a master-narrative
providing them with considerable symbolic capital for use in a broad range of political
conflicts.
In his book, God is Red. Vine Deloria, Jr. articulated the prospects of a distinctly
Native Am erican theology and illustrated the significance of that theology through an
historical commentary on the political ethos of American Indian activism. A Hunkpapa
Dakota with degrees from both seminary and law schools, Deloria had been the executive
director o f the National Congress of American Indians; and his work has consistently
reflected a strong concern for both the legal and spiritual dimensions of Indian life.208
Originally published in 1973, God is Red served to define the much of the religious
thought found in subsequent Indian activism. In the second edition of God is Red,
published in 1994, he would recall:

307see Gill. Mother Earth. 129-50 passim.
308On his life and relationship to the early years of American Indian activism, see Vine Deloria, Jr., "This
Country W as a Lot Better Off When the Indians Were Running it." Red Power: The American Indians'
Fight For Freedom, ed., Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., (1971. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press,
1985) 235-47.
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In 1972 when I was writing the first version of this book, I sought to emphasize the role
that spaces and places play in our human religious experience.
From the invasion of Alcatraz in 1969 to the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973,
I felt that the various Indian protests had a much deeper m eaning than simply securing
additional lands for reservations. At the bottom of everything, I believed then and continue
to believe, is a religious view of the world that seeks to locate our species within a fabric of
life that constitutes the natural world, the land and all its various forms of life. As long as
Indians exist there will be conflict between the tribes and any group that carelessly despoils
the land and the life it supports. At the deepest philosophic^ level our universe must have
as a structure a set of relationships in which all entities participate. W ithin the physical
world this universal stmcture can best be understood as a recognition of the sacredness of
p laces.209
Deloria's conviction that Indian activism had its roots in a distinct philosophy of religion
was in many respects a self-fulfilling prophesy. To the extent that he and others concerned
w ith Indian political rights characterized their political agenda in such term s, they
successfully refashioned an ostensibly political conflict into an ostensibly religious debate.
A nd this seem s fair enough, given the artificial grounds on w hich A m erican
constitutionalism separates religion from politics into distinct spheres of social activity.
M uch of Deloria's position is an essentially accurate appraisal o f the interests defining
Indian activism (a kind of self awareness, to the extent that he himself was interested in the
cause o f Indian rights); but his position also betrays a kind of rationalization of the
categories o f Indian-white relations. At times he seems to load the significance of an entire
environmental ethic into the terms "space" and "place," thus characterizing a presumably
universal structure of relations between all entities in terms more familiar to to the dynamics
of human territorial consciousness. In this manner his attempt to describe the interactional
schema relating people to the environment is skewed by an interactional schemata in which
hum ans are the major actors and the environm ent is confined to the role of objective
consciousness.
Deloria's writings contain many passages attributing a deep spiritual significance to
the environment, but his message is hindered by reliance on the spatial categories defining

209Deloria, God is Red. (1994), 1-2.
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te r rito r y .2 1 0

Given that contemporary federal control over Indian life is normally

defined in terms of spatial consciousness (as federal jurisdiction over reservation lands),
Deloria's attempts to situate the significance of Native American environmentalism in terms
o f "space" and "place" conveys a specific set o f legal implications; but this strategy does
have its limitations. It is easy to see how a general respect for the environment could lend
support for a political agenda designed to safeguard or expand the territory of an Indian
reservation; but it is difficult to see how the defense of such a territory would prove an
adequate response to the threat posed by an American public "carelessly despoiling the land
and the life it lives on." Thus, Deloria's position exhibits a kind o f ambivalence regarding
the dimensions of political conflict between Indians and whites. His commentary moves
freely back and forth between the terms o f a general dispute over the significance that the
environm ent "should have for us all," so to speak, and the particular significance that it
takes for Native Americans given the role provided them within the structure o f Indianwhite relations.
Deloria's more general statements generate a (by now familiar) pro-Indian Masternarrative. He and other Indian activists have successfully used this m aster-narrative to
confer an abstract significance to the concrete circumstances o f numerous political disputes
involving Native Americans. Each particular battle over an Indian policy can then be seen
as another event in a long history o f conflict between Indians and whites over the proper
significance o f the Am erican landscape. According to D eloria Euro-Americans have
essentially forsaken the spiritual dimensions of their own interaction with nature and are far
more interested in pursuing a historical vision in which the environment is confined to the
dom ain of utilitarian values. Thus, it is left to Indians to speak on behalf of the natural
order, report on the proper dialogue between man and nature, and illustrate such a dialogue
through their own actions. Deloria's philosophy o f history allows him to situate any

310see also Vine Deloria, The Metaphysics o f Modem Existence. San Francisco: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1979) passim.
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particular victory for a Native American cause within a broader sense o f historical
teleology, thus portraying it as a kind o f victory for the environm ent with which (or
whom), he maintains, they have a special relationship. According to such a view the major
political interests o f Native Americans are defined by a distinct set of political relationships
and an equally distinctive pattern o f environmental praxis. There is little place for "equality"
in this rhetoric, and a good deal that celebrates difference.
D eloria's works reflected the general sense o f an emerging brand of political
activism, and he sharpened the terms through which its advocates could address a larger
audience. Cultural differences formed a key theme in the rhetoric used by Native American
civil rights activists, and a healthy respect for the environm ent generated the most
recognizable of these differences. By affirming an orientation towards the environment
which was understood to be inconsistent with the terms o f Euro-A m erican social
organization. Native American activists forced environmental issues into the arena of
discourse about civil rights. M any young activists demanded the right to interact with
nature in terms defined within their own sense of cultural order, and they drew frequent
support from elder practitioners of "traditional Indian religions." Thus, it should come as
no surprise to find that environmental issues would play a significant role in the politics of
Indian rights.
It should also come as no surprise that the category of "religion" would serve as a
key them e through which Indians could articulate their own distinctive patterns of
interaction with the environment to a broader American public. The Taos campaign for
control o f Blue Lake had already prepared many o f the themes defining this role.
Americans were by now familiar with a general sense that Indian culture involved a kind of
religious devotion to the environment; and Congress had already supplied a legislative
precedent defining this ethos as a kind o f free exercise interest, at least to the degree that it
could be related to specific features of the natural environment. Moreover, the principle
com prom ise included in the ICRA, its omission of an Establishm ent Clause, further
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illustrated Congressional willingness to accommodate cultural differences insofar as they
affected religion. Thus, notions of "religious freedom" came to form a privileged rhetorical
theme through which to gloss unusual Native American interests, particularly those
pertaining to the environment, as an issue involving civil rights.
Federal lands outside of the reservation system also served as strategic site for
conflict between federal agencies and Native Americans, particularly for conflict falling
under the heading of "religion." Political conflicts which could be located within the space
of a reservation could usually be addressed in terms of trust doctrine, and to the extent that
such issues involved living conditions on the reservation it was often more productive for
activists to focus on this affect than any questions of religious freedom. Enforcement of
federal policies on federal lands outside of the reservation system, however, posed an
altogether different set of problems. Indian tribes could not claim direct control over the
resources contained within such territories, but they could invoke trust responsibilities as
an argument in favor of specific federal policies.
Contemporary notions of trust doctrine were already defined largely in terms of
spatial concepts - as a matter of federal jurisdiction over Indian territories; and so by calling
attention to resources located on off-reservation federal lands Indians could expand the
spatial parameters relevant to trust doctrine while still working within the language of its
basic rationale. Such arguments called upon the federal government to exercise control over
its own territories in a manner consistent with Native American interests. A number of
Indian tribes had a variety of plausible interests in aspects of federal policy affecting
management of public lands, because the very public status of such territories had long
enabled Indians to continue ceremonial practices in remote and undeveloped regions of the
American landscape. As the general public made more and more use of such regions and
environmental legislation mounted, however, many Indians found it increasingly difficult
to practice traditional rites in customary places. A number of concrete interests could
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therefore be directly related to an emerging pattern o f dialogue with federal authorities over
principles of land management.
Throughout the early nineteen-seventies Native American religious leaders sought
to negotiate with federal officials concerning the enforcem ent of laws affecting Native
American ceremonial practices. In 1977 Senator Abourezk, chairman of the Senate Select
Com m ittee on Indian Affairs, began to hold hearings to discuss the m atter with tribal
leaders. On December 15, 1977 Abourezk introduced Senate Resolution 102, the product
o f these hearings, into the Senate on behalf o f him self and ten other Congressmen
(Senators Humphrey, Kennedy, Inouye, M atsunga, Hatfield, Stevens, Gravel, Goldwater,
Domenici, and Bartlett). On February 14, 1978 Senators Udall and Blouin introduced a
com panion measure for consideration o f the H ouse o f Representatives (House Joint
Resolution, 738). These measures would eventually take form as the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act which was signed into law on August 11,1978.
In manner respects passage of the AIRFA appeared to follow the precedent set
earlier by the Blue Lake Amendment of 1970. F o r those Congressmen who had been
concerned about the precedent set by Blue Lake, however, passage of the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act must have been a complete nightmare. The AIRFA was a general
policy statement presenting an open ended range o f possible applications, and by this time
it was obvious that several tribal entities asserted a definite religious interest in a significant
portion of public lands. Thee claims would eventually strain the credibility o f the federal
policy-makers, the courts, and the general Am erican populace. People would soon learn
that the Am erican landscape possessed a num ber o f sacred sites, and that this might
interfere with federal water projects, private logging operations, perhaps even personal
vacation plans. Thus, in 1978 Congress faced precisely the sort of scenario hinted at so
darkly in debates over the status of Blue Lake. Under the AIRFA various courts and federal
policy makers would face a number of unusual free exercise claims, many of which dealt
specifically with the use of public lands. So, in passing the AIRFA Congress had to
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construct a vision of how principles of religious freedom might be applied to those who
asserted a spiritual interest in the American landscape.

Senate Joint Resolution 102: the AIRFA Goes to Congress.
Congressional authorities fashioned a discursive role for the AIRFA out of
ideological patterns familiar to the history of Indian-white relations. Much as the ICRA had
been presented as an extension of rights properly belonging to all Americans, thus invoking
a sense of history dominated by images of methodological individualism; the case for
passage of the AIRFA was always presented in the shadow of the Free Exercise Clause o f
the First Amendment. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs
prepared a report which accom panied S. J. Res. 102; it included a brief statem ent
describing the purpose of the bill. "The intent of Senate Joint Resolution 102" it reads "is to
insure that the policies and procedures o f a variety of federal agencies are brought into
compliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging
the free exercise of religion."^^ ’ The report would follow this statement of purpose with a
discussion of its historical context. This historical commentary served to situate the act
itself within the relatively narrow context of recent events in federal policy; it also situated
the act in the context of broader questions about the social and historical relationships
between Indians and whites. The narrative begins;
Native Americans have an inherent right to the free exercise of their religion. That right is
reaffirmed by the U.S. Constitution in the Bill of Rights, as well as by many state and
tribal constitutions. The practice of traditional native Indian religions, outside the JudeoChristian mainstream or in combination with it, is further upheld in the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act.312

2" U .S . Congress, Senate, Native Americans' Right to Believe and Exercise Their Traditional Native
Religions Free of Federal Government Interference. Report to accompany S. J. res. 102 submitted by James
Abourezk, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 95-709. (1978) 2.
2'2Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2.
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By affirming that Indians had an "inherent right of free exercise" the report served to
naturalize the significance of its own cultural categories, and by linking this inherent right
with the texts of the Constitution and the ICRA the report generated a historical masternarrative in which Congress had increasingly recognized these "inherent rights" (as
opposed to an equally plausible master-narrative in which Congress gradually imposed the
terms of methodological individualism onto the institutional framework of tribal affairs),
This commentary provided everything that would follow in the text of the report
with a solid rationale, one in keeping with the terms of American civil religion. In passing
the proposal Congress would in effect make sure that Indians received normal protections
due them as well as any other Americans under the First Amendment. Yet, this same
rationale could and did serve as a substantial limitation on the significance that the bill
would take in public policy, a limitation which served to m itigate claims rooted in the
interactional patterns of trust doctrine. If the "intent" of the AIRFA was to provide Indians
with a constitutional protection due other Americans, then as many would come to argue; it
m ust not provide them with any protection other than those enjoyed by every other
American. This would prove to be a crucial stumbling block for AIRFA litigation given the
highly unusual nature o f practices for which Native Am ericans sought government
protection.
Following its remarks on the First Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act
Abourezk's report would go on to assert that infringement of Native American rights to the
free exercise of religion had become a widespread practice among federal agencies.^^^The
report further asserted that such infringements were the result of attempts to enforce
otherwise sound pieces o f legislation which had been passed without considering their
impact on Indian religious traditions.^

The report next cited three principle areas cf

2t3Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2.
2 (^Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2.
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conflict between native American religious practices and federal policies. The first of these
involved access to sacred sites and cemeteries located on federal and state

la n d s .3 i5

Next

the report cited a number o f conflicts relating to the possession of substances and objects
associated with Native American rituals; restrictions on the use and possession of plants
and substances such as the hallucinogenic peyote (but also sweet grass and pine needles
confiscated on the suspicion that they might be some form of narcotic), profane treatment
of medicine bundles by customs officials (such bundles are normally opened only under
ceremonial conditioned and by proper religious authorities), and confiscation of eagle
feathers and body parts belonging to other endangered species used in Indian ceremonial
garb (as well as the feathers of common species of birds confiscated by officials suspecting
that they might have belonged to endangered species.^

Finally, the report called attention

to federal interference in Native American ceremonies as a problem in itself; both through
failure to police ceremonial grounds properly within federal jurisdiction, and through direct
interference such as creating an intrusive presence at "ceremonies which require strict
i s o l a t i o n . "317

Thus, the report sought to address a broad range of interests associated with

Indian ceremonial practices under three general headings, sacred sites, sacred objects, and
sacred events (ceremonial practices).
In finishing its summary of conflict between the religious practices of Native
Americans and the actions of federal agencies by referring to direct federal interference with
ceremonies, the report called forth images of deliberate religious oppression. This abstract
reference to deliberate government oppression of a religious tradition carried an unusually
graphic significance in reference to Native American subjects, given that such practices had

^l^Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 2-3.
21% eport to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 3-4.
217Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102,4. Note that the report's reference to Federal presence at
ceremonies requiring isolation alludes to the FBI surveillance practice of circling Sun Dance grounds in
South Dakota in a helicopter. In at least one instance, occurring in 1975, the FBI is reported to have landed
its helicopter and held elder members of the Sioux tribe at gunpoint. See also, Sewell, 431.
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been official BIA policy as late as the nineteen-twenties. This allusion to contemporary
abuse o f police pow er also ensured that Congressmen would identify with at least one
instance of a prototypical free exercise complaint out o f a list otherwise composed of
questions about bureaucratic policies. After condemning such deliberate interference, the
report moved on to reaffirm that the majority of conflicts between Native Americans and
federal officials had been the result of laws which incidentally impaired the free exercise
interests of the

f o r m e r .3 1 8

The solution, according to Abourezk's report on Indian Affairs

was to reassess the application of these laws to Native American religious practices. What
traditional Native Am ericans needed was not so m uch a reprieve from an oppressive
government policy as a new set of general policy guidelines administering the specific
policies of various federal agencies in a manner consistent with the interests of tribal
religious authorities.
The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs recommended several amendments
to the original legislation, two o f which they considered substantial. They asserted that
"Native American religious leaders" should be consulted in order to establish the nature of
any interests addressed through the AIRFA, and stressed that Native American practitioners
should constitute the proper source o f such inform ation rather than "Indian experts,
political leaders, or any other

n o n -p ra c titio n e r.

"319 The Committee also recommended the

inclusion of language directing administration officials to "implement" any changes in
federal policies through "Executive

a c t i o n . "320

The committee members did not merely

want the Executive branch to reevaluate its policies, they wanted to ensure that changes
relevant to the religious freedoms of N ative American practitioners would actually take
place.

318Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102,4-5.
319Repoit to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 1-2, 5.
320Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 6.
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Perhaps the first hint of conflict over the meaning o f the AIRFA came from a
statement issued by Larry L. Simms, an attorney working for the Office of Legal Council.
Simms argued that any provisions requiring implementation of changes necessary to protect
Native American rights; " . . . might be read to modify existing statutory law or to dispense
with the usual balancing of the right to religious freedom against other societal interests. . .
It m ight also be read to require that religious freedom protected by this resolution be
accorded a position not accorded to non-Indian religious freedom under the first
am endm ent."321 This raised two separate concerns, Simms argued; a potential conflict
with the Establishment clause of the Constitution, and the possibility that the AIRFA would
m odify substantial areas of federal law and "preempt" a num ber of State laws affecting
Native American religious

p r a c tic e s .3 2 2

Thus, Simms argued that the act should contain

language stipulating that after réévaluation of federal policies the executive branch should
implement only changes consistent with existing statutes and make recommendations to
Congress regarding any legislation deemed necessary to alter existing statutes on behalf of
relevant Indian

p r a c tic e s .3 2 3

He also wanted a provision explicitly denying that anything in

the act could be construed to alter existing provisions of State and federal

la w .3 2 4

Such

provisions would effectively prevented the AIRFA from directly altering many of the
agency practices which had given rise to the bill in the first place, though they would left
intact the possibility that such laws could be altered by more specific legislation in the
future.
The Senate Select Committee did not adopt Simms' proposed changes, but his
argum ent did serve to underscore some of the ambiguities contained in the act itself.

321 Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10.
322Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10.
323Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 10-11.
324Report to accompany S. J. Res. 102, 11.
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W hereas the resolution was purportedly "intended" to guarantee that Indians would be
accorded a right of free exercise comparable to that enjoyed by other Americans; its specific
provisions seemed to go beyond that. Yet nothing in the proposed bill could be used to
determine precisely how far Congress intended to go in order to meet the unusual needs of
Native American religious practitioners. By requiring the executive branch to reevaluate and
im plem ent changes in federal policies the bill generated a number o f open questions
regarding its own significance. Did it require modification of the Endangered Species Act,
for example, or would Native Americans found in possession of eagle feathers still be
subject to imprisonment? In this initial form (and in its final form, for that matter), the
AIRFA left this decision up to the discretion of federal policy makers. And whereas S. J.
102 did not explicitly deny that it required substantive changes in federal and state laws, as
Simms had proposed; neither did it specify the means by which any necessary changes
might be enforced. On April 3, 1978 the main text of the Senator Abourezk's report was
entered into the Congressional record, and Congress passed S. J. Res. 102 with all of its
attendant ambiguities without debate by means of a voice

v o t e .3 2 5

House Joint Resolution 738: A Little Spat and an Unfortunate Phrase.
House Joint resolution 738 was essentially identical to the resolution introduced
into the Senate, except for one minor amendment adding the word "traditional" to a phrase
contained in the bill.326 Representative Udall o f Arizona presented the main text of
Abourezk's report on S. J. Res. 102 within his own report to accompany H. J. Res. 738,
adding that the proposal would not incur any additional cost to the governm ent of the

325u.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 124 (April 3, 1978) 8365-66.
326u.S. Congress, House o f Representatives, American Indian Religious Freedom. Report to accompany
H.J. Resolution 738 submitted by Morriss Udall, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, Report No. 951308. (1978) 1.
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United

S ta te s .3 2 7

On July 18, 1978 House Joint Resolution 738 came up for a vote, but

the bill met with unexpected opposition on the floor of the House. Representative Udall
framed the case for this proposal in terms of the asymmetry between Christian and Native
American religious traditions:
Mr. Speaker, this country is primarily a Christian country with a large Jewish
population and substantial numbers of people practicing various other European and Asian
religions. Were we to consider legislation which adversely impacted upon these religions
and infringed upon the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion, we would,
from our own knowledge and background be aware of that impact and would modify the
legislation to eliminate the offensive language.
But the traditional religions of our native American people are not our religions and
we are unaware o f practices, rites, and ceremonials of these religions (sic). We have, in the
past, enacted legislation where we have unknowingly brought about the infringement of the
religious rights o f the Indians.
Administrative regulations implementing certain laws have, again unknowingly,
denied certain religious practices of the Indian people.
It is stating the obvious to say that this country was the Indians long before it was
ours. For many tribes, the land is filled with physical sites of religious significance to
them. Can we not understand that? Our religions have Jerusalems, M ount Calvaries,
Vaticans, and Meccas. We hold sacred Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, and the
W ailing Wall. Bloody was have been fought over these religious s i t e s .3 2 8
Udall's comments are interesting in a number of respects. In the remarks presented above
he had openly addressed the prospect of a general bias in favor o f Jewish and Christian
religions, and by presenting this bias as a kind of cultural artifact he had successfully raised
the question without accusing anyone of overtly bigoted behavior. In a sense he had
touched on a kind of structural bias that is indeed implicit within a good deal of legal
reasoning dealing with questions of religious freedom. He even responded to the problem
in plausible terms by constructing an analogy between the unusual interests associated with
his bill and religious sensibilities more recognizable to his fellow Congressmen. And by
continually stressing the lack of malice on the part of federal officials Udall's argument
helped to frame the prospective legislation as a matter of internal policy revisions,
reassuring his fellow representatives that H.J. 738 would not lead to major constitutional

327Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 738, 5.
328u.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record, vol.
124 (July 18, 1978) 21444.
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confrontations. Udall moved on to suggest, however, that the practice of including sacred
sites in wilderness areas and national parks constituted a "callous," if also an "unwitting"
practice under existing

p o lic y

.329

Following his initial remarks on sacred sites Udall proceeded through a haphazard
list o f com m ents regarding H. J. 738. Udall proceeded to comment on the religious
significance that anim al parts, including those o f endangered species, played in many
Indian

r e lig io n s .3 3 0

He also gave assurances that it was "not the intent" of his bill to

countermand laws generally beneficial to the American

p u b lic .3 3 i

He also introduced into

the record a statem ent from the Department of Justice indicating its support for the bill,
given that it was not "intended" to alter any existing

la w s .3 3 2

Udall had himself requested

an amendment striking a phrase requiring implementation o f changes deemed necessary to
accommodate the religious practices of Native American

p r a c titio n e rs .3 3 3

So,

it

was clearly

his own sense that the bill did not require overt changes in existing federal laws, whereas
the ADRFA's main sponsor in the Senate, James Abourezk, had strongly resisted efforts by
administration officials to limit its significance in such a

m a n n e r .3 3 4

Already surprised by

329Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
330Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
331 Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
332Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444. Note that the letter itself refers to the report that
accompanied S.J. Res. 102, and indicates the satisfaction of the department that the prospective bill would
neither provide Indians with protection beyond that of other Americans nor alter existing laws. The Letter
was signed by Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General.
333Representative Udall, Congressional Record. 21444.
334u.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, American Indian Religious
Freedom. Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, (February 24 and 27, 1978) 127-41. Ellen Sewell points
out that whereas Udall merely indicated that the act did not "change" existing laws the administration wanted
to ensure that the AIRFA would not "affect" existing laws. She writes that; "The difference between the
congressional and administrative language is one of nuance. Presumably the Act does not change' existing
law, either because Indians theoretically already possess the rights the Act protects, or because, as a policy
statement, it is to be carried out in conjunction with other laws. However, creating awareness of religious
rights and accommodating them would change the way the laws were carried out, and would thus affect'
existing law, without changing' it,"434-35n.
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the sudden need to argue in favor of H. J. 738, Udall further underscored his own sense
of the bill's limited meaning in subsequent debate (and whether this position was merely a
function o f his own limited sense remains an open question).
R epresentative Cunningham o f W ashington led the attack on H ouse Joint
Resolution 738. He began by disclaiming that he or any of his colleagues had any intent to
deny the religious freedom of any American citizen, but he went on to ask why was the bill
n e e d e d .335

Cunningham reminded the House that members of the Supreme Court had

once denied members of the Mormon Church the right to practice polygamy despite its
religious significance to

th e m .3 3 6

Next he turned his attention to the sense o f legal identity

defining an "American Indian" as it would relate to the AIRFA:
Every tim e we address the problem of treaty Indians , and these are the only native
Americans who have these alleged special rights, what we are doing is to compound the
problem we have with respect to reinterpreting the Constitution as far as equal protection
under the law is concerned, with no special class of U.S. citizen over another U.S. citizen.
Mr. Speaker, I would respectfully yield to the chairman (Representative Udall) if he
would care to answer. W hat is the definition o f an American Indian?337
These remarks exhibit a familiar slippage between issues involving Native American tribal
sovereignty and those involving more fam iliar public debate over civil rights. Indeed
Cunningham appears to have insinuated that legislation benefiting "treaty Indians"
constitutes a kind of affirmative action program to which he would clearly be opposed. He
thus took the special status afforded Indians by treaties to be a genuine threat to an
egalitarian vision of American social order, but he chose to elide questions about the
historical derivation of this status. (It is incidentally not quite accurate to suggest that
treaties are the only basis for special Native American rights, given that official recognition

335Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444.
336Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444. Here it is worth noting that
Cunningham was alluding to a legal precedent declaring that the principle of free exercise applied to beliefs,
but not to actions. This principle of case law had long since been overturned by the Supreme Court (see
chapter 1).
33?Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 21444.
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of an Indian tribe takes a variety of forms.) Indeed the presupposition that Indians are U.S.
citizens (a position long since authorized by Congressional legislation), and that this is the
m ost salient aspect o f anyone's identity in a debate over civil rights, in itself constituted a
major transformation of the principles of Indian law. This assumption effectively inverted
the logical presumption, established under trust doctrine, that Indian tribes retained
authority over internal matters barring specific federal legislation stating otherwise.
Cunningham also inverted the historical trajectory of Indian-white relations insofar as he
seemed to imply that Indians had been treated as full-fledged American citizens, until
someone (presumably a liberal) had decided to treat them differently. Cunningham thus
rewrote history in the process of assigning AIRFA proponents the burden of demonstrating
what Constitutional principle authorized Congress to treat Indians as a special class of
citizens. W hereas Indian tribes are normally presumed to possess rights independent of
U.S. citizenship until Congressional legislation indicates otherwise, Cunningham presented
such "alleged special rights" as the product of an over-zealous (and overly liberal) civil
rights agenda.
N ot withstanding the ideological tangent implied in Cunningham's remarks, he did
ask a fair question; who would count as an Indian for purposes of the AIRFA? Udall
responded by declaring that provisions defining the legal status of Native Americans were
detailed in numerous other instances of legislation dealing with Indians, but he said that;
"for the purpose of this little sense of Congress resolution, it is anyone who undertakes to
practice religion and calls him self a native American and has these kinds of religious
r ig h ts .

"338 In this statement Udall had embedded a vague reference to the technical sense

o f "Indian-ness" used in legal and political contexts. Representative Cunningham, ignored
this vague reference and appeared to interpret the answer as an open invitation to any ethnic
non-Indian to adopt the posture of a practicing American Indian traditionalist.

338Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21444-45.
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Cunningham pressed the m atter o f Indian identity even further, asking; "Mr.
Speaker, would the chairman concur that if one of our M embers should say that he is
practicing the American Indian religion, he would be authorized ingress to and egress from
private property and/ or would be authorized to use peyote?" 339 This rather crude line of
inquiry served to underscore Cunningham's own rhetorical stance in more ways than one.
While Cunningham raised the prospect that ethnic non-Indians might be able to claim the
special status due an Indian, his question presupposed that the AIRFA would directly affect
the property rights of a private citizen. This enabled him to refashion the interactional
framework inscribed within the resolution into a stereotypical civil rights dispute between
liberal and conservative notions over the general significance o f minority status. For
Cunningham the major actors in this drama were not federal agents and members of semiautonomous tribal governments, but individual Americans each endowed with the same
rights as any other. He thus framed his own opposition to the bill in terms o f a rigorous
(and rigorously formalist) defense of equality before the law.
As with any complex question, the attempt to answer Cunningham's inquiry was
doomed to produce an implausible answer, and Udall's response was no exception:
W e will make him (Rep. Cunningham's would-be Indian Congressmen) an
honorary member of the Navaho Tribe if he wants to take that kind of position. However, I
suppose that in the same way in which someone can embrace the Jewish faith or the
Catholic faith, if someone honestly and sincerely wants to embrace the American Indian
native way of religious ceremony, I suppose a person can do that if he chooses.
The joint resolution on page 3 specifically talks about the traditional religions of the
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and native H a w a i i a n s . 3 4 0
Cunningham's question had presumed that the AIRFA would give Indian claimants a right
to enter private property, and by answering this question in its own terms Udall tacitly
essentially granted the presumption. More importantly, his response also produced a
number of telling absurdities relating to the legal identity of Native Americans. In this

339Representative Cunningham of Washington, Congressional Record. 2 1 4 4 5 .
340Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 2 1 4 4 5
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utterance Udall had effectively illustrated the degree to which the provisions of the AIRFA
confounded ethnic, political, and religious categories. As a bill regarding questions of
religious freedom the AIRFA invited a notion o f "Indian-ness" defined after the pattern of
Euro-American religious traditions, a prospect that would render the category quite fluid
and thereby invite the kind o f pretense with which Cunningham was so

c o n c e m e d .3 4 i

Yet,

a good portion of the rationale for this bill actually rested on the political relationships
which bound the federal governm ent to oversee Indian tribal practices. From this
perspective it would have been absurd to suggest that the rights conferred by the AIRFA
could be applied to a significantly larger set of individuals than those already belonging to
tribes covered by trust doctrine. Ultimately, Udall could do little more than indicate that the
bill should affect the "traditional religions" of various Native American peoples, but this
merely begged the question; what is a "traditional Native American religion?"
The exchange between Udall and Cunningham had illustrated a number of the
problems implicit in the bill which would later plague its implementation. The proposal

341 The problem here lies in the fact that such "traditional" Native American religious practices are not
defined in terms of beliefs or faiths; one does not enter into these cosmological systems by affirming a set
o f denotational text sentences. Most of the traditions targeted by the AIRFA for protection would derive
their membership from those who had a recognized place in an Indian community, often determined by
inclusion in the appropriate tribal role. Whereas the Euro-American practice o f defining religious differences
in terms of an ongoing dispute over doctrine implies the prospect of changing a religion by deciding that its
tenets are true, no such profession o f faith would be sufficient for many Native American ceremonial
systems wherein membership in the religious community is closely tied to the political and economic life
of a specific tribal community.
This has subsequently proven to be a serious concern for many Native Americans, given the rise of
various New Age sects and do it yourself brands of spiritualism prone to borrowing from Native American
traditions. Many Indians have seen this as a direct attack on their religious traditions, a kind of theft, so to
speak. Given the discourse patterns of Euro-American theological disputes, this kind of reaction to a
potential convert would seem absurd as the primary discursive significance at issue in such arguments
would always be a question o f truth evaluation. But the discursive patterns used in Native American
ceremonies are defined by other means. Many Native Americans have reacted to the theft of this symbolic
capital as a threat to their communities. See for example, Andy Smith, "For All Those Who Were an Indian
in a Former Life," M s 44 (November / December, 1991) 44-45 passim-, Alice B. Kehoe, "Primal Gaia,
Primitivists and Plastic Medicine Men," and Christian F. Feest, "Europe's Indians," in The Invented Indian:
Cultural Fictions & Government Policies, ed., James A. Clifton, 313-32 passim-. Ward Churchill,
"Spiritual Huxterism: The Rise o f Plastic Medicine Men," Fantasies o f the Master Race: Literature.
Cinema and the Colonization o f American Indians. (Monroe Maine: Common Courage Press, 1992) 215-30
passim; Ward Churchill, Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North America. (Monroe Maine:
Common Courage Press, 1994) passim; Wendy Rose, "The Great Pretenders: Further Reflections on
Whiteshamanism." in The State o f Native America, ed., M. Annette James, 403-22.
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could be read in terms o f at least two different forms of identity; that defining membership
in a religious faith, and that defining membership in a tribal system. Udall's rather flippant
suggestion that adoption into an Indian tribe m ight resolve the tension between these
alternative notions o f "Indian-ness" thus reflected a probable desire to have it both ways.
Yet, he could offer no genuine context in which such a m easure w ould have been
appropriate, and so he employed the deictic marker "we" as an imaginary authority for such
a pronouncement. This usage was completely vacuous, because no-one in Congress was in
a position to make anyone a member of an Indian tribe. Earlier that very year the U.S.
Supreme Court had declared that tribal authorities had the right to determine their own
m e m b e r s h ip .3 4 2

And Congress could neither be sure that tribal authorities would maintain

a tight reign on their membership, nor that they would embrace those who had sincerely
adopted a Native American form of r e l i g i o n . 3 4 3
Once again it appeared as though the category of "religion" shaded rather quickly
over into political m atters insofar as it was applied to Indian subjects, a prospect
inconsistent with Euro-American notions of religion. The problem had emerged in relation
to both Blue Lake and the ICRA, but in each o f these cases Congress had been able to
accommodate the distinctive qualities of Indian cultures through context specific measures.
The Blue Lake Amendments had dealt with only one specific case, and the omission of an
Establishment Clause in the ICRA could only affect the already limited jurisdiction o f tribal
authorities; but the AIRFA would put in place an abstract statement o f policy principles
capable of generating an open-ended set of legal conflicts involving direct federal
jurisdiction. Representative Udall had fashioned an imaginary discursive framework in
which the political and religious dimensions of Indian-ness could be addressed as one, but

342santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
343The Navajo Tribal Code itself, for example, does not offer any provisions for adoption into the tribe or
assumption of an honorary Navajo status. Representative Udall's comments not-withstanding, the tribal
code expressly discounts any interest in such practices. Navaio Tribal Code. Volume 1. Title 1 Through 10.
(Oxford New Hamshire: Equity Publishing Corporation, 1962) Title I § 22.
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he could not ground that image in a plausible context involving real people (much less
"real" Indians).
The House opposition the AIRFA took full advantage of the vagueness o f H. J.
Res. 738 as well as uncertainties implicit within Udall's own statements. Representative
W ydler asked if there was a list anywhere of the sites that Indians might want to visit as
part of their

r e lig io n .3 4 4

Udall attempted to counter by claiming that no such list was kept

for "Baptists, Episcopalians, or Catholics," thus appealing to a sense of fair play and
equality before the law; but this merely served to underscore the weakness of his own
a n a lo g y .3 4 5

W ydler immediately added that "Baptists go to their churches; they own their

churches," thus underscoring the fact that the AIRFA addressed interests quite different
from those normally expected under the rubric of "free e x e r c is e ."346 To the House
opposition H. J. Res. 738 constituted a form of differential treatment insofar as it could
affect the use of public lands, and they clearly viewed this as an affront to the general
patterns of A m erican land tenure. Thus, throw n on the defensive Udall offered
reassurances that the bill applied only to federal lands and that it would not affect anyone's
private

p r o p e r t y .3 4 7

in language that would haunt Native American practitioners for years

to come, he explained that the bill "had no teeth in it," and that it was a Resolution which
merely expressed the sense of C o n g r e s s . 3 4 8 Thus, Udall's most persuasive point in favor
of his own bill seemed to be a disclaimer indicating that the issue was merely a symbolic
gesture. In later disputes Udall's comments to that effect would provide others with
evidence that the AIRFA was always intended to be a toothless paper tiger. After some

344Representative Wydler o f New York, Congressional Record. 21445.
345Representative Udall of Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445.
346Representative Wydler of New York, Congressional Record. 21445
347Representative Udall o f Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445.
348Representative Udall o f Arizona, Congressional Record. 21445.
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additional debate the House passed H. J. Res. 738; with 396 voting in favor of the
resolution, 20 opposing it, and 16 abstentions.

The AIRFA in Itself: An Implausible Entity at Best.
On August 11, 1978 then President Carter signed the AIRFA into law. On the
following day he issued a statement declaring that; "It is a fundamental right o f every
American, as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, to worship as he or
she pleases. This act is in no way intended to alter that guarantee or override existing laws,
but is designed to prevent government actions that would violate these constitutional
p r o t e c t i o n s ."349

Thus, adm inistration officials settled on the w eakest possible

interpretation o f the AIRFA, one for which they had argued throughout the legislative
process. President Carter's disclaimer combined with the statements by Representative
Udall to provide some of the most public commentary on the significance of the act itself.
Consequently, when various courts and federal agencies used these pronouncements to
fashion a sense of the legislative intent behind the AIRFA the resulting interpretation of the
act would generally carried little weight.
The written text of the AIRFA changed little through the course of Congressional
debate. In its final form the AIRFA included two major provisions and a long preamble.
The preamble to the AIRFA affirms that the free exercise of religion is an inherent right
protected by the First Amendment, that the United States has generally benefitted from the
number of religions flourishing under its protection, that religion constitutes an important
part of Native American cultures, and that "traditional American Indian religions"were an
important aspect of "Indian

l i f e . "350

The preamble also declares that; "the lack of a clear

and consistent federal policy has often resulted in the abridgement of religious freedom for

349American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. Appendix A.
350preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
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traditional Am erican Indian

re lig io n s .

"351 M uch as in Abourezk's original report, the

AIRFA attributes the abridgement of Native American religious freedom to enforcement of
otherwise sound pieces of legislation, and it singles out sacred sites, sacred objects, and
religious cerem onies as the key sources of conflict betw een Indians and federal
a g e n c i e s . 352

Thus, in many respects the pream ble to the AIRFA generates the same

narrative pattern that had been used to argue for passage of the act itself.
Through the AIRFA, its preamble seemed to suggest, an increasingly benevolent
federal governm ent w ould begin to enforce a set of rights which naturally belonged to
Native Americans. Such a natural right could be read in the usual terms of social contract
theory, implying that the AIRFA dealt with Native Americans as individuals endowed with
no special rights as Native Americans. And yet, the many references to the role that religion
played in traditional Indian culture could be taken to suggest that the natural right belonged
to larger social units, thus implying that the "inherent rights" in question were specifically
those rights reserved to Indian tribes under trust doctrine. The language of the AIRFA itself
could therefore be used to suggest at least two contrary interpretations; one involving the
political interests of tribal organization, and one involving the freedom of conscience
presumably owed every individual.
The am biguity im plicit w ithin the AIRFA's pream ble facilitated alternative
interpretations of its implications. This in turn made it possible to interpret the pragmatic
implications o f the Act's main provisions according to very different principles. The two
main provisions in the AIRFA read as follows;
R eso lved by the Senate a n d H ouse o f R epresentatives o f the U nited States o f A m erica in
C ongress assem bled. That henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect

and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskim o, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not lim ited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.

351 Preamble, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
352preambie, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 92,469 (1978).
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Sec. 2. The President shall direct the various Federal departments, agencies, and
other instrumentalities responsible for administering relevant laws to evaluate dieir policies
and procedures in consultation with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine
appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural
rights and practices. Twelve months after approval o f this resolution, the President shall
report back to the Congress the results of his evaluation, including any changes which were
made in administrative policies and procedures and any recommendations he may have for
legislative a c t i o n . 3 5 3
The absence of any provisions regarding enforcement in the AIRFA certainly bore witness
to the truth o f Morriss Udall's statement that the act had "no teeth." This absence further
made it possible for administration officials charged with the implementation of the AIRFA
to argue that the it carried few specific legal implications. And yet the AIRFA conveyed
plausible legal obligations for federal agencies as an official statement o f public policy. As
Ellen Sewell writes:
The law does not directly protect religious practice, but states a policy to protect religious
practice. Therefore the Act would be violated not by administrative interference with Indian
religion alone, but by administrative failure to pursue the policy of protecting religion.
Therefore any demonstration that the law was violated would presumably have to show not
only that religious practice was restricted, but also that the policy o f protecting religion had
not been p u r s u e d . 3 5 4
Thus, it appears that the immediate practical effect of the AIRFA was actually quite similar
to the arrangem ent which placed Blue Lake in the hands o f the Forest Service. An
adm ittedly unusual set o f ceremonial practices had been entrusted to the protection of
bureaucratic authorities, leading ultimately to a notion that questions about religious
freedom had been given over to the inherently unstable discourse o f public policy. Given
that the AIRFA was primarily a policy statement, however, it was still not clear just what
kind o f policy the act called for.
Ellen Sewell divides the range o f debate over the AIRFA into three plausible
interpretations. "At a minimum," she argues, the act required responsible authorities to

353section 1 and 2, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Statutes at Large. 9 2,469 (1978)
emphasis in original.
354sewell, 437.
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consider Indian needs in the course o f implementing their normal

p o lic ie s .3 5 5

This would

create a kind o f procedural right, meaning that; "A complainant could show a statutory
violation if an agency had interfered with an Indian religious practice and had never
considered the issue when planning its course of a c t i o n . " 3 5 6 She argues that the law is best
view ed as requiring more than this; at least to the extent that it
accom modation to Indian religion when at all

f e a s ib le ." 3 5 7

. . mandates

"Under this reading of the

law," she continues, "a complainant could show a statutory violation by showing that
religion was restricted and that the agency could have pursued a practical alternative less
restrictive to religion without significant sacrifice to other

g o a ls . "358

Finally, she argues

that the AIRFA does invoke the principles of trust doctrine, and that this could be taken as
an indication that Congress was making its usual trust responsibilities to Indian tribes
legally

e n f o rc e a b le .3 5 9

This last option would render the usually metaphorical significance

o f the "ward" / "trustee" relationship in terms of a decidedly more literal significance, in
affect providing Indians with a cause o f action in the event that federal agencies failed to
actively pursue the new policy to "protect and preserve" traditional Indian religions.
Any theoretical position about the significance of the AIRFA corresponds to a
different sense o f the interactional relationship between an Indian "complainant" and a
federal agency in the context of a court of law. Each o f these m icro-structural indices
(com plainant, federal agency, and court) would receive a different m acro-structural
inflection according to the differences between each o f the positions outlined by Sewell.
For, each legal dispute involving the AIRFA would raise questions about the relationship

355sewell, 4 3 7 .
3 5 6 s e w e ll, 4 3 7 .

357sewell, 4 3 7 .
3 5 8 s e w e ll. 4 3 7 - 3 8 .
3 5 9 s e w e ll, 4 3 8 .
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between Indians and the federal government, or rather; each argument over its policy
im plications would presuppose answers to questions about the relationship between
Indians and federal authorities. Thus, each of these positions refers to a plausible set of
indexical relationships that might or might not obtain in a court of law, depending on the
will of its participants (or at least the will of a judge or jury). When complainants actually
did begin to take federal agencies to the courts in order to press for policies more favorable
to their own religious practices a good deal of the rhetoric contained in those proceedings
would involve subtle manipulation of some rather sweeping historical master-narratives.
President Carter's statement took the weakest possible construction of the AIRFA
(as opposed to the weakest plausible construction outlined above), one which reduced it to
a symbolic gesture with no direct implications for public policy. This reading belied the
terms of the AIRFA itself insofar as the act included provisions designed to create changes
in federal policy, but the reading had a strong appeal insofar as it tied the significance of the
act itself to orthodox notions of American constitutionalism This approach generally hinged
on a sense of political relationships defined through social contract theory; a position
wherein practicing Indian traditionalists constitute a political minority whose interests are a
function of individual rights, and the government's interests (as well as the court's) are a
function of the need to ensure that all individuals are afforded equal protection under the
law. A moderate construction of the AIRFA (i.e. an approach based on the weakest
plausible construction described by Sewell) would characterize it as a measure designed to
shore up the substantive problems of a more permanent m inority (practicing Indian
traditionalists) by creating a positive government interest in off-setting the problems which
they would naturally face in a generally hostile social environm ent. The strongest
construction of the AIRFA would presume that the most salient aspect of an Indian
complainant under the provisions of the AIRFA stems from a specific relationship to some
tribal sovereignty. Having framed a given case under this last set of terms, a court would
have to decide whether or not the AIRFA constituted explicit government consent to be be
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held accountable for any failure to live up to the terms implied by trust

d o c tr in e .3 6 0

This

would effectively mean the difference between the second and third plausible readings of
the AIRFA described by Sewell, each being predicated on the same set o f political
relationships.
O f course, the particular facts of a given case would not always match any of these
master-narrative patterns (practicing Indian traditionalists were not always members of a
tribe, for example), but the vast majority of legal disputes dealing with the provisions of the
AIRFA were actually consistent with any of the preceding approaches. Recourse to such an
ideological position therefore provided litigants with a powerful tool through which they
could contextualize most any dispute and thereby generate the terms of an argument
favoring a given legal outcome. This process involved the derivation of a principle of case
law from a broad range of possible legal precedents through a selection process guided
only by ideological preconceptions about the prevailing social order. This process lent
special weight to a distinction between two alternative visions. "Case law dealing with
Indians is Janus-faced:" writes Sewell "one face is that of Indian law, and the other, the
face o f relevant substantive law, which is applied ignoring the Indian or tribal status of a
p a r t y . "361

Such a m ajor division betw een the plausible contextualization strategies

available to litigants combined with the ambivalent textual footing of the AIRFA itself
(calling on the authority of both free exercise principles and trust doctrine) to ensure that the
legal implications of the act would remain largely unstable. Ideological presuppositions
about the legal status o f Indian identity would consistently over-determine the conclusions
reached by legal authorities charged with interpretation of the AIRFA, and insofar many
courts chose to focus primarily on case law dealing with the First Amendment when

3 6 0 s e w e ll , 3 8 -4 9 .

361sewell, 4 6 6 (footnote omitted).
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dealing with the AIRFA they superimposed the terms used in popular debate over equality
and differential treatment onto the context of Indian-white relations.

The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report : Now About that Red Deitv Again.
Immediately following passage of the act the federal government had a chance to set
the tone for these discussions when it evaluated its own policies and reported them back to
Congress. In keeping with the second of the AIRFA's provisions, a special task force was
formed under the leadership o f Cecil D. Andrus, the Secretary of the Interior, in order to
study prospects for implementation of the act. The task force published its findings in a
report delivered to Congress in 1979. By this time it was clear that access to federal lands
posed the most significant threat to existing policy, and even questions about treatment of
sacred objects (Pine needles, eagle feathers, animal pelts, etc.) frequently implied many of
the same questions as were found in sacred site cases. Hence, the report treated notions
about federal land m anagement policy and Native Am erican sacred geography as the
prototypical instance of a prospective issue involving the AIRFA. The task force positioned
these questions in the context of trust doctrine, thus providing federal agencies with ample
authority to provide Native Americans with differential treatment; but it also constructed an
artificial image of what all of this would entail.
The introductory essay contained in the 1979 report reveals a great deal about the
approach taken by the task force to questions about sacred geography. Part of the task
force's strategy for dealing with that question can be gleaned from the historical overview
contained in this essay. The 1979 report also contains references to a folk theory o f culture
change that serves as an implicit response to fears about excessive Indian claims on public
lands. Both the abstract social theory and historical narrative contained in this document
elaborate on the contextualization cues already implicit within the AIRFA itself as well as
Senator Abourezk's report explaining S. J. 102. The task force effectively used them to
narrow the scope of Indian activity covered by the act along a temporal axis, and in so

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
doing the task force also narrowed the potential space o f Native Am erican sacred
geography that would be recognized under the AIRFA. Through the report the task force
seemed to be saying that the actual claims made by Indian traditionalists would not generate
a significant burden on public policy because; 1) any such claims would be limited to
specific sites, and 2) no new claims would occur. Thus, the task force endeavored to
reduce the scope o f legitimate claims to a finite set o f definite places, and to preempt
spontaneous native assertions of religious interest with a theory tying legitimate claims to
known historical traditions.
Before addressing any questions about change in Indian country the task force first
dealt with a more reflexive issue, addressing changes in public policy towards Indian
religion. The report contains several passages about centuries of deliberate repression of
Indian

r e lig io n .3 6 2

This bleak narrative covers events such as use of the Requirem ento.

W illiam Bradford's comments on the slaughter o f the Pequots, and the development of
Religious Crimes Codes (RCC) listed under Courts o f Indian

O f fe n s e .3 6 3 i n

revisiting the

history o f the RCC, a topic culminating its discussion of Euro-American oppression, the
task force report generated an imaginary dialogue between the proponents o f the RCC and
those of the AIRFA. For, the historical ideology which produced the RCC measured
prospective changes in Indian practices against negative value judgements about generalized
notions o f Indian culture (See chapter 2). The AIRFA report itself places the RCC in its
own historical narrative as a pivotal moment after which progressive changes would take
place in federal policy, leading ultimately to a positive orientation toward Native American
cultures. Hence, the master-narrative principles implicit in each policy contrasted sharply
with one another, both in their evaluation of Indian culture and their sense o f general
trajectory of American history; but viewed from the standpoint taken by the task force the

362American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. (P.L. 95-341. Washington D.C. August, 1979) 1-7.
363American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 1-7.
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provisions of the RCC were both cruel and quite fortunately dated. The AÎRFA report was
therefore an answer to the RCC; both in the sense that it afforded Indian religious traditions
their proper respect, and insofar as it pertained to an event that would follow the RCC in a
master-narrative sequence weighted towards positive evaluation of later historical events.
The AIRFA report thus voiced the interests associated with the Religious Crimes Codes in
its text, only to answer those interests in its own terms.
This imaginary dialogue with the stance taken in the Religious Crimes Codes helped
the task force generate a specific sense o f the interactional significance of the AIRFA. The
major actors in policies associated with the RCC had been federal agents acting under the
authority of the ward-trustee relationship defined in trust doctrine. The AIRFA had itself
invoked trust doctrine in its own text, and its implementation would require a sense of
federal authority different from that implied by the phrase "religious freedom." So, whereas
the task force clearly opposed the values informing BIA policy under the Religious Crimes
Codes, it generated its own authority through a narrative describing the relationship that
had obtained between Indians and the BIA under the RCC. Because the AIRFA hinged on
roughly the same body of legal doctrine that had formerly been used to justify past policies
o f oppression, a discussion of those policies served ironically to help define the
interactional relationship needed for enforcement of its provisions. Not withstanding its
references to the Free Exercise Clause, a principle generally informed by notions of
methodological individualism; the text of the AIRFA asserted a positive government interest
in protecting Indian religion. By recalling government abuse of Native American religions
the historical narrative in the report thus served an indexical function, defining its notions
about Indian religious freedom in the context of trust

d o c tr in e .3 6 4

This in turn serves to

remove the question of Indian religious freedom from the domain of individual tolerance
and pro-minority liberalism and to place it firmly in the context of Indian-white relations.

364American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 7; C.f. James Boyd White, 89-112, and passim.
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A fter is discussion of the RCC the narrative contained in the task force report
provided tangible examples of the federal government's turn toward a more benevolent
stance toward Native American culture. As with the oppressive policies o f the nineteentwenties, the task force's historical vision placed the federal government in a key position
to influence the kind o f changes that might affect traditional Indian religions. The report
offered examples like the return of Blue Lake as visible signs that the trust relationship may
work in favor of Native American interests, and that federal policy was moving in that
d ir e c tio n .3 6 5 i n

this narrative it was the federal government, rather than its Indian wards,

which would grow increasingly more enlightened by the passage of history.
W hereas the master-narrative implicit within the policy framework o f the RCC
framed federal Indian policy in the context of progress and assim ilation, that of the
Religious Freedom Act suggests an increasingly benevolent federal administration. In both
cases, however, som e generalized notion o f Indian culture or Indian religion were
necessary to lend credibility to, and guide implementation of government policy. For the
task force this theory took the form o f a comparison between "world religions" and "tribal
r e lig io n s ." 3 6 6

The task force characterized world religions as "commemorative" religions,

indicating that they were founded in a particular historical

e v e n t.3 6 7

The report contrasts

this with tribal religions which it describes as "continuing" religions, indicating the absence
of a historical tradition separating the foundation of the religion from its present day
p r a c tic e s .3 6 8

According to the task force native practitioners of a tribal religion therefore

operate by definition without any significant sense of history.

365American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 7.
366American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 8-12.
367American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 9.
368American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
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This dichotomy has numerous predecessors in social and religious thought, though
it is probable that the task force drew directly from Vine Deloria in writing the report.369
The sense of the spatio-temporal dimensions of Indian religion contained in the report
echoed Deloria's position on the subject in God is Red. The report assumed that continuing
tribal religions are older than commemorative religions.370 They went on to argue that
continuing tribal religions differ from commemorative world religions in that they are not
based on established truths, because such doctrines are less important for continuing
religions than cerem onial practices.371 The task force inferred from this that; ". . . no
institutions can arise in (tribal) religions," and that "Only one interpretation (of the religion)
is possible in each generation."372 Apparently tribal religions also differ from world
religions in their notion o f creation. W orld religions regard creation as an accomplished
fact, according to the task force, whereas tribal religions view creation as a continuous
process.373 The report therefore concluded that religious freedom for Native Americans
entails a " . . . right to maintain relationships with the natural w o rld .. ."374
Having read this much, one might suspect that tribal religions were more dynamic
than world religions, but the authors of the report did not see it that way. They stated in the
report that " . . . it would be the rarest of events for a new ceremony to be introduced (into a
tribal r e l i g i o n ) . "375 it is difficult to determine how the task force inferred this fact from the
characteristics that they themselves had assigned to tribal religions, but the statement does

369Robert Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 108.
370American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
371 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
372American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 10.
373American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 11.
374American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 12.
375American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 12.
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anticipate one of the recommendations included in the report. To minimize conflict between
tribal religions and commercial interests the task force stated:
The major sites of Native American religious ceremonials are already well known,
and any future controversy m ust revolve around known sites, not any additional sites that
m ight come into being. No tribes that are presently constituted and possess a living
religious tradition can be expected to move beyond those ceremonials and rituals they are
using already. The known shrines and sites originate in creation and migration traditions,
which by their very nature are foreclosed for the remainder of this w o r l d .3 7 6
This qualification ensured the plausibility of accommodating claims to sacred sites, but it
did so at the risk o f arbitrarily discriminating between different Indian claims. By insisting
that traditional Indian religions are inherently static, the task force was able to provide a
rationale for distinguishing legitimate from non-legitimate claims on the basis of historical
continuity. Hence, the report suggested that contrived religious claims could easily be
exposed and it argued that they should naturally be

r e je c te d .3 7 7

The confidence expressed in the report that fraudulent claims to sacred sites could
easily be distinguished from real ones appears to have been sadly mistaken. Moreover, the
report's own narrow vision o f Indian culture may have contributed to this problem by
reinforcing stereotypes of Indian behavior. As Michaelsen later pointed out, the notion that
claimants might not be Indian enough could easily work against them in pursuit of access to
a sacred

s ite .3 7 8

The task force's own distinctly a-historical sense of tribal religions

endorsed an abstract form o f this prejudice inasmuch as it created a notion of social stability
that no truly "continuing religion" could hope to achieve. According to its theory a new
sacred site would not be Indian enough to warrant consideration under the AIRFA.
The report's treatment o f tribal views on creation would seem to belie the assertion
that creation stories cannot produce a new interest in a sacred site. If creation is continual,
then how can a creation myth be so remote from present concerns? Faced with such an

376American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 89.
377American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 91.
378Robert S. Michaelsen, "American Indian Religious Freedom A ct Litigation," 63-64.
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unconvincing argument, David White and Robert Michaelsen issued scathing critiques of
the task force's approach to the issue, arguing that tribal religions were far more dynamic
than had been alleged in its

r e p o r t.3 7 9

Both authors further argued that the task force was

overly confident about its own ability to establish the range o f existing sites, because
sacredness often entails secretiveness in a tribal

r e lig io n .3 8 0

W hite even argued that

limiting application o f the AIRFA to specific sites constituted an unwarranted reduction on
the part of the task f o r c e . 3 8 l As Deloria had himself illustrated Native American interaction
with the environment had global as well as local / site specific implications; but the report
had narrowed its own treatment of the subject to the latter. It underestimated the scope of
geography sacred to Native Americans as much as it underestimated the vitality of their
religions. As Michaelsen argued ". . . Tribal religions appear (in the report) as museum
pieces, static entities which have little or no relation to the world about them

to d a y ." 3 8 2

The report serves in this manner to make the AIRFA appear less threatening, but it does so
by articulating a limited view o f the activities which could legitimately be considered part of
an "Indian religion."
W hatever the theoretical accuracy of the term s "continuing religions" and
"commemorative religions" as applied to the Native and Euro-American traditions in
themselves, it is clear that their use in the report derives a good deal of its significance from
the history of Indian-white relations. The ideological stance implicit in trust doctrine defines
the role that Indians play in American history in terms of spatial concepts, and government
policy based on trust doctrine has always been predicated on an impoverished sense of

379David R. M. White, "Native American Religious Issues . , . Also Land Issues," 39-44 passim;
Michaelsen, "The Significance o f the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 106-109.
380[)avid White, 42; Michaelsen, "The Significance o f the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 108.
381 David White, 42.
382Michaelsen, "The Significance of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act," 107. Note that the
image of a museum piece implies an impoverished sense of both space and time inasmuch as such an object
would insulated from the dynamics of history and presented in an isolated visual for the benefit o f a viewing
public.
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history as it relates to Indian culture. Likewise the significance that history plays in
reference to "world religions" in the report is clearly overdeterm ined by the claim to
historical agency made by any government policy under trust doctrine. The task force's
references to "commemorative" religions pertain directly to (Jew ish and Christian)
traditions closely identified with its own membership. In fact the task force seem ed to
recognize that it derived its own ritual authority from a kind of world religion, because the
report clearly identifies "commemorative" religions as the source of government authority
in the recognition of "natural

l a w . "383

Thus, the task force report itself identified the link

between its notions about world religion and the cosmological precepts of American civil
religion, precepts which defined its own interests in safe-guarding a right o f free exercise.
So, all questions about the theoretical accuracy o f the dichotom y betw een
"commemorative" and "continuing" religions aside; the distinction carries an indexical
function insofar as it is clear that federal authority is rooted in a "commemorative religion,"
and Native American tribal cosmologies are consistently translated into the form of a
"continuing religion" insofar as they relate to federal policy. Hence, the interaction between
Native Americans and federal officials could be seen in terms of the report as an interaction
between adherents to a "commemorative" world religion and those of a "continuing" tribal
religion.
The task force had articulated both a historical narrative and a social theory
purportedly describing the interests of Native American religious practitioners, and each of
these turned out to be self-referential. Through its Introduction and Historical Overview,
therefore, the report served to recontextualize the subject of Indian religious freedom in
terms o f trust doctrine, but it did so at the cost of caricaturizing the very interests AIRFA
proponents had sought to protect. In denying that Native American religions had a sense of
history the report came perilously close to denying that they had a future as well. Deloria's

383American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 11.
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original distinction between world and tribal religions elided a number of questions about
the dim ension of history implicit in many Native American

tr a d itio n s .3 8 4

And in its

acceptance of Deloria's theory the task force effectively set aside any political concerns not
fully com prehended under that theory. By construing Indian traditionalism in terms of a
pristine and timeless set of traditions, the report failed to acknowledge the historical agency
that m any Indians hoped to assert with the aid o f the AIRFA. Many were hopeful that
implem entation of the act would play a positive role in shaping the future of Indian tribal
customs. This was unfortunately not the understanding that emerged from those charged
with planning its implementation.

Conclusion: The AIRFA Comes Apart.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act report of 1979 had not done much to
resolve the fundamental ambiguities contained within the act itself. The AIRFA had not
specified any particular measures to be taken by federal agencies, and the report had not
resolved the m atter. Furtherm ore, the contextualization patterns used in the report
contrasted with those expressed by Representative Udall and President Carter in passing
the AIRFA. So, it remained unclear to whether the AIRFA should be read as a function of
federal policy interests in Indian welfare or as a recognition of the right of free exercise, a
principle norm ally envisioned as a limit on government interests. Federal agencies were
more concerned with policy objectives defined long before passage of the AIRFA; and so
they typically responded to it by providing for minor concessions to Indian traditionalists,
and by arguing for the least significant interpretation of the act itself when pressed into legal
disputes over their policies.

384see Raymond Fogelson, "Interpretations of the American Indian Psyche: Some Historical Notes," ed.,
June Helm, The Social Context of American Ethnology; Proceedings of the American Ethnological
Society. (1985) 23.
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A num ber of diverse agencies declined to participate in task force hearings
indicating that policy planners foresaw little to no potential conflict between themselves and
practicing Native American

tr a d itio n a lis ts .3 8 5

Participating agencies generally reviewed

their policies and accommodated Indian practices insofar as the latter did not conflict with
any significant policy goals. For example, the U.S. Customs Service opened a dialogue
with the Am erican Indian Law Center and the Native American Rights Fund as well as
individual representatives from a number o f Indian tribes and religious traditions, thus
im proving com m unications betw een them selves and practicing N ative A m erican
tr a d itio n a lis ts .3 8 6

This in itself solved a number of problems by clarifying procedures and

ensuring that Indians were able to take full advantage of existing policy provisions; but the
Customs Service was unable to completely resolve questions regarding the examination of
medicine bundles or treaty rights involving duty free passage across the U.S. - Canadian
b o r d e r .3 8 7

M ore importantly none of the major agencies concerned with the management

of federal Lands (the Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Land
Management) adopted specific changes in their policy procedures; though each incorporated
incorporated language expressing concern for Native American cultural values in their
general statem ents of

p r o c e d u r e .3 8 8

Clearly the notion of religious freedom m ade an

anticlimactic appearance as a function of bureaucratic policy. The stage was set following
publication of the 1979 report for legal conflict over the meaning o f the AIRFA, and Indian
traditionalists consistently lost this conflict.

385see American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 19-21.
386American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 36-38.
387American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. 38.
388American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report. (Forest Service) 26-27, (Bureau of Land Management)
33, and (National Park Service) 35; see also Steven C. Moore, Sacred Sites and Public Lands, in Handbook
of American Indian Religious Freedom, ed., Christopher Vecsey, 84-87.
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It had never been particularly clear whether or not the AIRFA was intended as a
means of fulfilling the government's responsibilities to its Native American wards or as a
m eans of lim iting the negative impact that governm ent policy would have on the
practitioners o f traditional Indian religions. The difference had remained unclear so long as
debate over the AIRFA took place in the context of legislative and executive committees,
but subsequent legal disputes involving the AIRFA required that someone decide on one or
the other interpretation of the act. The courts consistently sided with federal agencies on
thus matter, and they interpreted the AIRFA as a mere reiteration of the First Amendment.
This generally led the courts to adopt the balancing test as a means o f deciding AIRFArelated cases, and undermined the ability of AIRFA claimants to invoke federal trust
responsibilities. The courts therefore modeled the relationship between Indians and the
federal government in terms of a conflict between individual freedom o f conscience and
oppressive government interests rather than a claim to government support.
Under these circumstances AIRFA-related cases consistently foundered on the same
problem s w hich had plagued Taos proponents in the battle for B lue Lake and
Congressional advocates of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The inability to differentiate Indian
religions from other tribal institutions made it possible for AIRFA claimants to express a
religious interest in aspects of government policy normally treated as secular matters. Each
of these claims, however, raised novel questions about the relationship between religion
and American government. Just as Senator M etcalf had been skeptical about the notion of a
48,000 acre church surrounding Blue Lake, various courts also doubted that AIRFArelated cases could involve a substantial right o f free exercise. The courts consistently
denied that sacred site claims involved a burden on Indian rights of free exercise,
imprisoned ceremonial practitioners for the taking of endangered species, minimized the
importance of inmate's religious practices, and ultimately rejected even the long established
legal accommodations for the Native American Church. AIRFA-related cases generally
came apart whenever they were subjected to the usual terms of the balancing test, and hence
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the very rhetoric of religious freedom which had made the AIRFA possible became a
serious liability to AIRFA claimants in the years following its passage.
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